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1 
Introduction 
Wei-Chiao Huang and Huizhong Zhou
Western Michigan University 
It is a market economy, it is a nonmarket economy. It is capitalist, it 
is communist. It is a superpower, it is a developing country. It is a world 
factory, it is a global polluter. It is a nation of innovation, it is a nation 
of imitation. Its people are thriving, its people are suffering. It brings 
wealth to us, it takes jobs away from us. Such are the varied percep-
tions of a nation called China. In spite of frequent and ever-growing 
exchanges between the United States and China in business, culture, 
tourism, and almost all other aspects of social activities, in spite of over-
whelming media coverage about China and extensive research, to many 
Americans, China is still a dragon behind a mist curtain. 
Diverse, even diametrically opposed views of China reflect China’s 
multiple, complicated, and ever-changing facets on the one side, and 
lack of understanding and historical and ideological biases on the other. 
In addition, like any bilateral and global trade, China’s rise and its rela-
tions with the United States will inevitably create winners and losers, 
although the gains outweigh the losses for both China and the United 
States. For example, while large amounts of imports have made abun-
dant goods and services available to Americans at affordable prices for 
the last two decades, they have replaced some domestic manufacturing 
businesses and jobs. The different experiences or prospects of the con-
sequences of U.S.-China relations will certainly affect the perceptions 
and views of China. 
The 2010–2011 Werner Sichel Economics Lecture Series, “Dragon 
versus Eagle: The Chinese Economy and U.S.-China Economic Rela-
tions,” invited six prominent scholars to deliver lectures on China’s 
economic development and power, the driving forces of its growth, 
its trade relations with the United States, and the impacts on the U.S. 
economy. We are pleased to present the edited version of their lectures 
in this collection. 
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2 Huang and Zhou 
The primary concern from the U.S. perspective is, unsurprisingly, 
U.S.-China relations, especially as they relate to economics. The eco-
nomic relationship between the United States and China is crucially 
important for both countries because they depend on each other; they 
are integrated. The United States relies on China for cheap consumer 
products and for financing the U.S. debt, while China relies on the 
United States for export markets, technology, and foreign direct invest-
ment. China is the second-largest trading partner of the United States, 
with a total volume of imports and exports of $457 billion in 2010. The 
long-term trend in the U.S. trade deficit remains a key policy concern 
for the United States and its global trading partners. The overall U.S. 
merchandise trade deficit increased to $915.6 billion in 2006. China’s 
share in the merchandise trade deficit raised particular concern. The 
deficit with China increased rapidly and reached $235 billion in 2006 
and $273 billion in 2010. In addition, China is the largest creditor of the 
United States, holding $1.12 trillion in U.S. Treasury bills, according to 
the U.S. Federal Reserve. 
Robert B. Koopman, in his chapter titled “U.S.-China Economic 
Relations and Value Chains in Global Production Networks,” points out 
that while much attention has been paid to the increasing merchandise 
trade imbalance with China, it is useful to consider this trade relation-
ship in a broader context. He brings our attention to the changes in the 
composition of the United States with a number of its main trading 
partners. In 1989, imports from the United States’ largest Asian partners 
(Japan, China, Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Singapore) accounted 
for 43.9 percent of U.S. non-oil imports. By 2007, the same share had 
dropped slightly to 41.5 percent. During this period, the U.S. share of 
imports from many of its other Asian partners declined. Between 1989 
and 2007, the combined share of Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Sin-
gapore, and other Asian countries in U.S. non-oil imports dropped from 
41.1 percent to 20.9 percent. Thus, much of China’s increasing share of 
U.S. non-oil imports came at the expense of other Asian countries, par-
ticularly Japan, which dropped from 22 percent to 8.9 percent of U.S. 
non-oil imports during the same period. 
To fully understand what was happening in global trade flows, 
Koopman’s research delves further into value-added components of 
trade. By focusing on gross values of exports and imports, traditional 
trade statistics give us a distorted picture of trade imbalances between 
 
 
 
 
  
Introduction 3 
countries. Value-added trade statistics help reveal the real economic 
impacts of global trade on domestic and foreign countries. The value-
added approach demonstrates that many countries may add value to a 
particular good or service in a global supply chain, and that attributing 
the entire export value to the last exporting country can provide a mis-
leading picture of the sources of value in trade. 
China is often the final assembler in a large number of global supply 
chains, and it uses components from many other countries to produce 
its exports. Since processing exports have accounted for more than 50 
percent of China’s exports every year since 1996, imported intermediate 
inputs used in production for exports are contributed by other countries, 
including the United States. Accounting for value added, the contribu-
tion of China to the U.S. trade deficit differs substantially from what the 
traditional trade data suggest. The U.S.-China trade deficit on a value-
added basis is considerably smaller (by about 40 percent in 2004) than 
on the commonly reported basis of official gross trade. By contrast, 
Japan exports parts and components to countries throughout Asia; many 
of these components are eventually assembled into final products and 
exported to the United States. Thus, the U.S.-Japan trade balance on 
a value-added basis is larger than the comparable gross trade deficit. 
The U.S. value-added trade deficits with other major trading partners 
(Canada, Mexico, and the EU-15) differ by smaller amounts from their 
corresponding gross trade deficits. 
Koopman also identifies three major factors that contribute to the 
growing trade imbalance between the two countries and to China’s 
more recently growing trade surplus with the world. The first factor is 
China’s extensive use of policy instruments to encourage its rapid eco-
nomic development and transition from a centrally planned economy to 
a market-driven economy. These policies include, among others, incen-
tives for foreign investment and export performance, the establish-
ment of special economic zones and substantial infrastructure invest-
ment, and a managed exchange rate. A second explanation focuses on 
more macroeconomic factors, suggesting that significant imbalance in 
the U.S. savings and investment rates, combined with relatively rapid
consumption-led economic growth in the United States compared to 
other developed countries, have led to an increased current account and 
merchandise trade imbalance. A third factor has been the rapid growth in 
fragmented global production processes, as businesses take advantage 
 
 
 
4 Huang and Zhou 
of declining costs in information and communications and international 
logistics to distribute pieces of their production chain based on lowest 
cost sources. Although fragmentation of global production has devel-
oped independently of China’s policy environment and is a widespread 
phenomenon, a large part of China’s growth in exports to the United 
States has been in processing trade carried out by the foreign-invested 
enterprises, which have been encouraged by and benefited from China’s 
“imports for exports” policies. 
What is the size of the Chinese economy relative to the United 
States? Is it an economic superpower or a developing country? What 
have been the driving forces behind the unprecedented growth for more 
than a decade? In Chapter 3, “China’s Economy from an American’s 
Perspective,” Gene H. Chang offers a balanced view of the Chinese 
economy and its potential problems. 
The true size of China’s economy has been a subject of some debate. 
Using the official exchange rate and the figures reported by the State 
Statistics Bureau of China, China’s GDP in 2010 was $5.7 trillion, rank-
ing second in the world. This is about one-third of the U.S. GDP, which 
is $14.6 trillion. It is slightly larger than third-ranked Japan, which gen-
erated $5.4 trillion in GDP. 
However, with a population of 1.3 billion people, China is still poor. 
Its per capita GDP is only about one-tenth of that in the United States, 
ranked the 94th in the world. Its per capita consumption of energy, for 
example, is about 15 percent of the United States. In addition, economic 
development in China has been quite uneven, with the coastal regions 
much more developed than the inland. 
To put the development of the Chinese economy in perspective, 
Chang compares the sector composition in China with other countries. 
Economic theory and history indicate that in the preindustrial period, 
agriculture contributes the most value added to a country’s GDP. In the 
middle stage of industrialization, manufacturing and industry add the 
most value. Finally, in a developed economy, the service sector adds 
the most value to GDP. China’s service sector is relatively small, add-
ing value of $2.563 billion, which is about 22 percent of that of the U.S. 
service sector. In the industry sector, the value added is $2.751 dollars, 
which is 85 percent of the output of the U.S. industry. While agriculture 
in China accounts for less than 10 percent of GDP, it contributes a total 
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of $564 billion, more than three times as much as that of the United 
States. 
No one would doubt that China has experienced a remarkable 
growth at an annual rate of around 10 percent for three decades, lift-
ing hundreds of millions out of poverty. As a result, the standing of 
the Chinese economy in the world moves upward quickly. In 2000, 
China’s economy was behind most large industrial economies. Then 
China passed the U.K., France, Germany, and finally Japan in 2010, 
becoming the second-largest economy in the world. Based on certain 
assumptions, it is projected that China would overtake the United States 
to become the largest economy by 2020. 
What explains the rapid and sustained economic growth of China 
for three decades? Many have suggested reasons ranging from the Chi-
nese culture and system to purely timing and luck, but none is uncontro-
versial. Chang focuses on some obvious economic reasons, namely, the 
high rate of capital formation supported by the high rate of savings, and 
the political system, where governments have strong influences over 
the economy and control the banks. 
In terms of fixed capital investment and saving as percentages of 
GDP, China is ranked near the top of the world. China spends 45.6 
percent of its GDP on fixed capital formation. The country has been 
enthusiastically pouring money into infrastructure, residential housing, 
and equipment. The local governments are even more zealous in capital 
spending because large projects are symbols of their performance; they 
get credits for big building projects in their local areas, but they are 
not actually held accountable for the costs of these projects. The funds 
for the investment often come from the loans by the local state-owned 
banks. If the loans finally go bad, it is hard to pin down who was respon-
sible for the bad decision, and the state eventually picks up the tab. The 
true scales of construction and other investment projects are even larger 
than the reported figures in the official statistics, as the local officials 
always underreport their investment to avoid the discipline from the 
central government’s macroeconomic contractionary measures. 
The money for capital investment comes from public and private 
savings in China, which accounts for more than half (52 percent) of 
the GDP. For each yuan the Chinese made, they spent less than half in 
consumption. Why is the savings rate so high in China? Scholars give 
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a list of explanations in line with conventional theories, which include 
the following: 
• Rapid growth in income. As personal income rises rapidly, old 
habits remain, hence consumption increase lags behind income 
increase. 
• A relatively younger population composition, so the larger work-
ing population provides a “demographic dividend.” 
• The influence of the Confucian culture and thrifty habits by the 
older generations. 
• Lack of social security and high medical costs and costs of edu-
cation for children, so households have to engage in a lot of pre-
cautionary saving. 
Politicians and news media in the United States often blame under-
valued Chinese currency for the huge U.S. trade deficit with China, 
though the majority of economists would consider a lower gross sav-
ings rate as a more important factor for the U.S. trade deficit. Is the 
Chinese RMB undervalued? Chang, based on his own research, esti-
mates that the Chinese currency is 25 percent undervalued against the 
U.S. dollar, but 17 percent undervalued against the global balance equi-
librium value, because the U.S. dollar is about 10 percent overvalued 
against its global balance equilibrium value. China’s trade surplus with 
the United States is particularly large because, unlike the Euro zone 
and Japan, China keeps the RMB relatively stable with the U.S. dollar, 
thus reducing the foreign exchange cost in trade between China and the 
United States. Another reason is that China’s export involves mostly 
processing, which employs goods and services produced in other coun-
tries, as is detailed in Koopman’s chapter. 
While China has the potential to be a great power, it faces serious 
challenges in both the economic and political arenas. With a population 
of 1.3 billion people, China is still poor in terms of per capita income. 
In other vital measures, in per capita terms, China appears weak, too. 
For example, China’s per capita renewable water resources are only 20 
percent of those of the United States, and per capita energy consump-
tion is about 15 percent. To curb the population growth, China’s fertility 
rate dropped to 1.54 in 2010. The population will age quickly in the 
coming years. This sets up a “demographic time bomb” for the future. 
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By the year 2050, the elderly would make up more than 30 percent of 
the population, and the dependency ratio would reach 80 percent. 
To sustain its growth, China clearly has to move away from the 
current labor-intensive mode of development to a more technology-
intensive economy, and it needs to increase highly skilled human capital. 
Yet, the current state-controlled education and science and technology 
systems do not promote creative thinking and research and develop-
ment, which are crucial for sustained growth. Under the current system, 
science and technology rewards and research grants are often allocated 
based on who has political influences or personal connections rather 
than on merit. Intellectual property rights are not effectively protected, 
discouraging costly but valuable inventions and original innovations. 
China’s technology right now is far behind the United States. With such 
an inefficient and even corrupted system, the gaps in advanced areas are 
not likely to close in the near future. 
China’s income gap is widening, frequently causing social and polit-
ical conflict and unrest. The Gini index, a common indicator of inequal-
ity (to be explained in Chapter 4 by Terry Sicular), reaches 0.469 for 
China, which is higher than most countries in the world. The Chinese 
Communist government lacks the legitimacy to rule because it is not 
elected by people, and the people have little confidence in it. There is no 
independent legal system or channel where people can vent their griev-
ances or trust that they will be treated fairly. Hence, there exists wide-
spread hostility and distrust among people toward the governments and 
their officials, resulting in many protests and plenty of unrest. China is 
politically unstable under the current system, and a large-scale protest 
that topples the government is not entirely impossible in the future. 
The Communist political authoritarian system is an inherently and 
intrinsically unstable system under which China lacks rule of law. The 
party determines everything, hence impeding not only creativity and 
independent thinking, but also entrepreneurship. Even worse, private 
property is still not genuinely protected. If the Communist authoritarian 
system were to collapse, the resulting political upheaval and economic 
crisis could dwarf any scale of economic recession. 
As Chang points out, the income gap between the rich and the poor 
has been widening and has become an important factor for social insta-
bility. Terry Sicular’s chapter, “Winners and Losers in China’s Eco-
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nomic Reform,” addresses this issue in greater detail, especially recent 
trends in inequality in China. 
China has undoubtedly become more prosperous during the past 
three decades. However, dramatic policy and structure shifts, while 
bringing about tremendous benefits and wealth, inevitably create win-
ners and losers. Economists have long thought that economic devel-
opment is initially accompanied by rising inequality, but that eventu-
ally various forces emerge that will cause inequality to decline. This 
“inverted U” relationship between growth and inequality was first 
proposed by Simon Kuznets (1955) and is called the Kuznets hypoth-
esis. The reasoning is that initially growth begins in certain sectors and 
regions, and the benefits of early growth therefore go to a small sub-
set of the population, causing inequality to increase. As development 
continues, however, under the right conditions growth will spread to 
other sectors and regions. Employment will expand, and the benefits 
of growth will be shared more widely. In the long term, inequality can 
decline. Rising inequality is therefore not necessarily a permanent fea-
ture of growth in general, or growth in China. 
A commonly used measure of inequality, as explained in Sicular’s 
chapter, is the Gini coefficient, an index that takes a value of between 
0 and 1. A Gini of 0 would mean perfect equality—all members of the 
society have identical, equal income. A Gini of 1 would indicate perfect 
inequality—one person has all of the society’s income, and everyone 
else has zero income. The Gini coefficients for actual countries mostly 
range from 0.20 to 0.70. 
Between 1995 and 2002 inequality in China remained roughly con-
stant. Rural off-farm employment became more widespread, contribut-
ing to a decline in rural inequality. Macroeconomic growth during this 
period was widely shared. Nevertheless, other disequalizing factors— 
the urban-rural gap and education-based income disparities—contin-
ued. From 2002 to 2007 inequality resumed its upward trend. It appears 
that China had not yet reached the Kuznets turning point. By 2007, 
in fact, inequality in China had reached a level that was quite high by 
international standards; China’s Gini coefficient was 0.497, which was 
near that of Mexico and Zambia, two countries that are considered to 
be high inequality. 
Several factors appear to have contributed to the upward trend in 
inequality between 2002 and 2007. The gap between urban and rural 
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incomes continued to widen, although within rural and urban areas, lev-
els of inequality did not increase substantially. In 2007 urban incomes 
per capita on average were 4.1 times rural incomes. This ratio was up 
from 3.3 in 2002, which was already high by international standards. 
A second factor contributing to increasing inequality has been 
the household income derived from assets and property. In the 1990s 
major property rights reforms were implemented that gave households 
opportunities to own property. These reforms included the privatiza-
tion of urban housing, the development of the urban real estate market, 
enterprise ownership reforms, and the expansion of stock and financial 
markets. In the wake of these and other measures, household income 
from assets and property, including imputed rents from owner-occupied 
housing, rose to 10 percent of household income in 2002 and to 15 
percent in 2007. Asset income in China is unequally distributed, and its 
contribution to inequality has increased. A decomposition of income by 
source reveals that the contribution of income from assets and property 
to national inequality increased considerably from 9 percent in 2002 to 
20 percent in 2007. 
The rise in inequality between 2002 and 2007 implies that some 
households benefited more and others less from growth during this 
period. Who, then, were the winners and losers? Sicular examines the 
growth in household income by decile groups in the population. All 
decile groups, from the poorest 10 percent of the population at the far 
left to the richest 10 percent at the far right, enjoyed positive growth in 
income between the two years. Growth in income of the poorest decile, 
however, was much smaller (in both percentage and absolute terms) 
than that of the richest decile. Income of the poorest decile increased 
by 406 yuan, less than 50 percent of 2002 income. Income of the rich-
est decile roughly doubled, with an increase of nearly 16,000 yuan. For 
intermediate deciles, growth in income was correlated closely to their 
position in the income distribution. 
Both the number of poor and the poverty rate declined dramatically 
between the early 1990s and early 2000s. In 1993 the poverty rate was 
40 percent, but by 2002 it had fallen to 15 percent. The poverty rate 
declined further between 2002 and 2007 to about 4 percent. Most of 
this decline is due to a steep reduction in rural poverty. China’s suc-
cess in reducing poverty is outstanding by international standards. As 
a consequence of these trends, China has changed from a high-poverty 
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country to a moderately low-poverty country. Moreover, China’s share 
of world poverty has declined substantially, from nearly 40 percent of 
the world’s poor in 1990 to only 15 percent in 2005. In conclusion, 
China’s economic reforms have had many “winners” and few absolute 
“losers.” Yet, challenges to China’s harmonious society remain acute 
and ongoing. 
The rapid growth of the Chinese economy has been fueled by a 
large-scale migration from the countryside to the cities. As China relies 
on cheap labor and labor-intensive manufacturing as key factors for 
development, tens of millions of migrant workers pour into coastal 
developmental areas looking for factory jobs, which pay wages higher 
than they can earn in the countryside. The most recent census (2010) 
estimates that there are now nearly 200 million rural migrants in urban 
China. The sheer scale of the migration has brought about profound 
changes in the economic, social, and demographic structures of the 
nation. Migrant workers bring back to their rural hometown not only 
earned wealth, but also experiences and expectations they gain while 
living in the urban areas. These experiences will change their frame 
of reference, especially that of their children. They will no longer be 
content with earning higher income—they want the same comfortable 
and rich life that the urban residents do. Mary Gallagher, in her chapter 
titled “Changes in the World’s Workshop: The Demographic, Social, 
and Political Factors behind China’s Labor Movement,” offers insights 
on changes of the frame of reference of migrant workers, especially the 
younger generation, and the social and political impacts. 
Gallagher explains that China’s labor markets are highly segmented 
by institutional barriers to labor mobility across regions and across 
sectors. The hukou system, a restrictive residency registration system, 
is still fundamental in placing barriers between the labor markets of 
urban and rural citizens. There are also important social and cultural 
expectations about employment that further segment labor markets. 
Unemployed college graduates and unemployed rural migrants rarely 
compete in the same labor markets. There are some jobs that urban 
youth simply do not consider. Conversely, few employers in labor-
intensive manufacturing would want to hire urban youth, who might 
not work hard enough or be able to withstand the harsh conditions. 
Barriers to labor mobility and segmentation based on hukou status and 
education level continue to exist in China, to the extent that sometimes 
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labor shortages and labor surplus can coexist. For example, there were 
reports in the Chinese media in 2003 of a “migrant labor shortage” in 
development zones in China’s south. Although this shortage ebbed dur-
ing the global financial crisis and China’s export crisis of 2008–2009, 
these shortages began to reappear soon after. 
Migration, together with the one-child policy, has had transforma-
tive effects on the social and cultural characteristics of China’s new 
generation of migrants. Gallagher finds that migrant workers born in 
the 1980s and after are markedly different in basic characteristics, in 
political socialization, and in life experiences from that of their par-
ents. This generation is the first to be affected by the strict one-child 
policy that was implemented in the late 1970s. While in their parents’
generation a family might have several children, even rural children in 
this generation generally share at most one sibling. In urban areas, the 
majority of children born are the only child in the family. Given their 
greater importance to the family’s economy and long-term success, 
these “little emperors” have been lavished with attention and oppor-
tunity. Even rural children, who do not have the same educational and 
economic opportunities of their urban counterparts, have been given 
more attention and more protection from hard agricultural labor than 
in previous generations. Many rural parents understand that education 
is still the key to upward social mobility for their children. This focus 
on education has spared children from backbreaking manual labor and 
allowed them to focus on their studies. Although rural children do not 
attain the same level of education as urban children, they now have 
much higher rates of middle school and high school completion. Even 
if they take manufacturing jobs in the urban areas, they take it as part of 
their “going out” strategy for the transition to urban life. 
The post–1980s generation, both rural and urban, is also markedly 
different from the previous generation in terms of political socializa-
tion and life experiences under socialism. As children of the reform era, 
they have little familiarity with the mass political campaigns of the high 
Mao Era. Their primary years of education and political socialization 
coincided with post–Tiananmen China, when economic growth was the 
major goal. The private sector was allowed to expand, and the “rule by 
law” campaign was disseminated in the media, encouraging people to 
protect their legal rights. 
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These different demographic characteristics and life experiences 
have helped create a new generation of migrants who are challenging 
traditional barriers and identities that have existed in China since the 
Maoist hukou policy was put into place in the late 1950s. Three main 
characteristics of this new generation are worth examining here: 1) their 
frame of reference, 2) their long-term expectations, and 3) their poten-
tial capacity to organize their interests and grievances collectively. 
Surveys and interviews show that young rural migrants are increas-
ingly better integrated and familiar with global youth culture and Chi-
nese urban culture. Their frame of reference is increasingly not what 
would have happened to them if they had stayed in the countryside 
but what is possible for them as young urban citizens. This change in 
their reference point translates into higher expectations on the job and 
some tendency to value work that offers future opportunity even at the 
expense of current lower pays. 
Given the higher levels of education in the current generation, bet-
ter access to technology, and increased integration into urban culture, 
there is greater potential for this generation to articulate collective inter-
ests and to act collectively to promote and press for their interests and 
rights, vis-à-vis employers and the government alike. In the strikes of 
2010, analysts pointed to workers’new abilities to organize within single 
workplaces and to design institutions to allow for leadership selection 
and representation. The increased potential for young migrants’ collec-
tive power has been recognized in the media and by the governments. 
Since 2003, the party-state has been much more concerned about the 
conditions and long-term development of China’s urbanizing citizens. 
Migrant workers, mostly young adults, earn higher incomes than 
when they were in the countryside and substantially improve their lives, 
but what happens to those who stay behind in the rural areas, mostly 
older peasants? Would the movement of young rural adults to urban and 
coastal areas for higher-income-earning opportunities leave the older 
residents remaining in rural areas at greater risk of falling into poverty? 
John Giles addresses this issue in his chapter, “Left Behind in Old Age? 
Sources of Support for China’s Rural Elderly in a Period of Growth, 
Migration, and Demographic Transition.” 
In general, rural residents lack access to pension support when they 
are of retirement age, and they must rely on either their own labor income 
or support from family members. In rural China, financial support for 
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the elderly remains the responsibility of adult children and is even codi-
fied into laws governing the family. As the population of potential care 
providers continues to shrink as a result of both China’s demographic 
transition and the availability of attractive migrant employment oppor-
tunities for the young, many observers have expressed concerns for the 
well-being of the rural elderly. 
Giles points out that major differences exist in the primary sources 
of support for China’s urban and rural elderly, and between men and 
women from both groups of elderly. While pensions are the single most 
significant source of support for the urban elderly, they remain a very 
minor source of support for the rural elderly. Labor income is the pri-
mary source of support for 37.9 percent of the rural elderly. Support 
through antipoverty programs does not figure prominently, because the 
rural dibao (benefits for low-income residents) was not an important 
source of income support for rural elderly households. Also notable is 
the inability of the elderly to earn income from property. The elderly in 
China have not grown old in an environment in which they could accu-
mulate land wealth. Lack of land wealth limits the ability of the elderly 
to earn income from rents and may also limit the scope for encouraging 
intergenerational transfers from their children (who would be prospec-
tive heirs). 
Giles further examines the sources of support by gender among the 
rural elderly. Family support is more important for rural elderly women, 
and labor income remains more important for men. His research finds 
that 68.5 percent of rural women over 60 report that financial sup-
port from family members is their most important source of support, 
whereas only 27.5 percent report that labor income is most important. 
By contrast, 48.5 percent of rural elderly men report that labor income 
remains their most important source of support, and only 39.3 percent 
report support from family members. When distinguishing the impor-
tance of pension by gender, a significantly higher share of rural men 
(8.1 percent) than women (1.3 percent) report that pension income is 
their most significant source of financial support. The gap between men 
and women reflects historical differences between genders in employ-
ment in local government and the military. 
Given the structure of elderly support, Giles finds that the effects of 
lost farm income and uncertainty about land tenure likely dominate the 
effects of increased income from remittances in labor supply decisions 
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of the rural elderly. Nonetheless, this effect is not statistically signifi-
cant for men or for women under 70. Women over 70, however, are 8 
percent more likely to continue working (most likely in agriculture) if 
the household has a migrant child. The elderly have to work more to 
make up the income loss. Women over 70 with a migrant child work 
411 hours more during a year, or the equivalent of 10 40-hour work-
weeks. For regions of the country planting two crops a year, this would 
amount to full-time work during the agricultural busy season. 
Overall, migrant children continue to provide remittance support to 
their parents. On average, the predicted transfer from adult children is 
sufficient to maintain elderly incomes above the poverty line. However, 
as the range of potential transfers is wide, elderly people with migrant 
children face greater risk of falling below the poverty line. Migration 
of adult children may also have a significant impact on the work sta-
tus of elderly women. Having a migrant child in the family raises the 
probability that a woman over 70 will still be in the labor force and 
work longer hours. For men and women under 70, a migrant child has a 
positive but statistically insignificant effect on participation in income-
earning activities. 
What is the long-term outlook of the Chinese economy? Can China 
maintain the momentum and sustain this phenomenal growth well into 
the next several decades? A team of elite World Bank economists proj-
ects that China’s yearly growth rate will “slow down” to 5.9 percent in 
2021 and further down to 5 percent in 2026 (World Bank 2012). This 
projection is remarkably close to Dr. Zhiwu Chen’s one-man projec-
tion when he delivered the lecture “China in 2049” in 2011 at Western 
Michigan University. The final chapter of this volume is a short tran-
scribed version of his lecture. 
Chen presents a “big picture” of a possible future GDP path for 
China in comparison to the United States from 2011 to 2049, the cen-
tennial of the founding of People’s Republic of China. He depicts three 
phases of China’s growth path: an annual growth rate of 8.5 percent 
from 2011 to 2016 in the first phase, a drop in growth by 12 percent in 
2017 in the second phase (a bold projection with reasons given in the 
chapter, unlike projections by other agencies such as IMF), followed by 
a resumption of a steady growth rate of 5–6 percent per year through 
2049 in the third phase. Chen predicts that in 2049, when PRC is 100 
years old, China’s nominal GDP will surpass the United States, and if 
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purchasing power parity is taken into account, China’s GDP will sur-
pass the United States much earlier, in 2027, 15 years from now. 
Chen gives a very long-run historical perspective of China’s per 
capita GDP over 2000 years and notes that the high growth actually 
only occurred in the last 40 years. He gives an insightful analysis of 
China’s rapid growth and ascent in the recent decades. He refutes the 
conventional wisdom that the main driving factor of China’s rise is an 
abundant and low-cost workforce (reasons given in the chapter). He 
convincingly argues that China has ascended by “riding the tide,” ben-
efiting from the world’s encouraging trade environment because of 
increasing globalization and dispersion of technological progress as a 
result of industrial revolution. Chen concludes by pointing out some 
challenges and concerns for China’s sustainable growth, such as over-
reliance of growth on state capitalism, that is, government dominance 
in the past and current growth of the economy. 
The chapters in this volume reflect the opinions of six leading 
experts on certain important aspects and issues of the Chinese economy 
and its economic relations with the United States. While these chapters 
can cover only part of the complex pictures, they all contain insightful 
analyses of the issues concerned. The analytical frameworks and the 
insights presented in this volume will be valuable for understanding 
and evaluating the Chinese economy, its growth, and its relations with 
the United States, which hopefully will help guide policymakers in this 
ever-integrated global economy. 
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U.S.-China Economic 
Relations and Value Chains in 
Global Production Networks 
Robert B. Koopman 
U.S. International Trade Commission 
During the past 15 years trade between the United States and 
China has grown substantially. This trade growth has increased the 
economic interdependence between the two countries, resulting in ben-
efits for both, while also creating some economic tensions. China has 
experienced rapid economic growth and development with substantial 
decreases in poverty and increases in per capita GDP, which many aca-
demics attribute to China’s market-driven economic reforms and its 
related integration with the world economy. Up until the 2008 finan-
cial crisis, the U.S. economy experienced a long period of relatively 
strong growth through increased productivity and improved integration 
of information and computer technologies, as well as strong consump-
tion growth accompanied by a declining national savings rate. While 
U.S. consumption-led growth benefited from inexpensive goods from 
China such as consumer electronics and textiles, it has also resulted in 
growing bilateral imbalances. 
U.S. import growth from China has slowed over the last several 
years because of weak U.S. economic growth, a drop in the value of the 
dollar, and a decline in imbalances. This chapter focuses on the period 
prior to the financial crisis, as it aligns well with recent research on 
value-added trade, which is discussed in a later section. 
Researchers and policymakers have focused on three broad areas 
to explain the increasing trade imbalance between the two countries 
and, more recently, China’s growing trade surplus with the world. The 
first area is China’s extensive use of policy instruments to encourage its 
rapid economic development and transition from a centrally planned 
economy to a market-driven economy.1 These policies include, among 
17 
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others, incentives for foreign investment and export performance, the 
establishment of special economic zones and substantial infrastructure 
investment, and a fixed exchange rate. A second explanation focuses on 
more macroeconomic factors, suggesting that significant imbalance in 
the U.S. savings and investment rates, combined with relatively rapid 
consumption-led economic growth in the United States compared to 
other developed countries, have led to an increased current account and 
merchandise trade imbalance.2 A third area has been the rapid growth 
in fragmented global production processes, as businesses take advan-
tage of declining information and communications technology costs, 
and international logistics costs to distribute pieces of their production 
chain based on lowest cost sources (Dean, Fung, and Wang 2011; Hum-
mels, Ishii, and Yi 2001; Yi 2003). Although fragmentation of global 
production has developed independently of China’s policy environment 
and is a widespread phenomenon, a large part of China’s growth in 
exports to the United States has been in processing trade carried out by 
foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs), many of which have benefited from 
China’s pro FIE and pro “imports for exports” policies.3 
In this chapter I present a summary of the U.S.-China trade relation-
ship prior to 2008 and describe some of the driving factors underlying 
the rapid growth in U.S.-China trade. I then present data on the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) and U.S. import injury cases that support 
the notion that, from the U.S. perspective, trade relations with China 
are treated much like those with our long-term historical economic and 
political partners such as the European Union (EU) and North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) countries. Finally, I discuss cur-
rent research on value-added trade that could be important from a future 
policy perspective in understanding global value chains and China’s 
position in them. 
AN OVERVIEW OF ThE U.S.-ChINA TRADE RELATIONShIP
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 summarize U.S. merchandise trade shifts with 
the world and with China between 2002 and 2006. The overall U.S. 
merchandise trade deficit increased to $915.6 billion in 2006. The long-
term trend in the U.S. trade deficit remains a key policy concern for the 
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Figure 2.1  Overall Shifts in U.S. Merchandise Trade through 2006 
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United States and its global trading and financial partners. China’s rap-
idly increasing share in the merchandise trade deficit—it reached $235 
billion in 2006—has raised particular concern. The factors and trends 
driving U.S. merchandise trade were numerous. Economic growth in 
the United States and its major trading partners contributed to increased 
bilateral merchandise trade flows in 2006, while strong growth in con-
sumer spending, business structures investment, and exports supported 
the economic performance of the United States.4 The rate of increase in 
the U.S. merchandise trade deficit slowed from 17 percent in 2005 to 
7 percent in 2006, even as the deficit grew from $858.4 billion in 2005 
to a record $915.6 billion in 2006. Total U.S. exports increased to a 
record $929.5 billion, a 16 percent increase. Aircraft, spacecraft, and 
related equipment; motor vehicles; and petroleum products recorded 
the largest sector increases for a combined $33.5 billion (27 percent) 
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Figure 2.2  Shifts in U.S.-China Merchandise Trade through 2006 
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of export growth, although export increases are recorded in every mer-
chandise sector. Meanwhile, U.S. imports for all merchandise sectors 
increased by 11 percent to a record $1.8 trillion. The energy products, 
minerals and metals, and transportation equipment sectors accounted 
for over half of the increase. The crude petroleum, motor vehicles, and 
petroleum products commodity groups recorded the largest increases in 
2006, accounting for a third of import growth. 
The U.S.-China trade relationship continues to evolve quickly. The 
U.S. merchandise trade deficit with China rose for the fifth straight year, 
increasing by 16 percent to $235.4 billion, reflecting the continued U.S. 
demand for goods produced in China. China is the fourth-largest export 
market for the United States and the second-leading import source in 
terms of absolute value. The continued rapid economic growth in China, 
coupled with China’s increasing role as a low-cost production location, 
contributed to the expansion in U.S.-China trade in 2006. U.S. exports 
 
 
 
Value Chains in Global Production Networks  21 
to China rose at a greater rate than the preceding years, by $12.8 bil-
lion, or 33 percent. The most significant increases in U.S. exports were 
in electronic products ($3.2 billion), transportation equipment ($2.5 
billion), and minerals and metals ($2.5 billion). Increased demand for 
computer and telecommunications products by U.S. consumers contrib-
uted to continued growth in U.S. imports from China, increasing by 
$6.3 billion (16 percent) and $3.7 billion (26 percent), respectively. In 
2006, the U.S. telecommunications market grew at the fastest rate since 
2000, with demand for services such as broadband leading to increased 
demand for telecommunications and network equipment. 
Changes in the Composition of U.S. Trade 
While much attention has been paid to the increasing merchandise 
trade imbalance with China, it is useful to consider this trade relation-
ship in a broader context. Table 2.1 shows the changes in the composi-
tion of U.S. non-oil imports with a number of its main trading part-
ners between 1989 and 2007. China’s share of U.S. imports increased 
from 2.8 percent to 20.6 percent, displacing Japan as the United States’
second-largest import source after NAFTA. During this period China 
became the largest single import source country for the United States. 
In 1989, imports from the United States’ largest Asian partners 
(Japan, China, Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Singapore) accounted 
for 43.9 percent of U.S. non-oil imports. By 2007, the same share had 
dropped slightly, to 41.5 percent of U.S. non-oil imports. During this 
period, the U.S. share of imports from many of its other Asian partners 
declined. Between 1989 and 2007, the combined share of Japan, Korea, 
Taiwan, Malaysia, Singapore, and other Asian countries in U.S. non-
oil imports dropped from 41.1 percent to 20.9 percent. Thus, much of 
China’s increasing share of U.S. non-oil imports came at the expense 
of other Asian countries, particularly Japan, which dropped from 22 
percent to 8.9 percent of U.S. non-oil imports during the same period. 
While the total value of non-oil imports from Asia grew substan-
tially, its share of total non-oil imports remained fairly constant, reflect-
ing substantial growth of imports from other regions as well. This phe-
nomenon is particularly interesting because the composition of U.S. 
imports from Asia changed substantially, as more and more of the share 
of U.S. non-oil imports from Asia came from China. 
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Table 2.1  U.S. Import Shares by Country, 1989–2007 
Year Rest of world NAFTA Rest of Asia Japan China EU15 
1989 10.9 24.0 19.1 22.0 2.8 21.1 
1990 11.0 24.3 18.5 20.8 3.5 21.9 
1991 11.0 24.4 18.6 21.1 4.4 20.6 
1992 11.3 24.5 18.4 20.1 5.5 20.2 
1993 11.4 25.2 17.8 20.2 6.2 19.2 
1994 11.7 26.2 17.5 19.3 6.5 18.7 
1995 11.7 27.0 17.9 17.8 6.8 18.7 
1996 11.9 28.3 17.4 15.9 7.3 19.2 
1997 12.4 28.4 16.8 15.1 8.0 19.3 
1998 12.6 28.7 16.0 14.1 8.5 20.2 
1999 12.2 29.4 15.8 13.7 8.9 20.0 
2000 12.6 29.1 16.1 13.4 9.5 19.3 
2001 12.7 29.3 14.7 12.3 10.3 20.7 
2002 12.8 28.5 14.5 11.5 12.3 20.5 
2003 13.3 27.0 14.0 10.6 14.2 20.8 
2004 13.7 26.5 13.7 10.1 15.9 20.1 
2005 13.9 25.8 12.9 9.8 17.9 19.8 
2006 14.1 25.3 12.7 9.6 19.2 19.2 
2007 13.7 25.1 12.0 8.9 20.6 19.6 
NOTE: U.S. imports, except Chapter 27, in percentage of total. 
SOURCE: USITC and author’s calculations. 
A similar pattern arose in U.S. non-oil export shares (see Table 2.2). 
The NAFTA partner countries held a fairly constant share of U.S. non-
oil exports between 1989 and 2007, while large Asian countries’ shares 
declined from 29.2 percent to 25.7 percent of U.S. non-oil exports. 
As with imports, a fairly substantial shift occurred between exports to 
Japan and China. In 1989, Japan accounted for 12.1 percent of U.S. 
non-oil exports and China 1.7 percent. By 2007, Japan had dropped to 
5.7 percent and China climbed to 6.0 percent. 
Driving Factors in U.S.-China Bilateral Trade 
In general, bilateral trade between the United States and China was 
driven by FIEs, and more recently from a growing role by private firms 
operating in China (see Figure 2.3). Electronic machinery (HS-84) con-
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Table 2.2  U.S. Export Shares by Country, 1989–2007 
Year Rest of world NAFTA Rest of Asia Japan China EU15 
1989 17.4 28.5 15.4 12.1 1.7 24.9 
1990 16.7 28.3 15.2 12.3 1.3 26.1 
1991 17.9 28.0 15.6 11.5 1.6 25.4 
1992 18.9 29.1 15.6 10.8 1.7 23.9 
1993 19.4 30.2 16.2 10.5 2.0 21.7 
1994 17.7 31.8 16.9 10.6 1.9 21.0 
1995 18.0 29.0 18.4 11.2 2.2 21.2 
1996 18.7 29.9 17.9 11.0 2.1 20.5 
1997 19.0 31.5 17.4 9.7 2.0 20.5 
1998 18.9 33.5 14.7 8.7 2.2 22.2 
1999 16.6 35.2 15.5 8.5 2.0 22.2 
2000 15.6 35.6 16.4 8.6 2.2 21.6 
2001 16.9 34.9 15.1 8.1 2.7 22.3 
2002 16.0 36.0 15.7 7.7 3.3 21.2 
2003 15.6 35.3 15.9 7.6 4.2 21.5 
2004 16.5 34.9 15.9 7.0 4.6 21.1 
2005 17.9 34.9 15.0 6.5 5.0 20.6 
2006 19.3 33.4 14.7 6.1 5.7 20.7 
2007 21.7 31.4 14.0 5.7 6.0 21.1 
SOURCE: USITC. 
stituted the largest and fastest growing product category for both imports 
and exports (see Tables 2.3A and B). In addition, China’s government 
incentive schemes, such as Economic and Technological Development 
Zones and other specialized zones, played a dominant role in China’s 
imports from the United States (see Figure 2.3 and Tables 2.3A and 
2.3B).5 
China’s trade pattern with the United States differs in some respects 
from its trade pattern with the world. Yao (2008) finds that while China 
ran a large trade surplus with the United States in machinery and elec-
trical products, it ran a substantial deficit with the rest of the world 
in these products, and that China’s special economic zones played an 
important role in these trade flows. This, along with the general realign-
ment of U.S. import shares from Asia discussed above, supports the 
argument that China is playing an important role as an assembly plat-
form for Asia by importing electronic components and shipping final 
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Figure 2.3  Disaggregating China-U.S. Trade by Enterprise Type, 
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Figure 2.3  (continued) 
China’s Exports to the U.S. by Enterprise Type 
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Figure 2.3  (continued) 
China’s Exports to the U.S. by Trade Mode 
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Table 2.3A  Decomposing China’s Top 20 Traded Products with the 
United States: U.S. Exports to China ($, millions) 
1995 2006 
Rank 
(2006) HSa Product Value 
% of 
total Value
 % of 
total 
1 85 Electrical machinery and associated 
parts 
1,270 11 10,178 18 
2 84 Machinery and associated parts 2,190 19 7,704 14 
3 88 Aircraft, spacecraft, and associated 
parts 
1,176 10 6,090 11 
4 90 Optical/photographic, medical, or 
surgical instruments and parts 
450 4 2,941 5 
5 39 Plastics and articles thereof 351 3 2,716 5 
6 12 Oil seeds, grains, and fruits 56 0 2,585 5 
7 52 Cotton, including yarns and woven 
fabrics 
834 7 2,082 4 
8 72 Iron and steel 141 1 1,800 3 
9 74 Copper and associated articles 146 1 1,774 3 
10 76 Aluminum and associated articles 147 1 1,735 3 
11 47 Wood pulp; recovered (waste and 
scrap) paper and paperboard 
184 2 1,474 3 
12 29 Organic chemicals 263 2 1,418 3 
13 87 Vehicles, nonrailway 172 1 1,291 2 
14 41 Raw hides, skins, and leather 111 1 876 2 
15 28 Inorganic chemicals; organic or 
inorganic compounds of precious 
metals 
39 0 687 1 
16 81 Base metals, cermets, and 
associated articles 
10 0 677 1 
17 38 Miscellaneous chemical products 105 1 669 1 
18 44 Wood and articles of wood; wood 
charcoal 
29 0 551 1 
19 98 Special classification provisions, 
nesoi 
148 1 483 1 
20 48 Paper and paperboard; articles of 
paper pulp, paper or paperboard 
142 1 466 1 
Subtotal 7,963 68 48,198 87 
Total 11,748 55,224 
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Table 2.3B  Decomposing China’s Top 20 Traded Products with the 
United States: U.S. Imports from China ($, millions) 
1995 2006 
Rank % of % of 
(2006) HSa Product Value total Value total 
1 85 Electrical machinery and associated 7,886 17 64,906 23 
parts 
2 84 Machinery and associated parts 3,624 8 62,266 22 
3 95 Toys, games, and sports equipment 6,222 14 20,892 7 
4 94 Furniture; bedding, cushions, and 1,979 4 19,358 7 
lamps 
5 64 Footwear 5,824 13 13,890 5 
6 62 Articles of apparel and clothing 3,277 7 11,858 4 
accessories 
7 73 Articles of iron or steel 556 1 8,367 3 
8 61 Articles of apparel and clothing 1,376 3 8,010 3 
accessories 
9 39 Plastics and articles thereof 1,623 4 7,465 3 
10 42 Articles of leather 2,536 6 6,835 2 
11 87 Vehicles, nonrailway 501 1 5,134 2 
12 90 Optical/photographic, medical, or 1,274 3 4,787 2 
surgical instruments and parts 
13 63 Textile articles 645 1 4,628 2 
14 44 Wood and articles of wood; wood 225 0 2,997 1 
charcoal 
15 83 Miscellaneous articles of base metal 324 1 2,982 1 
16 71 Natural or cultured pearls, stones, 248 1 2,564 1 
precious metals 
17 99 Special import reporting provisions, 202 0 2,502 1 
nesoi 
18 40 Rubber and articles thereof 138 0 2,472 1 
19 29 Organic chemicals 360 1 2,258 1 
20 72 Iron and steel 198 0 2,176 1 
Subtotal 39,018 86 256,348 89 
Total 45,555 287,773 
a HS = Harmonized system code. 
SOURCE: USITC Dataweb.  This is an update from a table in Hammer (2006). 
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assembled goods to the United States. Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001) 
and Dean, Fung, and Wang (2011) show that a significant share of Chi-
na’s export values reflect content imported from other countries and 
reexported after some transformation. 
There has been a broad debate on the driving factors behind the rap-
idly growing U.S.-China trade relationship (Ahearne et al. 2007; Fosler 
and Bottelier 2007; Branstetter and Lardy 2006; Dean, Fung, and Wang 
2011; Hummels, Ishii, and Yi 2001; and Yi 2003). An extensive discus-
sion of that debate is beyond the scope of this chapter. Instead I will 
discuss how this rapidly growing economic relationship generated trade 
tensions between the two countries, as represented by the United States’
use of international WTO dispute settlement panels and national anti-
dumping (AD) cases, and then present a summary of a novel method for 
looking more closely at this trade relationship that better reflects global 
supply chains. 
The United States, China, and the WTO 
As part of an internal U.S. political economy debate and compro-
mise, Congress and the president agreed to changes in U.S. import 
safeguard mechanisms such as AD and import surge protections, as the 
United States committed to reduced tariffs in the Kennedy Round of 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations in 1967. 
As a result of that round and later GATT and WTO rounds, bilateral 
free trade agreements, and nonreciprocal tariff preference agreements, 
the U.S. average trade weighted tariff rate dropped significantly from 
roughly 12 percent to 5 percent between 1967 and the mid 1970s, and 
continued to drop to 1.3 percent for 2007 (Irwin [2005] and author’s 
calculations). With the creation of the WTO in 1995, the United States 
has also made use of, and been the recipient of, formal dispute panels 
to resolve disagreements with its trading partners. These mechanisms 
are viewed as integral components of normal U.S. trade relations. In the 
next section I summarize data regarding the United States’ use of WTO 
dispute panels and national AD cases during this period to illustrate the 
fact that trade disputes between the United States and China are not 
much different from those between the United States and its other large 
trading partners. 
 
	  
 
 
 
30 Koopman 
It is important to note some important differences between WTO 
dispute panels and the AD mechanism discussed below. World Trade 
Organization dispute cases are brought by one or more governments 
against another government, and the cases are heard in Geneva, Swit-
zerland, by WTO dispute panels with three members chosen by the 
WTO. Antidumping cases in the United States are brought by one or 
more U.S. firms, or other nongovernmental interested parties, against 
one or more foreign firms. The cases are argued by private parties in 
Washington, DC, before two U.S. government agencies—the Depart-
ment of Commerce to determine whether dumping is occurring, and the 
U.S. International Trade Commission to determine whether that dump-
ing injures the U.S. firms. Thus it is inaccurate in the AD context to 
refer to U.S. cases against China, as the cases are brought by private 
parties before U.S. government panels. 
U.S.-China Trade Tensions 
The growing bilateral trade deficit between the United States and 
China has generated concern among policymakers in both countries. 
Numerous sources in China have expressed concern that the U.S. gov-
ernment is making extensive use of WTO dispute panels, that U.S. firms 
are making extensive use of AD injury cases, and that the use of these 
mechanisms has a negative impact on the two countries’ “harmoni-
ous trade relations” (see, for example, China State Council [2005] and 
China Daily [2007a,b]). Many U.S. lawmakers and interest groups have 
called for the government to make more extensive use of WTO dispute 
panels and to make import injury mechanisms, such as AD, easier for 
U.S. firms to file, or to prove, and thus help slow the bilateral deficits’
growth.6 
Below I briefly review the use of these mechanisms in the United 
States vis-á-vis China and its firms and put them in a broader context 
for U.S. trade relations. Through 2008 the U.S. government’s use of 
WTO cases and private firms’ use of import injury cases (and the U.S. 
government’s determinations in those cases) appear to not single out 
China or its firms. Instead, the broad data appear to show that China 
and its domestic firms were treated similarly to the United States and 
its other major trading partners and general political allies, such as its 
NAFTA partners and the EU. 
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WTO Dispute Settlement Cases 
Between 1995, when the WTO was created, and 2008, the United 
States was a complainant in 86 dispute settlement consultations (see 
Table 2.4). The top five respondent countries are the European Eco-
nomic Community, Mexico, Korea, Japan, and Canada—countries long 
considered U.S. political and economic partners. China ranks sixth, fol-
lowed by India, Brazil, and Argentina. The pattern that emerges from 
this data is that the United States views WTO consultations as part of 
its normal trade relationship with its major political and economic part-
ners, and that China and other developing countries with significant 
U.S. trade relations are treated similarly. This suggests that from a U.S. 
perspective, utilizing the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is a natu-
ral part of a robust economic relationship. 
Since China joined the WTO in 2001, it has ranked second to the EU 
in terms of number of panels with the United States as a complainant, 
followed by Canada and Mexico (see Table 2.5). This probably reflects 
a combination of China’s rapid growth to become a major trading part-
ner for the United States. Recall that China’s share of U.S. imports has 
risen dramatically, roughly doubling since its accession to the WTO, 
and surpassing the EU as the United States’ second-largest trading part-
ner. If we compare the rankings in Table 2.5 with the import shares in 
Table 2.1, the data suggest that from a U.S. perspective our trading 
tensions with China appear normal and on par with our main economic 
and political allies. While China has expressed that it desires harmoni-
ous trade relations with its partners, including the United States, from 
the U.S. perspective it would appear that through 2008, at the WTO, 
the United States has treated China as it would any other large trading 
partner. 
Import Injury (AD) Cases 
Firms in China remain a major target for AD cases around the world. 
According to the Global Trade Protection Report, 2,007 firms in China 
were the main target of AD cases between 1995 and 2006, with 540 
investigations. Interestingly, U.S. firms ranked fourth being targeted in 
172 cases, behind the EU and member states at 502 cases and South 
Korean firms with 228 cases. 
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Table 2.4  WTO Dispute Settlement Consultations, since WTO 
Established with the United States as Complainant, through 
2008 
Rank Respondents Total number of cases % of total cases 
1 EEC 16 18.4 
2 Mexico 6 6.9 
3 Korea 6 6.9 
4 Japan 6 6.9 
5 Canada 6 6.9 
6 China 5 5.7 
7 India 4 4.6 
8 Brazil 4 4.6 
9 Argentina 4 4.6 
10 Philippines 3 3.4 
11 Ireland 3 3.4 
12 Belgium 3 3.4 
13 Australia 3 3.4 
14 Turkey 2 2.3 
15 Greece 2 2.3 
16 France 2 2.3 
17 Venezuela 1 1.1 
18 United Kingdom 1 1.1 
19 Sweden 1 1.1 
20 Romania 1 1.1 
21 Portugal 1 1.1 
22 Pakistan 1 1.1 
23 Netherlands 1 1.1 
24 Indonesia 1 1.1 
25 Egypt 1 1.1 
26 Denmark 1 1.1 
27 Chile 1 1.1 
Totals 86 98.9 
SOURCE: WTO. Data generated by Ted Wilson, Office of Economics, USITC. Per-
centage does not equal 100 due to rounding. 
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Table 2.5  WTO Dispute Settlement Consultations, since China’s Accession 
with the United States as a Complainant, through 2008 
Rank Number Percent 
1 EEC 6 30.0 
2 China 5 25.0 
3 Canada 2 10.0 
4 Mexico 2 10.0 
5 Egypt 1 5.0 
6 India 1 5.0 
7 Japan 1 5.0 
8 Turkey 1 5.0 
9 Venezuela 1 5.0 
Totals 20 100.0 
SOURCE: WTO. Data generated by Ted Wilson, Office of Economics, USITC. 
I do not discuss or estimate the economic effects of AD actions, 
as that is beyond the scope of this chapter, but for a discussion of the 
potential economic impacts of AD actions see Blonigen and Prusa 
(2003). Examining U.S. AD data, we can see whether China’s rapid 
trade growth with the United States led to a disproportionate number of 
AD investigations on firms in China, and/or a disproportionate amount 
of China’s trade affected by AD findings. Table 2.6 shows that between 
2001 and 2006, firms in China were respondents in 20 percent of all 
U.S. AD cases (more than any other country, but roughly in line with 
China’s share of total U.S. non-oil imports), and that firms in China 
accounted for 31 percent of the affirmative determinations. Thus, while 
firms in China were named in new AD filings in proportion to China’s 
U.S. import share, they were more likely than firms from other coun-
tries to be found causing injury to U.S. firms. For the longer 1980–2006 
period, firms in China were a party in only 10.5 percent of the cases, so 
the share of cases involving China had definitely risen (see U.S. Inter-
national Trade Commission [2008]). 
The above discussion focuses on the injury determination of the 
AD process. The long-run average since 1980 is 37 percent of all AD/ 
countervailing duty (CVD) cases (42 percent for AD alone) being found 
in the affirmative, affecting 0.3 percent of total imports. Thus, China’s 
recent experience is not out of line with the long-term findings for all 
countries. Also note that the dumping determination is handled by the 
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Table 2.6  Number of U.S. Antidumping Cases and Affirmative Findings, 
China and Total, 2001–2006 
Antidumping cases Affirmative findings 
Year  China Total  China Total 
2001 9 92 5  40 
2002 8 35 6  12 
2003 9 35 6  14 
2004 9 34 8  20 
2005 3 10 2  6 
2006 4  8 2  2 
Totals for  42 214 29  94
 period 
Percent 20  31
 China 
SOURCE: USITC data and author’s calculations. 
Department of Commerce, and its long-run average for affirmative 
findings of dumping is nearly 90 percent, while the ITC injury determi-
nation rate is much lower. 
Another way to look at the treatment of firms from China in U.S. 
trade is the share of China’s imports to the United States affected by AD 
cases. Irwin (2005) finds that rising U.S. AD activity on an aggregate 
level is related to the increase in import penetration, among other fac-
tors, and that the rise in import penetration is largely associated with 
falling U.S. import tariffs. 
Figure 2.4 shows U.S. imports from the world plotted against those 
affected by new AD/CVD cases. Since 1980, there have been occa-
sional spikes of around 1 percent of the value of imports affected by 
new AD/CVD duties; the long-run average, despite rapidly growing 
imports, is around 0.16 percent. 
In Figure 2.5 we see that China’s historical trade volume subjected 
to new U.S. AD duties tracked fairly closely with that of the world. 
Since 1980, there have been occasional spikes in activity of nearly 1 
percent, thus similar to the world total, however the average over the 
period is 0.16 percent, which equals the world total for that period. 
Figure 2.6 shows that, as with Irwin’s findings, during the 1989– 
2007 period U.S. import tariffs for the world continued to decline, from 
3.4 percent to 1.3 percent. Duties on imports from China fell from 8.5 
 
 
1.2 2.5 
Value Chains in Global Production Networks  35 
Figure 2.4  U.S. Imports from the World, and Percentage Affected by 
Affirmative AD/CVD Findings 
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SOURCE: USITC data and author’s calculations. 
percent to 3.1 percent, representing the biggest decline among the coun-
tries and regions covered.7 Such a decline in tariff rates and increased 
penetration is consistent with historical U.S. experience of rising AD 
activity. 
U.S. imports from China have grown rapidly since its WTO acces-
sion, but in the aggregate firms in China appear to be treated in a quite 
similar respect to those in the rest of the world (see Figures 2.4 and 
2.5). Between 2000 and 2006, less than 0.19 percent of total imports 
from China were subject to new affirmative determinations in the 
United States, while the world average was 0.14 percent. Both of these 
numbers represent a small fraction of U.S. imports. It is true that in 
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Figure 2.5  U.S. Imports from China, and Percentage Affected by 
Affirmative AD/CVD Findings 
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the period 1980–1999, imports from China were much less affected 
by new AD cases in the United States than the world average. Imports 
from China during the pre-WTO accession era (1980–1990) averaged 
only 0.11 percent of import value subject to a new affirmative decision, 
while imports for the world over the same period averaged 0.18 percent. 
Thus, since WTO accession and 2006, China moved more in line with 
the average treatment in terms of U.S. imports subject to AD duties. 
Thus, in terms of two measures of trade tensions, the numbers of 
WTO dispute settlement panels and the share of imports affected by 
import injury findings, we see that the United States largely treated 
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Figure 2.6  U.S. Average Duty Rates, by Country or Region, 1989–2007 
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China and its firms as it did any other major trading partner, includ-
ing its main political and economic allies. In the United States, as in 
other countries, the number of AD cases brought against firms in China 
has been increasing, and the number of cases involving firms in China 
found affirmative in the injury phase has risen above the world average. 
These data suggest that China’s concerns that U.S. actions in the WTO 
and in its national import injury cases indicate that the United States 
does not care about harmonious trade relations may be misplaced and 
simply reflect a difference in culture and expectations as to how each 
side defines harmonious and normal trade relations. 
Apart from growing trade tensions, the rise of China as a supplier 
to the world is remarkable. The next part of this chapter focuses on a 
methodology to better understand how globalization—and the develop-
ment of global value chains that appear to focus on China—may affect 
traditional gross trade values often used to describe bilateral trade rela-
tions. These insights, based on the domestic and foreign value embed-
Rest of world 
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ded in gross trade data, suggest that the trade relationship between the 
United States and China is more complicated than traditional data sug-
gest, and that Japan and other Asian countries export indirectly to the 
United States through China. 
VALUE ADDED IN ChINESE ExPORTS
Recently, Pascal Lamy, director general of the WTO, suggested that 
“. . . by focusing on gross values of exports and imports, traditional trade 
statistics also give us a distorted picture of trade imbalances between 
countries.” He argues that value-added trade statistics help reveal that 
the macroeconomic imbalances present in the current global economy 
are not likely to be corrected through focus on bilateral trade deficits 
(Lamy 2011). 
In the United States there has been great political and press atten-
tion paid to the long-term current account deficit, and particularly 
the bilateral trade deficit with China. At the U.S. International Trade 
Commission, beginning shortly after China’s accession to the WTO in 
the early 2000s, we started receiving requests from our governmental 
customers regarding the growing trade imbalance with China. We first 
gathered data similar to that seen in Figure 2.7, traditional import values 
showing rising imports from China, and much of the rest of the world in 
value terms. Of course, when the questions first came in we had not yet 
experienced the recession of 2008 related to the financial crisis, so the 
path of import growth was fairly steadily upward, except for the 2001 
recession. We next transformed the data into shares as seen in Figure 
2.8, which plainly shows that something important was going on in 
Asia, and that much of it was related to Asian supply chain realignment 
and a focus on China as a point of final assembly in those chains. How-
ever, we had no way of clearly showing these links in the aggregate data 
at that time. Groups highly critical of trade referred to data such as that 
in Figure 2.7 and generally focused on China for keeping its currency 
artificially low in order to increase exports to the United States, among 
other countries. Critics argued that since other Asian countries contin-
ued to expand exports to the United States, China’s increased exports 
were essentially completely offsetting domestic production, not substi-
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Figure 2.7  U.S. Imports from Asia, NAFTA, and the World, 1989–2009 
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40  Figure 2.8  U.S. Imports Shares from Asia and NAFTA, 1989–2009 
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tuting for other Asian exports. Further, trade critics often pointed out 
that low prices from China, due to the currency undervaluation, stimu-
lated demand in the United States for Chinese imports, and were then 
generating a growing current account deficit. To better address these 
kinds of comments we then developed data similar to that presented 
in Figure 2.9, which suggest that macro factors, particularly relatively 
strong economic growth—exhibited in this figure through a stable, low 
unemployment rate through most of the period, and relatively robust 
economic growth in the United States compared to other developed 
countries, combined with a low savings rate—were the main contribu-
tors to growing trade deficits. Despite the various forms of data pre-
sented, there was no clear “smoking gun” linking other Asian countries 
to Chinese exports. Similar arguments and concerns were expressed 
regarding NAFTA trade flows. 
Methods for Understanding Domestic and Foreign Value Added 
in Trade 
These efforts to inform our customers and the need to more fully 
understand what was happening in global trade flows led us to delve 
fairly deeply into value-added trade issues.8 How would one assess 
foreign versus domestic content in a country’s exports? In one of the 
literature’s most influential papers, Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001; HIY
in subsequent discussion) propose a method to decompose a country’s 
exports into domestic and foreign value-added (FVA) share based on a 
country’s input-output (IO) table. Hummels, Ishii, and Yi make a key 
assumption that the intensity in the use of imported inputs is the same 
between production for exports and production for domestic sales. 
However, this assumption is violated in the presence of processing 
exports, a prevalent part of China’s export and import markets. Pro-
cessing exports are characterized by imports for exports with favor-
able tariff treatment: firms import parts and other intermediate materials 
from abroad, with tariff exemptions on the imported inputs and other 
tax preferences from local or central governments, and, after process-
ing or assembling, export the finished products. The policy preferences 
for processing exports usually lead to a significant difference in the 
intensity of imported intermediate inputs in the production of process-
ing exports and that in other demand sources (for domestic final sales 
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Figure 2.9  Current Account Deficits, U.S. Unemployment, and the 
RMB-$ Exchange Rate 
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and normal exports). Since processing exports have accounted for more 
than 50 percent of China’s exports every year at least since 1996, we 
felt that the HIY formula was likely to lead to a significant underesti-
mation of the share of FVA in its exports. In fact, most economies offer 
tariff reductions or exemptions on imported intermediate inputs used in 
production for exports. By ignoring processing exports, one is likely to 
incorrectly estimate domestic and foreign content in trade, especially 
for economies that engage in a massive amount of tariff/tax-favored 
processing trade, such as China, Mexico, and Vietnam. 
In Koopman, Wang, and Wei (2008; KWW in subsequent discus-
sion), we aim to make two contributions to the literature. First, we pres-
ent a formula for computing shares of foreign and domestic value added
(DVA) in a country’s exports when processing exports are pervasive. 
We develop this formula because we believe the production technology 
and input sourcing differs for goods produced for domestic consump-
tion and normal exports compared to those produced under export pro-
cessing regimes. We show that the HIY formula is a special case of this 
general formula. Second, we applied our methodology to China using 
data for 1997, 2002, and 2007. We estimate that the share of FVA in Chi-
na’s manufactured exports was about 50 percent in 1997–2002 before 
China’s WTO membership—almost twice as high as that implied by the 
HIY formula—and has risen to over 60 percent in 2007 after five years 
of its WTO membership. Our method and data also allow us to examine 
sectoral level results, and we find interesting variations across sectors. 
Those sectors that are likely labeled as relatively sophisticated, such as 
computers, telecommunications equipment, and electronic devices, had 
particularly low domestic content (about 30 percent or less). 
The approach in KWW is an accounting exercise and does not thor-
oughly examine the determinants, driving forces, and consequences 
of changes in domestic contents in China’s gross exports. However, 
we believe we produced a solid methodology to estimate and account 
domestic and FVA in developing countries exports as a necessary first 
step toward a better understanding of these issues. 
Besides HIY and related papers on vertical specialization, KWW is 
also related to the input-output (IO) literature. In particular, Chen et al. 
(2008) and Lau et al. (2007) are the first to develop a “noncompetitive” 
type IO model for China (i.e., one in which imported and domestically 
produced inputs are accounted for separately) and to incorporate pro-
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cessing exports explicitly. However, we believe that these papers do not 
describe a systematic way to infer separate IO coefficients for produc-
tion of processing exports versus those for other final demands. As a 
result it is difficult for others to replicate their estimates or apply their 
methodologies to other countries. In addition, KWW use an aggregated 
version of China’s 1995 and 2002 IO tables, respectively, to perform 
their analysis, with 20 some goods-producing industries. We provide a 
more up-to-date and more disaggregated assessment of FVA and DVA
in Chinese exports with 83 goods-producing industries. Finally, they 
imposed an assumption in estimating the import use matrix from the 
competitive type IO table published by China’s National Statistical 
Bureau: within each industry, the mix of the imported and domestic 
inputs is the same in capital formation, intermediate inputs, and final 
consumption. We relaxed this assumption by refining a method pro-
posed in Dean, Fung, and Wang (2011) that combines China’s process-
ing imports statistics with the United Nations Broad Economic Catego-
ries classification. 
The KWW Methodology 
In this section we summarize the methodology developed in KWW. 
As the reader will see, the method is particularly innovative and gen-
erates very useful insights regarding domestic and foreign content of 
Chinese trade. This method has also been applied to Mexico’s exports 
in De La Cruz et al. (2010), and more recently extended in a substantial 
way to examine global trade in value added in Koopman et al. (2010). 
In KWW we use very detailed information on China’s trade regimes, 
bilateral and at the tariff line, to modify China’s economy-wide IO data 
to reflect the substantial technology differences between its processing 
sectors and nonprocessing sectors. Our goal was to build on existing lit-
erature to split China’s IO table into two parts, processing and nonpro-
cessing, which would more accurately reflect the fact that the process-
ing sector intensively used imported components that did not enter the 
domestic economy for other uses in final demand. Table 2.7 provides a 
sense of what we are trying to accomplish. We are essentially trying to 
estimate the values in the columns of the IO matrix for production for 
domestic use and normal exports and production of processing exports. 
A mathematical description of the approach follows. 
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Table 2.7  Input-Output Table with Separate Production Account for Processing Trade 
Intermediate use 
Production for Production 
domestic use and of processing Final use Gross output 
normal exports exports (C+I+G+E) or imports 
DIM 1,2,…, N 1,2,…, N 1 1 
1 ZDD ZDP YD − EP X − EP 
. 
. 
. 
N 
1 0 0 EP EP 
. 
. 
. 
N 
1 ZMD ZMP YM M 
. 
. 
. 
N 
1 VD VP 
1 X − EP EP 
Domestic 
intermediate 
inputs 
Intermediate 
Production for domestic 
use and normal exports (D) 
Processing exports (P) 
inputs from imports 
Value-added 
Gross output 
SOURCE: Koopman, Wang, and Wei (2008). 
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We use superscript P and D, respectively, to represent process-
ing exports and domestic sales and normal exports. This expanded IO 
model can be formally described by the following system of equations: 
DD DP P D P(2.1) I − A −A   X − E  Y − E  
  =  P  P  
 0 I  E  E  
MD P MP P M(2.2) A (X − E ) + A E + Y = M 
DD MD D(2.3) uA + uA + Av = u 
DP MP P(2.4) uA + uA + Av = u 
The analytical solution of the system is 
P DD DP D P(2.5)  X − E  I − A −A 
−1 
Y − E  
 =  P   P 0 IE    E  
The generalized Leontief inverse for this expanded model can be com-
puted as follows: 
DD DP DD DP DD DD DP I − A −A 
−1 
B B   I − A I − A A 
(2.6) B =   =  PD PP  =  0 I B B 0 I      
DD −1 DD −1 DP (I − A ) (I − A ) A  
=  0 I  
Substituting Equation (2.6) into Equation (2.5), we have 
P DD −1 D P DD −1 DP p(2.7) X − E = (I − A ) (Y − E ) + (1− A ) A E 
Substituting Equation (2.7) into Equation (2.2), the total demand for 
imported intermediate inputs is 
M MD DD −1 D P MD DD −1 DP P MP p(2.8) M −Y = A (I − A ) (Y − E ) + A (1− A ) A E + A E 
MP p+ A E 
It has three components: the first term is total imported content in final 
domestic sale and normal exports, and the second and third terms are 
indirect and direct imported content in processing exports, respectively. 
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We can compute vertical specialization (VS) or foreign content 
share in processing and normal exports in each industry separately: 
T TMD DD −1(2.9) VSS D uA (I − A )
= MD DD −1 DP MP VSS P uA (1− A ) A + uA 
The total foreign content share in a particular industry is the sum of the 
two weighted by the share of processing and nonprocessing exports sp 
and u−sp, where both s and u are a 1 by n vector: 
P P VSS 
D 
(2.10) VSS = (u − s , s ) 
VSS P 
The foreign content (or FVA) share in a country’s total exports is 
P P 
MD DD −1 E − E MD DD −1 DP MP E(2.11) TVSS = uA (I − A ) + ( (1− ) + )
te 
EP MD DD −1 DP MP + u(A (1− A ) A + A ) 
te 
where te is a scalar, the country’s total exports. Equation (2.11) is a 
generalization of Equation (2.1), the formula to compute industry-level 
share of vertical specialization. Equation (2.11) is a generalization of 
the formula for country-level share of vertical specialization proposed 
by Hummels et al. (2001, p. 80). In particular, either when ADD = ADP
and AMD = AMP , or when EP/te = 0, Equation (2.11) reduces to the HIY
formula for VS. 
Similarly, the domestic content share for processing and normal 
exports at the industry level can be computed separately: 
D T − DD −1 DD −1 DP DVS D p (I − A ) (I − A ) A (2.12) = Av B = (Av A v )  DVS P 0 I  
TD DD −1Av (I − A )= D DD −1 DP PAv (I − A ) A + Av 
The total domestic content share in a particular industry is a weighted 
sum of the two: 
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DVS D (2.13) DVS = (u − sP , sP ) 
DVS P 
The domestic content share in a country’s total exports is 
P P 
D DD −1 E − E D DD −1 DP P E(2.14) TDVS = A (I − A ) + ( (1− ) + )V V Vte 
P 
D DD −1 DP P E+ (AV (1− A ) A + AV ) te 
Either when ADD = ADP and Av
D = Av
P or when EP/te = 0, Equation (2.14) 
reduces to the HIY formula. We can easily verify that for both process-
ing and normal exports, the sum of domestic and foreign content shares 
is unity. 
However, statistical agencies typically only report a traditional IO 
, ADD, AMPmatrix, AD, and sometimes AM, but not ADP , and AMD sepa-
rately. Therefore, a method to estimate these matrices, based on avail-
able information, had to be developed. In KWW we accomplish this 
through a quadratic programming model by combining information 
from trade statistics and conventional IO tables. The basic idea of this 
model is to use information from the standard IO table to determine 
sector-level total imports/exports, and information from trade statistics 
to determine the relative proportion of processing and normal exports 
within each sector, and thus use up all available data to split the national 
economy into processing and nonprocessing blocks, each with its own 
IO structure. Using the data from the IO table to determine sector-level 
total imports/exports helps to ensure that the balance conditions in the 
official IO account are always satisfied, and that the IO table with sepa-
rate processing and nonprocessing accounts estimated from the model 
always sums to the published official table. Such a method is a for-
malization of the calibration methods widely used in macroeconomics 
and CGE modeling when the number of endogenous variables is larger 
than the number of equations (see KWW, pp. 9–14, for details of the 
method). 
Estimation results 
Table 2.8 presents the results from KWW for the decomposition of 
aggregate FVA and DVA shares in 1997, 2002, and 2007. For compari-
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son, the results from the HIY method that ignores processing trade are 
also reported. The estimated aggregate DVA share in China’s merchan-
dise exports was 54 percent in 1997 and 60.6 percent in 2007. For man-
ufacturing products, these estimated shares are slightly lower in levels 
but trending upward significantly at 50 percent in 1997 and 59.7 percent 
in 2007, respectively. In general, the estimated direct DVA shares are 
less than half of the total DVA shares. However, the estimated indi-
rect FVA share was relatively small; most of the foreign content comes 
from directly imported foreign inputs, especially in 1997 and 2002. The 
indirect FVA increase over time and reach about a quarter of China’s 
directly imported foreign inputs in 2007, indicating that the share of 
simple processing and assembling of foreign parts is declining, while 
more imported intermediates are being used in the production of other 
intermediate inputs that are then used in the production process. 
Relative to the estimates from the HIY method, our procedure pro-
duces estimates of a much higher share of FVA in Chinese gross exports 
and with a different trend over time. To be more precise, estimates from 
the HIY method show that the foreign content share (total vs. share) 
increased steadily from 17.6 percent in 1997 to 28.7 percent in 2007 
for all merchandise exports, and from 19.0 percent to 27.1 percent for 
manufacturing only during the same period. In contrast, our estimates 
Table 2.8  Shares of Domestic and Foreign Value Added in Total 
Exports (%) 
The HIY method The KWW method 
1997 2002 2007 1997 2002 2007 
All merchandise 
Total foreign value added 17.6 25.1 28.7 46.0 46.1 39.4 
Direct foreign value added 8.9 14.7 13.7 44.4 42.5 31.6 
Total domestic value added 82.4 74.9 71.3 54.0 53.9 60.6 
Direct domestic value added 29.4 26.0 20.3 22.2 19.7 17.1 
Manufacturing goods only 
Total foreign value added 19.0 26.4 27.1 50.0 48.7 40.3 
Direct foreign value added 9.7 15.6 16.3 48.3 45.1 32.4 
Total domestic value added 81.1 73.6 72.9 50.0 51.3 59.7 
Direct domestic value added 27.5 24.6 24.6 19.6 18.1 16.5 
SOURCE: Koopman, Wang, and Wei (2008). 
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suggest a trend in the opposite direction, with the share of FVA in all 
merchandise exports falling from 46 percent in 1997 to 39.4 percent 
in 2007, and a similar decline for the share in manufacturing exports, 
which fell from 50 percent in 1997 to 40.3 percent in 2007. The decline 
occurs mainly during the 2002–2007 period, which corresponds to the 
first five years of China’s entry to the WTO. Our estimates indicate that 
the HIY method appears to incorrectly estimate both the level and the 
trend in domestic versus foreign content in the People’s Republic of 
China exports. 
What accounts for the difference between our and the HIY
approaches? There are at least three factors that drive the change of 
foreign content of the country’s gross exports: 1) the relative propor-
tions of its total imports used as intermediate inputs in producing pro-
cessing exports and domestic sales and normal exports; 2) the share of 
processing exports in its total exports; and 3) the sector composition of 
its exports. Because processing exports tend to use substantially more 
imported inputs, and processing exports account for a major share of 
China’s total exports, the HIY indicator is likely to substantially under-
estimate the true foreign content in China’s exports. This explains why 
the level of domestic content by our measure is much lower than that of 
the HIY indicator. On the other hand, as exporting firms (both those pro-
ducing for normal exports and those for processing exports) gradually 
increase their intermediate inputs sourcing from firms within China, or 
multinationals move their upstream production to be near their down-
stream production, the extent of domestic content in exports rises over 
time. This is exactly what has happened since China joined the WTO. 
However, because exports from industries with relatively lower domes-
tic content often grow faster due to dramatic inflow of foreign direct 
investment, the composition of a country’s total exports may play as 
an offsetting factor to reduce the share of DVA in the country’s gross 
exports and thus slow down the increase of DVA share in a country’s 
total exports. As the Chinese government starts to reduce the policy 
incentives for both FIEs and processing exports at the end of 2006, 
we are observing a trend of increasing domestic contents in Chinese 
exports as China continues its industrial upgrading in the years to come. 
Our interpretation is confirmed by DVA shares for processing and 
normal exports estimated separately (Table 2.9). There is a more than 
10 percentage point increase in the total FVA share for domestic sales 
 
 
 
 
 
Value Chains in Global Production Networks  51 
and normal exports between 1997 and 2007, which is consistent with 
the trend indicated by the HIY measure. However, in processing exports 
we see that more domestic-produced inputs were used, and DVA share 
increased from 20.7 percent in 1997 to 37.0 percent in 2007, up more 
than 16 percentage points. Because processing exports still constitute 
more than 50 percent of China’s total exports in 2007 the weighted 
average total DVA share went up over the decade. 
There are conflicting forces at work. On the one hand, as domes-
tic input suppliers increase their quality over time, and multinationals 
move more and more of their upstream production into China, export-
ing firms may decide to increase local sourcing of their inputs. On the 
other hand, the reductions in the country’s trade barriers also encourage 
exporting firms to use more imported inputs. These two opposing forces 
partially offset each other. However, on net, the domestic content share 
in China’s exports appears to be on the rise. Looking ahead, the share of 
imported content in exports could fall or rise, depending on the relative 
speed with which domestic input suppliers and multinationals can step 
Table 2.9  Domestic and Foreign Value Added: Processing vs. Normal 
Exports (% of total exports) 
Normal exports Processing exports 
1997 2002 2007 1997 2002 2007 
All merchandise 
Total foreign value added 5.2 10.4 16.0 79.0 74.6 62.7 
Direct foreign value added 2.0 4.2 5.0 78.6 73.0 58.0 
Total domestic value added 94.8 89.6 84.0 21.0 25.4 37.3 
Direct domestic value added 35.1 31.9 23.4 11.7 10.1 10.9 
Manufacturing goods only 
Total foreign value added 5.5 11.0 16.4 79.4 75.2 63.0 
Direct foreign value added 2.1 4.5 5.2 79.0 73.6 58.3 
Total domestic value added 94.5 89.0 83.6 20.7 24.8 37.0 
Direct domestic value added 31.5 29.5 22.4 11.7 10.0 10.9 
SOURCE: Koopman, Wang, and Wei (2008) and author’s estimates based on China’s 
1997, 2002, and 2007 benchmark input-output table published by the Bureau of 
National Statistics and Official China trade statistics from China Customs. 
NOTE: The HIY method refers to estimates from using the approach in Hummels, 
Ishii, and Yi (2001). The KWW method refers to estimates from using the approach 
developed in this paper that takes into account special features of processing exports.
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up their quality and variety versus the extent of additional reductions in 
the cost of using imported inputs. 
Sectoral results 
To see if there are interesting patterns at the sector level that help 
explain the decline trend of imported contents in China’s total exports, 
and further assess whether the increasing DVA share reflects actual 
upgrade of Chinese industrial structure, Tables 2.10 and 2.11 report, in 
ascending order on domestic content share, the value-added decompo-
sition in China manufacturing exports by industry in 2002 and 2007, 
respectively, together with shares of processing and foreign invested 
enterprises exports in each sector’s exports as well as the sector’s share 
in China’s total merchandise exports. We choose to report the results 
from 2002 and 2007 not only because we would like to use the latest IO 
table released, but also because these two benchmark tables are consis-
tently classified on most recent Chinese industry classifications, which 
simplifies issues involved in overtime comparison. Similar results for 
1997 are omitted to save space. 
Among the 57 manufacturing industries in Table 2.10, 15 have a 
share of DVA in their exports less than 50 percent in 2002, and col-
lectively account for nearly 35 percent of China’s merchandise exports 
that year. Many low-DVA industries are likely to be labeled as rela-
tively sophisticated, such as telecommunications equipment, electronic 
computer, measuring instruments, and electronic devices. A common 
feature of these industries is that processing exports account for over 
two-thirds of their exports, and foreign-invested enterprises played an 
overwhelming role. In 2007, the number of industries with less than 
50 percent domestic contents in their exports declined to 10, but their 
exports accounted for more than 32 percent of China’s total merchan-
dise exports, and these low-DVA industries are more concentrated in 
high-tech sectors. There are 11 industries in the top 15 low-DVA indus-
tries in 2002 that maintained that ranking in 2007. 
The next 18 industries in Table 2.11 have their share of DVA in the 
range of 51–65 percent; they collectively accounted for 28 percent of 
China’s total merchandise exports in 2002. Several labor-intensive sec-
tors are in this group, such as furniture; toys and sports products; and 
leather, fur, and down products. 
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The remaining 24 industries have relatively high shares of DVA. 
However, as a group they produced less than 30 percent of China’s 
total merchandise exports in 2002. Apparel, the country’s largest labor-
intensive exporting industry, which by itself was responsible for 7 per-
cent of the country’s total merchandise exports in 2002, is at the top 
of this group with a share of domestic content at 66 percent. The 12 
industries at the bottom of Table 2.10 with DVA share more than 75 
percent collectively produced only less than 10 percent of China’s total 
merchandise exports in 2002. 
The weights of high-DVA industries in China’s exports increased 
significantly in 2007. The number of industries with a DVA share of 
more than 75 percent increased to 25 in 2007 (bottom of Table 2.11), 
and their exports constituted more than 30 percent of China’s total 
merchandise exports in 2007. Among these high-DVA industries, we 
not only see the traditional labor industries such as furniture, textiles, 
and apparel still play a significant role (they account for more than 
half of these high-DVA-sector exports), but also the increasing role of 
heavy and capital-intensive industries such as automobile, industrial 
machinery, and rolling steel (they account for nearly one-third of these 
high-DVA sector’s exports). The data clearly indicate China’s indus-
trial upgrade is real and FIEs have played a very important role in this 
process. 
The groundbreaking work by HIY (2001) on vertical specialization 
needs to be interpreted with care, particularly in countries that make 
extensive use of processing trade. We find that for China the traditional 
HIY method substantially overestimated China’s domestic content in 
its exports and underestimated foreign content in its exports as in Table 
2.9. The HIY method estimates total DVA in Chinese exports ranging 
from 82 percent to 71 percent between 1997 and 2007, and that DVA
was declining. The KWW method estimates that Chinese DVA ranged 
from 46 percent to 39 percent during this period, much lower than the 
HIY method, and that Chinese DVA was rising. 
Further, with our method and data we could provide fairly detailed 
sectoral estimates of DVA in exports, as in Table 2.10. From this per-
spective you can observe that in 2002 China’s DVA in telecommunica-
tions, shipbuilding, and electronic computers was less than 20 percent 
of exported value. Many high-tech or sophisticated exports contained 
 
54  Table 2.10  Domestic Value-Added Share in Manufacturing Exports by Sector, 2002 
Value-added decomposition (%)
Nonprocessing Processing Weighted sum 
Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic % of % % of 
value value value value value value processing of FIE merchandise 
IO industry description added added added added added added exports exports exports 
Telecommunications equipment 12.6 87.5 94.7 5.3 87.5 12.5 91.2 88.4 3.2 
Shipbuilding 17.7 82.3 85.3 14.7 82.5 17.5 95.8 21.0 0.6 
Electronic computer 16.4 83.6 81.3 18.7 80.7 19.3 99.1 89.7 7.0 
Cultural and office equipment 20.3 79.7 80.7 19.3 76.7 23.3 93.4 71.6 4.3 
Household electric appliances 11.8 88.2 93.2 6.8 76.2 23.9 79.1 56.9 1.9 
Household audiovisual apparatus 17.5 82.5 78.7 21.3 73.0 27.0 90.6 62.3 5.2 
Printing, reproduction of recording media 8.9 91.1 80.3 19.7 68.1 31.9 83.0 62.7 0.3 
Plastic 15.6 84.4 89.7 10.3 63.4 36.6 64.5 51.2 2.4 
Electronic components 15.4 84.6 67.2 32.8 61.9 38.1 89.7 87.5 3.4 
Steelmaking 11.0 89.0 87.2 12.8 55.8 44.3 58.8 86.1 0.0 
Generators 14.8 85.2 68.1 32.0 55.7 44.3 76.8 55.8 0.9 
Other electronic and communication 2.2 97.8 64.0 36.0 54.7 45.3 84.9 84.9 1.8 
equipment 
Rubber 9.4 90.6 87.8 12.2 51.1 48.9 53.1 44.4 1.6 
Nonferrous metal pressing 13.8 86.2 92.5 7.5 50.7 49.3 46.9 48.7 0.4 
Measuring instruments 14.2 85.8 67.1 32.9 50.5 49.5 68.6 51.8 1.8 
Paper and paper products 9.2 90.8 87.6 12.4 48.9 51.1 50.7 57.0 0.5 
Furniture 11.7 88.3 87.5 12.5 47.5 52.5 47.2 56.8 1.7 
Articles for culture, education, and sports 12.5 87.5 61.8 38.2 47.3 52.7 70.6 56.3 3.3 
activities 
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Nonferrous metal smelting 11.1 88.9 89.4 10.6 46.4 53.6 45.0 17.4 0.8 
Smelting of ferroalloy 16.5 83.6 87.1 13.0 45.2 54.8 40.8 13.1 0.2 
Synthetic materials 19.5 80.5 62.9 37.1 44.8 55.2 58.3 65.4 0.3 
Petroleum refining and nuclear fuel 20.6 79.4 94.5 5.5 44.3 55.7 32.1 24.9 0.8 
Metal products 9.7 90.3 89.8 10.2 44.3 55.7 43.2 45.6 4.4 
Other transport equipment 14.0 86.0 87.3 12.7 44.2 55.8 41.2 50.5 1.2 
Other electric machinery and equipment 11.6 88.4 59.9 40.1 43.9 56.2 66.8 60.1 5.6 
Special chemical products 17.1 82.9 68.6 31.4 41.3 58.7 46.9 48.4 0.8 
Other manufacturing products 10.8 89.2 68.7 31.3 41.0 59.0 52.2 37.6 1.7 
Woolen textiles 8.9 91.1 91.2 8.8 40.0 60.1 37.8 42.6 0.3 
Paints, printing inks, pigments, and 16.5 83.5 91.7 8.3 38.4 61.6 29.1 44.4 0.4 
similar products 
Motor vehicles 10.5 89.6 90.0 10.0 38.4 61.6 35.2 48.2 0.8 
Glass and its products 13.2 86.8 83.5 16.5 36.4 63.6 33.0 48.8 0.5 
Leather, fur, down, and related products 8.1 91.9 59.7 40.4 36.1 63.9 54.3 50.3 4.5 
Chemical products for daily use 14.7 85.3 73.2 26.8 36.0 64.1 36.3 43.6 0.4 
Wearing apparel 8.7 91.3 65.7 34.3 34.4 65.6 45.1 39.2 7.0 
Chemical fiber 19.8 80.2 90.8 9.2 34.3 65.7 20.5 29.2 0.0 
Other special industrial equipment 10.8 89.3 68.0 32.0 33.6 66.4 39.9 44.0 1.3 
Boilers, engines, and turbines 14.1 85.9 86.9 13.1 33.5 66.5 26.7 28.4 0.4 
Other industrial machinery 9.9 90.1 61.4 38.6 32.4 67.6 43.7 43.7 3.5 
Iron-smelting 13.2 86.8 89.0 11.0 31.2 68.8 23.7 3.0 0.1 
Railroad transport equipment 16.2 83.9 85.4 14.6 29.9 70.1 19.9 5.9 0.1 
Wood, bamboo, rattan, palm, and straw 12.2 87.8 88.7 11.3 27.2 72.8 19.6 45.6 1.0 
products 
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Value-added decomposition (%)
Nonprocessing Processing Weighted sum 
Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic % of % % of 
value value value value value value processing of FIE merchandise 
IO industry description added added added added added added exports exports exports 
Knitted and crocheted fabrics and articles 9.4 90.6 65.3 34.7 27.1 72.9 31.6 34.2 5.8 
Agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, 14.3 85.7 86.1 13.9 27.1 72.9 17.8 20.8 0.1 
and fishing machinery 
Pesticides 23.0 77.0 88.5 11.5 27.1 72.9 6.3 14.4 0.2 
Hemp textiles 10.5 89.5 88.3 11.7 25.7 74.3 19.5 19.5 0.3 
Textiles productions 9.9 90.1 71.1 28.9 24.6 75.5 24.0 31.8 1.4 
Cotton textiles 8.2 91.8 64.5 35.6 24.3 75.7 28.7 28.8 3.3 
Fire-resistant materials 9.5 90.5 84.6 15.4 23.8 76.2 19.1 49.8 0.1 
Metalworking machinery 12.8 87.2 81.2 18.8 21.9 78.1 13.3 27.0 0.2 
Medicines 9.8 90.2 75.7 24.3 20.9 79.1 16.9 28.7 0.7 
Pottery and porcelain 11.8 88.2 85.3 14.8 20.2 79.8 11.4 33.1 0.7 
Other non-metallic mineral products 9.6 90.4 83.3 16.7 19.9 80.1 14.0 35.7 0.4 
Fertilizers 15.6 84.4 90.3 9.7 18.9 81.1 4.5 21.7 0.1 
Basic chemical raw materials 12.9 87.1 56.3 43.7 18.0 82.0 11.7 18.8 2.0 
Rolling of steel 9.8 90.2 59.5 40.5 17.7 82.3 16.0 16.8 0.3 
Cement, lime, and plaster 9.0 91.0 79.8 20.3 14.0 86.0 7.0 77.7 0.1 
Coking 8.6 91.4 86.8 13.2 10.6 89.4 2.6 5.3 0.3 
Total merchandise 10.4 89.6 74.6 25.4 46.1 53.9 55.7 51.8 92.5 
SOURCE: Koopman, Wang, and Wei (2008). China 2002 and 2007 benchmark IO tables have 84 and 90 goods-producing sectors respec-
tively; they both concord to China’s 4 digit classification of economic activities (GB/T 4754-2002). This concordance enabled us to 
aggregate both year’s estimates to 77 consistent goods-producing industries reported in this table. 
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less than 40 percent of Chinese domestic content. On the other hand, 
many of China’s historical export sectors, such as apparel, textiles and 
fabrics, and many steel or metal-related items, had domestic content in 
excess of 60 percent. These estimates suggest that studies that examine 
extraordinary sophistication of China’s exports, such as that by Rodrik 
(2006) and Schott (2008), might need to be interpreted with some care, 
as this sophistication may reflect the embodiment of sophisticated 
imported components. Further, if the domestic content in exports from 
China is low, especially in sectors that would have been considered 
sophisticated or high-skilled in the United States, then imports from 
the PRC may still generate a large downward pressure on the wage 
of the low-skilled Americans after all (as pointed out by Krugman 
[2008]). These are important policy questions and have implications 
for both developing and developed countries. A good understanding of 
the nature and extent of global supply chains could provide important 
insights for economists and policymakers. 
The work we did on China, similar work for Mexico (De La Cruz 
et al. 2010), and a growing literature on value added in trade led us to 
develop a method to look at global value added trade, while incorporat-
ing the insights we developed for large single country traders making 
heavy use of processing. Thus, in Koopman et al. (2010) we develop 
an estimation technique designed to tie, at a global level, value-added 
estimates to gross trade flows, which is the most commonly available 
trade data and is heavily used to support various policy positions. Thus 
we use IO techniques to examine global value chain links using gross 
exports as a weighting mechanism. In this chapter we fully character-
ized value-added contributions from direct and indirect sources in a 
country’s gross exports, formally generalizing the concept of verti-
cal specialization to account for all sources of value added in gross 
exports in a multicountry, multisector framework. It also connects the 
vertical trade literature with value-added trade literature, generalizing 
concepts such as DVA that returns home in goods and services after 
being processed or finished abroad, denoted VS1* by Daudin, Rifflart, 
and Schweisguth (2009). This measure can be sizable for some large 
advanced economies. 
To do this, we first divide gross exports into final demand and inter-
mediates. Within intermediates, we further divide those goods that are 
consumed by the direct importer from those goods that are processed 
58  Table 2.11  Domestic Value-Added Share in Manufacturing Exports by Sector, 2007 
Value-added decomposition (%) 
Nonprocessing Processing Weighted sum 
Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic % of % of % of 
value value value value value value processing FIE merchandise 
IO industry description added added added added added added exports exports exports 
Electronic component 22.5 77.5 76.9 23.1 67.7 32.3 83.1 89.8 4.9 
Household audiovisual apparatus 24.1 75.9 70.4 29.6 67.4 32.6 93.4 79.1 2.5 
Electronic computer 24.3 75.7 67.1 33.0 66.2 33.9 97.9 93.3 11.3 
Cultural and office equipment 25.9 74.1 66.9 33.1 63.5 36.5 91.7 86.4 1.6 
Other electronic and communication equip. 32.0 68.0 65.3 34.7 60.3 39.7 84.8 81.6 1.4 
Telecommunications equipment 24.8 75.2 64.7 35.3 56.4 43.6 79.3 83.6 5.9 
Shipbuilding 16.1 83.9 60.9 39.1 56.2 43.8 89.4 16.5 1.1 
Petroleum refining and nuclear fuel 31.3 68.7 79.9 20.1 55.6 44.4 50.1 27.3 0.7 
Measuring instruments 20.0 80.0 62.2 37.8 54.2 45.8 81.2 73.3 2.5 
Synthetic materials 23.6 76.4 66.1 34.0 52.4 47.7 67.7 66.1 0.6 
Household electric appliances 18.0 82.0 64.4 35.6 48.2 51.8 65.1 61.7 2.7 
Other electric machinery and equipment 19.7 80.3 66.3 33.7 47.9 52.1 60.5 65.9 4.9 
Rubber 18.3 81.8 73.0 27.0 46.7 53.4 51.8 41.9 1.7 
Plastic 19.2 80.8 68.9 31.1 44.9 55.1 51.7 54.7 1.7 
Articles for culture, education, and sports 17.0 83.0 54.4 45.6 41.7 58.4 66.0 64.9 2.1 
activities 
Special chemical products 23.3 76.7 66.0 34.0 38.4 61.6 35.3 51.2 0.8 
Chemical fiber 23.6 76.4 48.1 51.9 37.4 62.6 56.2 48.7 0.3 
Other special industrial equipment 17.5 82.5 57.0 43.0 34.8 65.2 43.8 54.7 2.7 
   59 
Generators 19.7 80.3 48.8 51.2 33.4 66.6 47.2 50.3 0.7 
Railroad transport equipment 22.3 77.7 45.9 54.1 31.0 69.0 37.0 12.2 0.1 
Leather, fur, down, and related products 9.6 90.4 59.6 40.4 30.8 69.2 42.5 46.0 2.4 
Paper and paper products 14.5 85.5 42.4 57.6 30.8 69.2 58.4 62.8 0.4 
Metal products 15.0 85.1 60.4 39.7 29.9 70.1 32.9 49.5 4.4 
Boilers, engines, and turbines 18.4 81.6 61.3 38.7 29.4 70.6 25.6 37.8 0.5 
Nonferrous metal pressing 21.4 78.6 43.9 56.1 28.8 71.2 32.7 41.4 1.0 
Other manufacturing products 13.5 86.5 52.0 48.1 27.7 72.3 36.8 41.5 1.6 
Paints, printing inks, pigments, and similar 23.5 76.5 43.2 56.8 27.5 72.6 20.1 47.3 0.3 
products 
Pesticides 26.1 73.9 46.5 53.6 27.1 72.9 4.8 19.5 0.1 
Chemical products for daily use 19.2 80.8 41.6 58.4 26.7 73.3 33.5 55.5 0.3 
Nonferrous metal smelting 23.8 76.2 43.6 56.4 26.7 73.3 14.6 19.6 0.8 
Other transport equipment 19.0 81.0 45.1 54.9 26.2 73.8 27.8 46.5 0.9 
Basic chemical raw materials 19.2 80.8 57.5 42.5 25.1 74.9 15.6 26.4 1.9 
Motor vehicles 16.0 84.0 52.6 47.4 24.7 75.3 23.7 42.0 2.0 
Agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, 19.4 80.6 42.3 57.7 24.4 75.6 21.9 32.7 0.1 
and fishing machinery 
Other industrial machinery 16.5 83.6 43.8 56.2 24.4 75.6 29.0 49.9 3.4 
Iron-smelting 24.1 75.9 49.4 50.6 24.4 75.6 1.1 24.3 0.1 
Smelting of ferroalloy 24.3 75.7 46.7 53.3 24.4 75.6 0.4 8.8 0.4 
Furniture 13.3 86.7 43.9 56.1 23.8 76.2 34.2 56.0 2.0 
Printing, reproduction of recording media 13.6 86.4 39.0 61.0 23.5 76.5 39.0 44.4 0.2 
Glass and its products 16.7 83.3 41.0 59.0 23.3 76.7 27.2 46.4 0.6 
Woolen textiles 10.6 89.4 42.2 57.9 23.1 76.9 39.8 46.8 0.2 
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Value-added decomposition (%)
Nonprocessing Processing Weighted sum 
Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic % of % of % of 
value value value value value value processing FIE merchandise 
IO industry description added added added added added added exports exports exports 
Metalworking machinery 18.8 81.2 43.2 56.8 22.7 77.3 16.0 36.4 0.3 
Rolling of steel 20.0 80.0 47.2 52.9 22.2 77.8 8.3 22.6 3.8 
Fertilizers 19.0 81.0 42.7 57.3 22.1 77.9 13.2 9.5 0.3 
Cotton textiles 12.0 88.0 54.3 45.8 21.1 78.9 21.5 26.1 2.1 
Wearing apparel 10.5 89.5 46.1 53.9 21.0 79.0 29.7 36.9 4.6 
Medicines 12.4 87.6 62.5 37.5 19.7 80.3 14.5 32.3 0.8 
Wood, bamboo, rattan, palm, and straw 15.4 84.6 41.7 58.4 19.6 80.4 16.1 33.1 1.0 
products 
Steelmaking 19.2 80.8 48.3 51.7 19.2 80.8 0.2 7.1 0.3 
Pottery and porcelain 16.6 83.4 41.9 58.2 18.0 82.0 5.2 29.9 0.5 
Textiles productions 11.6 88.4 45.1 54.9 17.6 82.4 18.1 35.1 1.8 
Knitted and crocheted fabrics and articles 11.8 88.2 48.4 51.6 17.5 82.5 15.6 25.7 5.7 
Other non-metallic mineral products 14.0 86.0 43.4 56.6 17.0 83.0 10.1 25.1 0.5 
Hemp textiles 13.4 86.6 43.2 56.8 16.1 83.9 9.0 14.7 0.2 
Fire-resistant materials 13.5 86.6 44.9 55.1 15.3 84.7 5.8 51.6 0.1 
Cement, lime, and plaster 11.0 89.0 47.1 52.9 11.6 88.4 1.7 29.6 0.1 
Coking 10.4 89.6 10.4 89.6 0.0 11.4 0.3 
Total merchandise 16.0 84.0 62.7 37.3 39.4 60.6 50.1 55.7 96.0 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations. China 2002 and 2007 benchmark IO tables have 84 and 90 goods-producing sector, respectively; they 
both concord to China’s 4 digit classification of economic activities (GB/T 4754-2002). This concordance enables us to aggregate both 
years’ estimates to 77 consistent goods-producing industries reported in this table. 
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and exported by the direct importer for consumption or further process-
ing in a third country: 
(2.15) Ers = Yrs + Ars X s = rs + rs ss + rs st + rs 
Yrs + Ars X ss + ∑ Ars X st + Ars X sr
 
 t≠r ,s 
 Final goods Intermediates Processed andProcessed and exported 
exported to s  absorbed in s exported back to r to third countries 
where Xst is the output of country s used to produce goods absorbed in 
country t. Note that the last three terms sum to the bilateral gross trade 
in intermediate goods, and each may include both intermediates and 
final products produced in the importing country s. 
In Koopman et al. (2010), we transform the above equation to arrive 
at our key decomposition equation that states that a country’s gross 
exports to the world is the sum of the following five broad terms: 
(2.16) E = DV +  FVr* r r 
= V B Y +V B A X +V B A X +V B A X +r rr ∑ rs r rr ∑ rs ss r rr ∑∑ rs st r rr ∑ rs sr 
s≠r s≠r s≠r t≠r ,s s≠r
  
   
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
+V B A X + FVr rr ∑ rs sr r 
s≠r
  
(4) (5) 
where, 
(1) DVA embodied in exports of final goods and services absorbed 
by the direct importer, 
(2) DVA embodied in exports of intermediate inputs used by the 
direct importer to produce its domestically needed products, 
(3) DVA embodied in intermediate exports used by the direct 
importer to produce goods for third countries (indirect value-
added exports), 
(4) DVA embodied in intermediate exports used by the direct 
importer to produce goods shipped back to source (reflected 
DVA), and 
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(5) value added from foreign countries embodied in gross exports 
(FVA used in exports). 
This decomposition formula is also shown in Figure 2.10, which 
integrates the older literature on vertical specialization with the newer 
literature on value-added trade, while ensuring that measured value 
added from all sources accounts for total gross exports. The vertical spe-
cialization literature emphasized that gross exports contain two sources 
of value added, domestic and foreign. The second equation above shows 
that a country’s DVA could be further broken down into additional com-
ponents that reveal the destination of a country’s exported value added, 
including its own value added that returns home in its imports.9 The 
sum of (1), (2), and (3) equals each country’s value-added exports to 
the world; the sum of (1), (2), (3), and (4) equals domestic content in a 
country’s gross exports, thus nicely connecting the two major concepts 
in the vertical specialization and value-added trade literature on the one 
hand, and clearly distinguishing them on the other hand. 
In addition, all other measures in the literature can be derived from 
a combination of the five basic measures. For instance, the sum of (3) 
and (4) equals HIY’s VS1 in gross exports; the sum of (1), (2), and (3) 
divided by gross exports equals Johnson and Noguera’s (2010) ratio 
of value-added exports to gross exports (VAX ratio); and the sum of 
(4) and (5) equals the portion of trade that is double counted in official 
trade statistics.10 
In Table 2.12 we report the global decomposition by country or 
regional grouping in our database for 2004 and map it back to the exist-
ing measures in the literature. An interesting insight reported in the 
table is our estimate of the double or multiple counting (column 9) in 
global trade flows as a result of value added moving across multiple 
borders. We estimate that the global average is 25.6 percent. One can 
observe a number of interesting insights from this global approach. We 
can see that some countries, such as Japan, Indonesia, and the Phil-
ippines, are important intermediate suppliers, providing indirect value 
added through their exports to third countries. Some countries such 
as Brazil, Russia, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand export a lot of 
value-added intermediates that are consumed by the direct importer. 
Another interesting insight is that the EU and the United States have a 
much greater share of their DVA exports return home to them embed-
ded in other countries’ exports. 
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Figure 2.10  Decomposition of Gross Exports: Concepts 
Exported in 
final goods 
(1) 
Exported in 
intermediates 
absorbed by 
direct importers 
(2) 
Exported in 
intermediates 
re-exported to 
third countries 
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Exported in 
intermediates 
that return 
home 
(4) 
Other countries’
DVA in 
intermediates 
(5) 
Domestic 
value added 
(DVA) 
Foreign 
value added 
(FVA) 
Gross exports 
Direct value- Indirect value-
added exports added exports 
(1) + (2) (3) 
NOTE: (4) is also labeled as VS1* by Daudin et al. (2009). (5) is labeled as VS, and (3) 
+ (4) is labeled as VS1 by HIY (2001). (4) and (5) involve value added that crosses 
national borders at least twice, and are the sources of multiple counting of value added 
in standard trade statistics. The share of domestic content in a country’s exports equals 
(1) + (2) + (3) + (4). (1) + (2) is the VAX ratio for each country’s exports to the world 
defined by Johnson and Noguera (2010). 
SOURCE: Koopman et al. (2010). 
This global approach also allows us to provide interesting policy-
relevant insights that otherwise might not have been evident. For exam-
ple, in the USITC’s recent study (2011) we provide insights on U.S. 
trade using value-added trade data.11 Although U.S. imports from China 
and Mexico are considerable, these countries contribute less value 
added to U.S. imports than Europe, Canada, and Japan, the three larg-
est contributors to value added (Table 2.13). Remarkably, U.S. value 
added that returns home after receiving further processing elsewhere 
ranks fourth, at 8.3 percent. Among all countries, the United States has 
the highest share of its own value-added exports returned home in its 
 
 
        
        
64  Table 2.12  Decomposition of Gross Exports, 2004 
Basic decomposition Connection with existing measures 
DVA in DVA in Indirect GVC 
direct intermediates DVA participation 
exports absorbed exports Foreign (vertical 
of final by direct to third Retuned value VAX Domestic Multiple trade, 
goods importer countries DVA added ratioa VS1b contentb counting OECD) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Advanced economies 
Australia, New Zealand 27.0 33.6 27.4 0.6 11.5 88.0 27.9 88.5 12.0 39.4 
Canada 23.5 36.2 10.9 1.3 28.1 70.5 12.2 71.9 29.5 40.4 
EFTA 23.0 36.3 14.7 0.8 25.2 74.0 15.5 74.8 26.0 40.8 
EU 38.1 29.6 13.5 7.4 11.4 81.1 20.9 88.6 18.9 32.3 
Japan 38.4 18.5 28.0 2.9 12.2 84.9 30.8 87.8 15.1 43.1 
United States 32.5 27.6 14.6 12.4 12.9 74.6 27.0 87.1 25.4 39.9 
Asian NICs 
Hong Kong 27.2 25.8 18.9 0.6 27.5 71.9 19.5 72.5 28.1 47.0 
Korea 29.5 13.5 22.3 0.9 33.9 65.2 23.2 66.1 34.8 57.0 
Taiwan 19.2 12.6 26.4 0.8 41.1 58.2 27.1 58.9 41.8 68.2 
Singapore 11.0 13.1 12.2 0.6 63.2 36.3 12.8 36.8 63.7 76.0 
Emerging Asia 
China normal 44.2 20.3 19.7 1.2 14.6 84.2 20.9 85.4 15.8 35.5 
China processing 28.8 10.2 4.1 0.3 56.6 43.1 4.4 43.4 56.9 61.0 
Indonesia 20.0 28.1 28.4 0.6 22.9 76.5 29.0 77.1 23.5 51.9 
Malaysia 16.7 17.7 24.1 0.9 40.5 58.6 25.0 59.5 41.4 65.5 
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Philippines 17.6 11.1 29.0 0.4 41.9 57.8 29.4 58.1 42.2 71.2 
Thailand 27.9 14.0 18.1 0.3 39.7 60.0 18.5 60.3 40.0 58.1 
Vietnam 32.9 15.3 14.4 0.4 37.0 62.6 14.8 63.0 37.4 51.8 
Rest of East Asia 35.3 26.9 16.1 0.1 21.7 78.2 16.2 78.3 21.8 37.9 
India 30.2 30.8 18.6 0.4 20.1 79.6 18.9 79.9 20.4 39.0 
Rest of South Asia 48.8 19.2 10.6 0.1 21.3 78.6 10.7 78.7 21.4 32.0 
Other emerging 
Brazil 27.4 40.7 19.0 0.3 12.7 87.0 19.2 87.3 13.0 31.9 
EU accession countries 28.7 29.2 10.4 1.0 30.8 68.3 11.4 69.2 31.7 42.1 
Mexico normal 23.5 41.1 17.4 0.6 17.3 82.1 18.1 82.7 17.9 35.3 
Mexico processing 20.6 10.1 5.6 0.3 63.4 36.3 5.9 36.7 63.7 69.3 
Rest of Americas 23.8 40.6 20.4 0.7 14.4 84.9 21.2 85.6 15.2 35.6 
Russian Federation 9.5 49.1 30.5 0.7 10.2 89.1 31.2 89.8 10.9 41.4 
South Africa 23.1 34.5 24.0 0.2 18.2 81.6 24.2 81.8 18.4 42.4 
Rest of the world 15.0 45.6 22.4 2.5 14.6 83.0 24.9 85.4 17.0 39.5 
World average 29.2 27.7 17.5 4.0 21.5 74.4 21.5 78.5 25.6 43.0 
a Data from Johnson and Noguera (2010). 
b Data from Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001). 
NOTE: All columns are expressed as a share of total gross exports. DVA = domestic value added. Country groupings follow IMF regions 
(http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/01/weodata/groups.htm#oem). 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations. 
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imports.12 This high share reflects both the large size of the U.S. market 
and its tight integration with Canada and Mexico. 
The value-added approach more accurately portrays the origin of the 
value in U.S. imports than can standard gross import data. For example, 
Japan has an 8.7 percent share of total U.S. imports, but accounts for 
10.4 percent of the value added in U.S. imports. Japan’s higher share 
of value-added imports indicates that a substantial share of its exports 
(26 percent) first journey to other countries and undergo additional pro-
cessing before being exported to the United States. Specifically, Japan 
produces a large volume of high-value components that are shipped 
to other Asian countries, particularly China, where they are assembled 
into consumer goods and then exported (Dean, Lovely, and Mora 2009). 
In contrast, China’s share of U.S. value-added imports (7.7 percent) is 
less than its share of total U.S. imports (11.1 percent). China is the final 
assembler in a number of supply chains in which Japan and other coun-
tries in East Asia supply parts. Similarly, exports from many smaller 
East Asian countries pass through third countries, such as China, before 
entering the United States. Canada and Mexico also have lower shares 
of U.S. value-added imports than their total U.S. imports. U.S. imports 
from Canada and Mexico contain many U.S.-produced components, 
which contribute to the large share of U.S. exported value that returns 
home. Obviously understanding the underlying geographic composi-
tion of value added in imports can ensure a deeper understanding of a 
large number of policy issues, such as FTA negotiations, supply chain 
disruptions, and the impact of currency revaluations. 
Various countries and regions contribute value to U.S. imports in 
different sectors (Table 2.14). Europe is the largest source of value 
added for many sectors, particularly business services. U.S.-returned 
value added is most significant in motor vehicles and parts (19.1 per-
cent); much of this represents value added returned home from other 
NAFTA countries, as the United States is heavily involved in auto sup-
ply chains in this region. Europe and Japan also contribute significant 
amounts of value added to U.S. imports of motor vehicles and parts. 
U.S.-returned value added is also fairly high for apparel (11.0 percent), 
since some rules of origin provide for duty-free imports of apparel 
made from U.S. yarns and fabrics. East Asia, which has abundant low-
cost labor and is well integrated into supply chains with China, contrib-
uted the most value added to U.S. imports of apparel (27.8 percent).13 
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Table 2.13  U.S. Imports and Value-Added Shares in U.S. Imports, 2004, by Source 
Total Share of Share of Share of value-added passing 
imports general imports value-added through a third country before 
Region ($, millions) (%) imports (%) entering the United States (%) 
Europe 393,301 24.7 26.1 17.6 
Canada 242,170 15.2 11.0 3.2 
Japan 138,417 8.7 10.4 26.0 
United States — 0.0 8.3 100.0 
China 176,879 11.1 7.7 14.8 
Mexico 154,571 9.7 4.9 4.0 
Rest of Americasa 76,183 4.8 4.7 13.2 
Developing East Asia 79,250 5.0 4.5 32.4 
Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong 73,066 4.6 4.3 36.7 
Korea 51,707 3.3 3.3 31.8 
Brazil 23,662 1.5 1.6 20.3 
Australia and New Zealand 15,717 1.0 1.3 33.6 
Russia 12,003 0.8 1.3 46.4 
India 17,486 1.1 1.1 22.0 
South Asia 9,557 0.6 0.5 10.2 
Rest of world 120,320 7.6 8.5 23.5 
Total 1,590,124 100.0 100.0 25.8b 
aIncluding South American, Central American, and Caribbean countries other than Mexico and Brazil. 
bU.S. average, weighted by U.S. imports from all sources. 
SOURCE: Commission estimates. Table 3.2 in the USITC study. 
68  Table 2.14  Country or Regional Sources of Value Added on U.S. Imports, Selected Sectors, 2004 (%)
 U.S 
Latin 
Sector
 returned 
China Japan East Asia Canada Mexico America Europe Others 
Total 8.3 7.7 10.4 12.0 11.0 4.9 6.3 26.1 13.2 
Selected sectors 
Apparel 11.0 11.2 2.4 27.8 2.4 2.0 10.4 11.4 21.4 
Chemicals, rubber, and plastics 6.3 5.0 9.7 8.7 12.0 2.5 3.6 42.8 9.4 
Motor vehicles and parts 19.1 2.5 23.0 7.2 16.0 3.8 1.9 23.1 3.4 
Electronic equipment 8.6 14.4 19.0 29.6 2.4 9.3 1.3 11.4 3.9 
Machinery and equipment 11.3 10.1 17.2 9.7 6.9 4.7 2.9 32.1 5.1 
Business services 1.5 1.3 6.2 12.7 8.8 0.2 2.7 55.5 11.3 
SOURCE: Commission estimates from USITC (2008, Table 3.3). 
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Sectoral insights on value-added imports can again inform FTA nego-
tiations, provide insights on supply chain disruptions, and help identify 
potential indirect effects of protection measures. 
The value-added shares of U.S. absorption (i.e., the use of interme-
diate inputs plus consumption of final products, or equivalently total 
domestic expenditures on goods and services) provide another view of 
the sectors and regions where global value chains are important to the 
U.S. economy. Absorption can distinguish the relative U.S. and FVA
shares in products consumed in the United States. Overall, the United 
States itself generates a large share (89 percent) of the value of final and 
intermediate goods that it uses (Table 2.15). This share is on par with 
those of Japan (90 percent) and the EU-15 (88 percent), and is higher 
than those of most developing countries.14 The many goods and ser-
vices produced and consumed in the United States and the large portion 
of U.S. value returned in imports contribute to the high share. 
Although overall U.S. value in absorption is high, the domestic 
value share is typically lower for sectors actively involved in global 
supply chains. There is substantial foreign content in electronic equip-
ment, apparel, and motor vehicles. For apparel, consistent with value 
added in imports, China and East Asia contribute more value to U.S. 
absorption than Mexico and Latin America (largely from Central Amer-
ica). Japan, Canada, and Europe are major participants in supply chains 
for motor vehicles and parts, and together account for almost one-third 
of the value added in U.S. absorption in the sector. Japan, East Asia, 
Mexico, and Europe participate in the supply chain for electronic equip-
ment, which is one of the largest in terms of the number of countries 
contributing significant value added. Electronics has the highest share 
of foreign content: fully two-thirds of the value of all electronics prod-
ucts used by U.S. industry and consumers originates abroad. Hence, 
foreign value in some U.S. industries may be substantially higher than 
estimates in previous studies based on gross input use or gross trade. 
In business services, a category that includes consulting and com-
puter support, the United States provides a large portion (88.5 percent) 
of its absorbed value added, while Europe contributes 5.9 percent. 
Despite the high profile of India’s consulting and computer services 
and the prominence of some large suppliers, India supplied only 0.1 
percent of the value added in U.S. absorption of business services in 
2004, though this may have risen in recent years. 
Table 2.15  Country or Regional Sources of Value Added in U.S. Absorption, Selected Sectors, 2004 (%) 
Latin 
Sector U.S. China Japan East Asia Canada Mexico America Europe Others 
70 
Total 89.0 0.9 1.3 1.5 1.3 0.6 0.7 3.2 1.4 
Selected sectors 
Apparel 54.3 4.1 0.6 18.3 2.1 1.8 5.7 2.9 8.6 
Chemicals, rubber, and plastics 69.1 3.1 4.2 4.2 3.4 0.8 1.4 11.9 1.5 
Motor vehicles and parts 57.3 1.5 11.3 3.4 10.1 4.6 0.6 10.6 0.5 
Electronic equipment 33.3 9.3 12.7 23.3 1.8 10.9 0.8 7.0 0.8 
Machinery and equipment 76.1 2.7 4.5 3.1 2.2 1.6 0.7 8.4 0.6 
Business services 88.5 0.3 1.4 1.1 1.4 0.0 0.5 5.9 0.8 
SOURCE: Commission estimates from USITC (2008, Table 3.4). 
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In addition, the U.S. trade balance is a frequently discussed trade 
issue. The United States has had large trade deficits in recent years (e.g., 
$500 billion in 2010), and it has also had substantial bilateral deficits 
with major trading partners. The value-added trade work discussed 
here, and in the literature more broadly, has demonstrated that many 
countries may add value to a particular good or service in a global sup-
ply chain, and that attributing the entire export value to the last export-
ing country can provide a misleading picture of the sources of value in 
trade. While the overall trade balance is not affected by value-added 
calculations, examinations of bilateral trade balances on a value-added 
basis yield different conclusions about the extent to which specific for-
eign countries contribute to a country’s deficit, and here we will focus 
on the U.S. deficit. 
The contribution of China to the U.S. trade deficit differs substan-
tially depending on which of the two measures is used. China is often 
the final assembler in a large number of global supply chains, and it 
uses components from many other countries to produce its exports. In 
Figure 2.11 we see that the U.S.-China trade deficit on a value-added 
basis is considerably smaller (by about 40 percent in 2004) than on 
the commonly reported basis of official gross trade.15 In contrast, Japan 
exports parts and components to countries throughout Asia, many of 
which are eventually assembled into final products and exported to the 
United States. Thus the U.S.-Japan trade balance on a value-added basis 
is larger than the comparable gross trade deficit. The U.S. value-added 
trade deficits with other major trading partners (Canada, Mexico, and 
the EU-15) differ by smaller amounts from their corresponding gross 
trade deficits. 
There is significant political debate in the United States regarding 
efforts to encourage China to appreciate the Renminbi (RMB) faster. 
The logic behind this argument is that if the RMB were to unilaterally 
appreciate by 30 percent, then Chinese export prices will increase by 
30 percent, raising prices in the United States of Chinese products and 
reducing U.S. demand for those imported products. Apparently expec-
tations are that U.S. consumers would then buy other, U.S-made prod-
ucts, or production of those products would shift back to the United 
States, and/or U.S. consumers would decide to save the money they oth-
erwise would have spent, resulting in an overall decline in U.S. imports. 
Furthermore, a number of commentators have suggested that such an 
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Figure 2.11  U.S. Bilateral Trade Deficits with Major Trading Partners, 
2004 
China 
EU-15 
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Gross deficit 
Value-added deficit 
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SOURCE: Commission estimates from USITC (2008, box 3.4) 
appreciation could raise U.S. employment anywhere from 600,000 to 
2.3 million additional jobs.16 
However, unilateral RMB appreciation will likely raise the costs of 
Chinese content, or value added, in its exports. Thus, if Chinese value 
added for electronics products is 15 percent of its exports prices, then 
a 30 percent appreciation of the RMB could raise the price of Chinese 
electronics products by only 4.5 percent, not 30 percent. Of course, his-
torically, exchange rate pass through has typically been much less than 
1.0, perhaps because of value-added content related issues, but also 
because of competitive pricing decisions by exporters who may absorb 
some of the increase. Further, it appears more likely that U.S. consum-
ers would continue to demand similar products, probably imported from 
some other international supplier, at a higher price, though perhaps 
priced in a different currency. An excellent overview of these issues can 
be found in Arnold (2008). Thus, with a more in-depth understanding 
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of value-added trade, one can better understand the potential impact on 
country-specific export prices based on a currency appreciation. 
Another insight gained from value-added trade is correcting a fairly 
standard, though potentially misleading, measure of export’s contribu-
tion to GDP growth. In Figure 2.12 we see that export growth as a share 
of GDP is not necessarily a good indicator of GDP growth, as Mexico, 
a country with a relatively high ratio of export to GDP, has had mixed 
GDP growth over the period, while countries such as Brazil and India, 
with relatively low shares of export to GDP growth, are experiencing 
rather robust and extensive economic growth. McKinsey researchers 
illustrated that export growth’s contribution to economic growth in 
China using traditional GDP growth decomposition methods was very 
misleading (Horn, Singer, and Woetzel 2010). Using traditional meth-
ods suggests that exports contributed 40–60 percent of China’s eco-
nomic growth from 1990 to 2008; however, they recalculate China’s 
GDP growth for 2002–2007, 2008, and 2009, adopt the KWW (2008) 
method, and find that exports contributed 14–27 percent of overall GDP
Figure 2.12  Gross Exports as a Share of GDP, Selected Countries 
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growth and that the role of investment and private consumption are sub-
stantially more important. Economists generally view sustained eco-
nomic growth as being driven by investment and consumption growth 
on the demand side. 
In sum, the fact that we can now generate single country and global 
value-added trade databases now allows the insights generated from a 
vast array of product-specific value and supply chain case studies to 
be translated into more aggregated data tied to traditional measures of 
global trade. The ability to combine product level case studies with sec-
tor and country level data is a major step forward in our efforts to more 
accurately inform policymakers about the impacts and implications of 
trade and trade policy. 
Notes 
The contributions of Zhi Wang, Shang-Jin Wei, and Justino De La Cruz are greatly 
appreciated; however, any and all remaining errors in this paper are mine. The views 
expressed here are solely those of the author and do not reflect the views of the U.S. 
International Trade Commission or any of its commissioners. 
1. For a more extensive discussion on these issues see, for example, Fosler and
Bottelier (2007) and Branstetter and Lardy (2006). 
2. Ahearne et al. (2007) presents a nice summary. 
3. See Hammer (2006) for extensive discussions on driving factors in U.S-China 
trade and Yao (2008) for a similar discussion on trade between China and the 
world. 
4. This section is drawn from U.S. Trade Shifts found at http://www.usitc.gov/
tradeshifts/2007/default.htm (accessed June 27, 2012). 
5. This is a very abbreviated summary of the U.S.-China trade relationship. For more 
detailed discussions of U.S.-China and China-world trade patterns, see Hammer 
(2006) and Yao (2008). 
6. See, for example, testimony from C. Fred Bergsten, of the Peterson Institute of 
International Economics, before the Hearing on China’s Exchange Rate Policy, 
Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, September 
15, 2012. http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/transcript/9854.html#trumka
(accessed June 27, 2012). 
7. China’s trade-weighted tariff rate reflects the relatively high tariffs remaining 
on imports of textiles and apparel. In fact, China’s declining average tariff rate 
over the period in the table reflects more of the changing composition of China’s 
exports increasingly toward products in lower tariff lines as found in HS 84. 
8. De La Cruz et al. (2010); Koopman, Wang, and Wei (2010); and Powers et al. 
(2010) are among some of the papers generated from this effort. In the following 
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discussions on value-added trade in China and for global value added estimates, I 
draw heavily from sections of Koopman, Wang, and Wei (2008) and Koopman et 
al. (2010). 
9. Since Equation (16) decomposes all bilateral exports from country s to country r, 
it also simultaneously decomposes bilateral imports. 
10. Component (3) should not be included in double counting because when this value 
crosses a border the second time, it becomes foreign value in the direct impor-
ter’s exports. For this reason, it is not included as double counting to avoid an 
overcorrection. 
11. The discussion surrounding Tables 2.12, 2.13, and 2.14 draws heavily on USITC 
(2011). 
12. The world average is 4.0 percent. Other economies with high shares include the 
EU (7.2 percent) and Japan (3.4 percent) (Koopman et al. 2010). 
13. Major changes have occurred in global supply chains involving textiles and 
apparel since 2004, and China’s prominence in U.S. imports has likely increased.
14. EU-15 refers to the first 15 countries to join the EU. DVA shares for Japan, the 
EU-15, and other countries come from Koopman et al. (2010). 
15. Using a slightly different method, a recent study by the WTO and the Institute of 
Developing Economies–Japan External Trade Organization (2011) finds that this 
discrepancy was about 53 percent in 2005 and 42 percent in 2008. Johnson and 
Noguera (2010) have roughly similar results also, though in their estimates the 
bilateral U.S. deficit with Mexico reversed to a surplus. 
16. Bergsten (2010) estimates between 600,000 and 1.2 million jobs from a substan-
tial appreciation, Krugman (2010) estimates the effect at 1.4 million jobs, and 
Scott (2010) estimates 2.3 million jobs with a return of the bilateral deficit to 2001 
levels. It has been difficult to reproduce employment impacts like this using stan-
dard USITC general equilibrium models, even when we restrict the model to force 
substitution of forgone imports to U.S. production. 
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China’s Economy from 
an American’s Perspective 
Gene H. Chang 
University of Toledo 
There have been many discussions about China’s economy through-
out the United States. Take an example from the Midwest. Years ago, 
the popular media focus was on cheap products made in China being 
sold in Walmart and Meijer, a regional grocery chain. Later, it was Gen-
eral Motors’ joint venture and Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurants in 
China. Most recently, the focus has turned toward China’s purchases 
of U.S. assets. It is no longer just about China investing in U.S. gov-
ernment bonds—in Toledo, Ohio, local news reports last year told of 
Mayor Michael Bell’s sale of some city-owned properties to Chinese 
investors. After two trips to China, Bell succeeded in selling two water-
front real estate properties for a total of $5 million, helping balance the 
city’s budget. While the deal did cause some controversy, most people 
welcomed the injection of money into the city’s strapped budget; in 
similar fashions across the country, people are realizing that China’s 
economy has become very relevant not just on the national level, but 
also on the local level. 
This chapter will focus on China’s economy from an American’s 
perspective by focusing on China’s economic size, momentum, and 
potential, as well as the possible problems and hurdles China will face 
in the near future. Although there have been many discussions about 
China, there are also many misunderstandings too. As China is playing 
an increasingly important role in global affairs in the new century, the 
United States needs to be prepared to meet the challenges from China. 
A better understanding about China would help to improve policies of 
the bilateral relationship, so we can coexist in the new global economic 
order. 
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Perhaps the word that best describes China and its economy in the 
twenty-first century is dynamic. Here the word has multiple meanings: 
it means that the Chinese economy is expected to grow quickly and 
reshape the world economic map. It also means that China can impact 
the world economy in ways that the rest of the world may or may not 
appreciate. It also means that China has the potential to experience 
political or economic crises that could cause China’s system to collapse 
and its economy to stagnate. 
The West has complex views on China’s increasing role in the 
world. In a 2011 global survey by the Pew Research Center on interna-
tional opinions of whether China will overtake the United States as the 
largest economy, most Europeans think that China has already done so 
or soon will. Americans are equally divided between “yes” or “never” 
on this question. People in rival countries such as India and Japan are 
more doubtful. Yet, by any measure, there has been a significant change 
in the global attitude toward China compared to 10 years ago, when 
China’s economic size was only a small fraction of that of the United 
States. To a large extent, the world is uncomfortable about a super-
power that is under an authoritarian regime and ruled by a Communist 
Party. Among the same respondents, most (except for those in African 
and Muslim countries) consider China becoming the world’s leading 
economic power as a bad thing. 
In this chapter, I will discuss some seemingly straightforward 
subjects that often result in misunderstandings. They include the size 
of China’s economy, trade with China, the kinds of challenges China 
poses to the United States, and China’s own problems and weaknesses. 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ChINA AND ThE UNITED STATES 
China and the United States are similar in physical size and climate 
zones, but in terms of topography, China is mostly mountainous and the 
United States is mostly flat. The resource endowments of both coun-
tries are similar, but China’s population is more than four times that of 
the United States. The two countries are the largest economies in the 
world; however, in per capita terms, China is much poorer. In terms of 
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social and economic development levels, China also significantly lags 
the United States. Table 3.1 lists the basic statistics of the two countries. 
The economic relationship between the United States and China 
is crucially important for both countries because they depend on each 
other and they are integrated. The United States relies on China for 
cheap consumer products and for financing the U.S. debt, while China 
relies on the United States for export markets, technology, and for-
eign direct investment. China is the second-largest trade partner of the 
United States, with a total volume of imports and exports of $457 bil-
lion in 2010. Aside from multinational companies’ intracompany, cross-
border shipments between the United States and Canada, China is the 
United States’ largest trading partner. 
China’s trade volume with the United States is 2.5 times the trade 
volume that the United States had with Japan (Table 3.2). U.S.-China 
trade is continuously expanding and shows no obvious signs of slow-
ing down (Figure 3.1). In addition, China is the largest creditor of the 
United States, holding $1.12 trillion in U.S. Treasury bills, according to 
the U.S. Federal Reserve. However, scholars estimate that China actu-
ally holds an additional $700 billion in U.S. dollar denominated public 
Table 3.1  China and the United States: Comparing Statistics and World 
Rankings 
China United States 
Statistics World ranking Statistics World ranking 
Population 1330 million 1 305 million 3 
Area (sq. km.) 9.6 million 4 9.8 million 3 
Climate Diverse Diverse but 
but mostly mostly 
temperate temperate 
Topography Mostly Mostly flat 
mountainous 
Renewable water 2,829 cu. km. 6 3,069 cu. km. 4 
Economic size (GDP) $6 trillion 3 $15 trillion 1 
GDP per capita 4,382 94 $47,284 9 
Life expectancy at 73.5 105 (of 223 78.1 50 (of 223 
birth (years) entities) entities) 
Human development 0.663 89 (out of 169) 0.902 4 (of 169) 
index 
 
 
82 Chang 
Table 3.2  Top U.S. Trade Partners, 2010 
Country Total trade volume ($, billions) 
1 Canada 524.7 
2 China 456.8 
3 Mexico 393.0 
4 Japan 180.9 
5 Germany 130.9 
SOURCE: http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/top/dst/2010/12/balance.html (accessed 
June 26, 2012). 
and private assets (such as Fannie Mae’s bonds). These U.S. assets held 
by China are equivalent to 13 percent of the U.S. GDP. While the United 
States and China depend on each other, the two countries have frequent 
disagreements and disputes over a number of issues, such as trade, the 
environment, human rights, and military presence in the world. 
Why has China become a top U.S. trading partner? The classical 
explanation is comparative advantage. China and the United States are 
very different in factor endowment: China has abundant cheap labor, 
with people willing to work for very low wages, while the United States 
has abundant capital and technology. China and the United States are 
complementary: China exports labor-intensive products, such as toys 
and textiles, to the United States, and the United States exports capital-
intensive products, such as airplanes and generators, to China. The 
comparative advantage theory, however, does not fully explain the scale 
of trade. For instance, it cannot explain why Canada has a great scale of 
trade with the United States, as Canada has a similar factor endowment 
and thus is similar in comparative advantages to the United States. An 
alternative theory, called the gravity model, argues that trading volume 
is positively related with the country’s economic size but negatively 
related with the spatial distance. Canada and Mexico are top trading 
partners of the United States because of the short geographical distance. 
China, Japan, and Western Europe are top trading partners because of 
their large economic sizes. In addition, unlike Canada, Japan, and West-
ern Europe, China’s industrial structure is more complementary with 
that of the United States, according to comparative advantages. 
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Figure 3.1  U.S. Trade and Trade Deficit with China, 1985–2011 
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SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau. 
ThE TRUE SIzE OF ChINA’S ECONOMy 
How large is China’s economy? The answer to this question has been 
a subject of some debate. Many scholars think that China’s economy is 
actually larger than the number published by the Chinese government. 
As the Pew (2011) survey reveals, some people think that China has 
already overtaken the United States to become the world’s largest econ-
omy. However, some scholars suggest that China’s economy is smaller 
than the reported statistics. Admittedly, China’s official statistics are not 
very reliable, as they can be influenced or even “cooked” for political 
reasons. Hence, let us first discuss the size of China’s economy. 
Using the official exchange rate and the figures reported by the State 
Statistics Bureau of China, China’s GDP in 2010 was $5.7 trillion, rank-
ing second in the world. This is about one-third of the United States’
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Figure 3.2  Size of China’s Economy as Compared with the Largest 
World Economies, 2010 
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SOURCE: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2011. 
GDP of $14.6 trillion. It is slightly larger than third-ranked Japan’s GDP
of $5.4 trillion (Figure 3.2). 
The regional gap between provinces in China is quite large, with 
the coastal areas more developed than the inland. For instance, the 
economy of Guangdong province, on the south coast, is equivalent to 
the GDP of Indonesia, and the economies of Zhejiang and Jiangsu are 
equivalent to those of Austria and Switzerland. 
However, the official exchange rate often does not reflect the pur-
chasing power of the currency. For instance, a Big Mac costs $3.73 in 
the United States but costs 13.20 yuans in China, which converts to 
only about $2.00 dollars. (The official exchange rate is 6.3 yuans to 1 
dollar.) That means that the Chinese currency is probably undervalued 
by the official exchange rate. The United Nations has conducted studies 
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Figure 3.3 China’s Economy Measured by Purchasing Power Parity, 2010 
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SOURCE: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2011, and http://www.wikipedia 
.org (accessed June 2, 2011). 
of the purchasing powers of different currencies, taking into account 
their domestic prices. Converted by the purchasing power parity (PPP) 
rate, the GDP of China in 2010 is $10.l trillion, more than two-thirds 
of that of the United States (Figure 3.3), and more than double that of 
Japan. 
On the other hand, Rawski (2001) argues that the Chinese economy 
size is actually overstated and that the local cadres tend to exaggerate 
the outputs for political gains. He uses the change in the number of air-
line passengers as a proxy for economic growth rate of China and sees 
this number decline in 1997, yet the GDP reported by the government 
grows by 7.8 percent. Therefore, he argues that China’s growth rate 
in 1997 may have only been 2–3 percent, or possibly even negative. 
Rawski’s argument is widely cited by the news media but refuted by 
many scholars. 
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Most analysts, however, consider the Chinese data to be roughly 
correct, although few would deny that the official statistics are not inde-
pendent of the Chinese government. The GDP figures in China are not 
systematically biased upward for a variety of reasons. First, local offi-
cials have more incentive to inflate the GDP growth rates rather than 
the absolute size because the GDP growth rate is a better indicator of 
the performance of their leadership. An overstated GDP size one year 
would adversely affect the growth rate figures for the following year. 
Secondly, the central government does not have an incentive to sys-
tematically overstate GDP figures. Sometimes it would even prefer a 
smaller growth rate in order to show that it is succeeding in control-
ling an overheating economy and containing inflation. To prevent the 
provinces from overstating the growth rates, the central government 
has some techniques to independently calculate and check the national 
growth rate using its own sampling survey teams from the state sta-
tistical bureau. As is often quoted in Western newspapers, the strange 
thing about Chinese statistics is that sometimes every province reports 
a higher growth rate than the national average. This is exactly due to 
inconsistencies between local and national figures when the central 
government does its own independent survey and publishes a smaller 
growth figure. 
Rawski’s (2001) argument was not supported by later updated GDP
figures, either. Each year in January, the State Statistics Bureau publishes 
the preliminary GDP figure for the previous year. Later, when more 
updated and comprehensive data are available, the national figure is 
revised. The GDP figure is often revised upward, which actually refutes 
Rawski’s argument. In 2006, the State Statistics Bureau lifted the GDP
growth rate by an average of 0.5 percent a year between 1993 and 2004 
to reflect the updated census results, which found that the economy in 
2004 was 17 percent larger than previously reported. The only year for 
which the State Statistics Bureau did not revise GDP upward was 1998, 
when the bureau left it at 7.8 percent, a tacit admission that this figure at 
the time was exaggerated. One major reason for the 17 percent under-
reported GDP was the missing value of some activities in the service 
sector. For instance, the business activities of restaurants, small stores, 
vendors, and barbers were often unreported or underreported. Many 
scholars, who point out that China’s service sector is much smaller than 
other comparable countries, believe that even the current output of Chi-
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Figure 3.4  Value Added by the Service Sector as Percentage of GDP in 
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na’s service sector remains undervalued. Figure 3.4 shows a regression 
result indicating that in 2007, China’s service sector accounted for only 
41 percent of GDP, which was 10 percent lower than the average for 
other countries at the same development level. 
The GDP figure at PPP by the United Nations is probably a more 
reliable and comprehensive indicator of the true economic sizes of the 
nations in the world. Rawski’s (2001) use of the number of airline pas-
sengers as a proxy of true GDP is not convincing, as airline travel is 
more a luxury good and thus not representative. If one has to use a com-
modity production as a proxy of GDP, economists often use the produc-
tion of electricity. Electricity is used in production and consumption in 
almost every sector, so its production is a more representative indicator 
of the GDP size than the number of airline passengers. Figure 3.5 shows 
the electricity production by country in 2008. The United States ranks 
at the top by producing 4,140 billion kwh, and China ranks second at 
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Figure 3.5  Electricity Production by Country, 2008 
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SOURCE: http://www.wikipedia.org (accessed June 6, 2011). 
about two-thirds of the U.S. level. One can see that electricity produc-
tion is roughly reflecting the GDP in PPP measures. In 2010, China’s 
electricity production further grew to 4,140 billion kwh, matching the 
U.S. level in 2008. Hence, extrapolating from electricity production, 
Chinese GDP statistics seem generally consistent with its true size. 
In terms of raw material and manufacturing industries, China is a 
dominant player in the world market. It has a great share of the world 
production in major raw materials, accounting for 50 percent of the 
global steel and cement production (Figure 3.6), which are mainly used 
for construction. Ten years ago, China produced about 2 million auto-
mobiles, much less than Japan, the United States, Germany, or South 
Korea. In 2010, China produced more than 18 million automobiles, 
roughly the sum of the total productions for both second-ranked Japan 
and third-ranked United States (Figure 3.7). 
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Figure 3.6  World Steel Production, 2009 
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WhO WILL FEED ChINA? 
Another controversial topic about China’s economic capability is 
agricultural production. In 1995, Lester Brown wrote Who Will Feed 
China?, a book that spawned hundreds of conferences and seminars. He 
took a neo-Malthusian view about the prospects of the world food sup-
ply as China’s income grows: “To feed its 1.2 billion people, China may 
soon have to import so much grain that this action could trigger unprec-
edented rises in world food (shortage) and prices” (p. 170). Now, nearly 
20 years later, this scenario has not happened. China is still capable of 
feeding its population, although it imports corn and wheat, mostly as 
animal feed. 
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Let us look at the agriculture sector and compare the sector compo-
sition and production in China with other countries. Economic theory 
indicates that in the preindustrial period, agriculture contributes the 
most value added in a country’s GDP. At the middle stage of industri-
alization, manufacturing and industry add the most value. At the devel-
oped stage, the service sector adds the most value in GDP. Table 3.3 
illustrates the sector composition and production for China as compared 
with other countries. Its service sector is relatively small, adding value 
of $2.56 trillion, which is about 22 percent of that of the U.S. service 
sector. As previously mentioned, the value added in the service sec-
tor in China is undervalued because many small businesses were not 
reported. Supposing it is undervalued by 10 percent of GDP as pre-
dicted in the regression in Figure 3.4, China’s service sector production 
would be $3.15 trillion, or 28 percent of that of the United States. In the 
industry sector, the value added is $2.75 trillion, which is 85 percent of 
the output of the U.S. industry. While agriculture in China accounts for 
less than 10 percent of GDP, it contributes a total of $564 billion, the 
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Table 3.3  Nominal GDP Sector Composition, 2010 
Nominal Agriculture Industry Services 
Country GDP % $, billions % $, billions % $, billions 
United States 14,658 1.2 176 22.2 3,254 76.7 11,243 
China 5,878 9.6 564 46.8 2,751 43.6 2,563 
Japan 5,459 1.1 60 23.0 1,256 75.9 4,144 
Germany 3,316 0.8 27 27.9 925 71.3 2,364 
India 1,538 16.1 248 28.6 440 55.3 850 
SOURCE: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_sector_composition 
(accessed June 26, 2012). 
largest in the world, and 320 percent of that of the United States. Yet, 
because of the large population size, China’s agricultural output per 
capita ranks lower. 
Most scholars dismissed Lester Brown’s argument, although 
recently Brown has changed the tone to emphasize the need for a “wake-
up call” about the deterioration of the global environment. During the 
past two decades, China’s agriculture as well as its food supply contin-
ued to grow. Indeed, food production outpaced population growth in the 
past three decades (Figure 3.8). So far, the domestic supply and demand 
for food is basically balanced. 
WILL ChINA OVERTAKE ThE UNITED STATES AS ThE
LARGEST ECONOMy? 
Since the beginning of the reform in 1978, China has experi-
enced remarkable growth at an annual rate of around 10 percent for 
three decades, lifting hundreds of millions out of poverty. Figure 3.9 
shows the average annual economic growth rate during the period of 
1980–2009. 
The global ranking of China’s economy also moves upward quickly. 
In 2000, China’s economy was still behind most large industrial econo-
mies. In the following years, China has passed the U.K., France, Ger-
many, and Japan, one by one, and in 2010, it became the second-largest 
economy (Figure 3.10). While it is still smaller than the United States in 
terms of GDP, because of China’s faster growth, China now contributes 
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Figure 3.8  Food Production Outpaces Population Growth in China 
(2000 = 100) 
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SOURCE: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2009. 
more to global growth than the United States. Multiplying the GDP size 
by the growth rate, in 2010 China contributed $574 billion while the 
United States contributed $393 billion. 
If this trend continues, China will overtake the United States to 
become the largest economy by 2020 (Figure 3.11). We can attribute 
this rapid change in China’s ranking to two previous events, but we have 
to assume that they continue in the next 10 years: 1) economic growth 
continues at around 9–10 percent, and 2) China’s currency appreci-
ates as income increases, due to both the elimination of the existing 
misalignment of the undervalued Chinese currency renminbi (RMB) 
and the diminishing Balassa-Samuelson effect. Taking into account the 
factors for currency appreciation, RMB has the potential to appreci-
ate 5 percent each year for another 10 years. Measuring China’s GDP
by PPP rather than the market exchange rate would also contribute to 
this change in ranking. When China’s economy grows, the price level 
will gradually approach that of the developed countries; in other words, 
the difference between nominal GDP and PPP GDP would diminish. 
China’s GDP by PPP is about two-thirds of the U.S. GDP right now. 
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Figure 3.9  Average Annual GDP Growth Rate, 1980–2009 
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SOURCE: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2010. 
Assuming the U.S. economy grows at a rate of 3–4 percent, and China 
grows at 10 percent, one can calculate that China’s PPP GDP would 
catch that of the United States by the end of this decade. Of course, if 
China’s growth slows down in the coming years, it would take a longer 
time to catch up with the United States. 
What explains the rapid and sustained economic growth of China 
for three decades? Reasons range from Chinese culture to purely tim-
ing, and none are uncontroversial. Below, I will focus on some obvious 
economic reasons, namely, the high rate of capital formation (invest-
ment in fixed capital), supported by the high rate of saving. In terms 
of fixed capital investment and saving as percentages of GDP, China is 
ranked near the top of the world (Figure 3.12). 
China spends 45.6 percent of its GDP on fixed capital formation 
(Figure 3.12). The country is enthusiastic in spending on infrastructure, 
residential housing, and equipment, and it is never timid about pouring 
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Figure 3.10  GDP by Country, 1998–2010 
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money into huge projects, which is partially due to the authoritarian 
regime that does not need taxpayers to approve the spending. Local 
governments are even more zealous about spending because large proj-
ects are symbols of their performance; they get credits for building big 
projects in their local areas, but they are not actually held accountable 
for the cost. The investment funds often come from loans by local state-
owned banks. If the loans finally go bad, it is hard to determine exactly 
who was responsible for the bad decision. Ultimately, the state picks up 
the tab. Kornai (1980) calls this behavior under such a system the “soft 
budget constraint.” The true scales of construction and other investment 
projects are even larger than the reported figures in the official statistics, 
as the local officials tend to underreport their investment to avoid the 
discipline from the central government’s macroeconomic contraction-
ary measures. As a result, construction is everywhere in China. A com-
mon impression of a foreign visitor to China is that the entire country 
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Figure 3.11  Projections for GDP 
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looks like a construction site, and construction cranes become the sym-
bol of the national bird. 
Ironically, the zealous drive for investment helps the Chinese 
economy in special situations. In the economic recession following the 
financial crisis of 2008, the love for investment helped the economy to 
recover. In 2008, when the financial crisis spread to China, exports and 
production dropped, and many factories closed. In Guangdong and its 
neighboring provinces, more than 20 million workers lost their jobs.
In December 2008, China’s Politburo convened a meeting, and within 
two days, the country announced a US$600 billion equivalent stimulus 
package for the following two years. The package included a nation-
wide high-speed rail system project with a 10-year plan of $300 billion, 
and 50 nuclear power projects (one-third of the global total planned) in 
addition to the 27 already under construction. Then, the stimulus pack-
age of the central government was further amplified by the local gov-
ernments. One calculation is that the local governments’ spending plans 
together added another $2.4 trillion. It was also implemented quickly; 
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Figure 3.12  Fixed Capital Investment and Saving as Percentage of 
GDP, 2009 
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SOURCE: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2010. 
several days after the announcement and before the beginning of 2009, 
the money started to distribute through the nationwide banks. Despite 
the waste and corruption that was involved in the process, the stimulus 
worked. Most of the laid-off workers from closed factories in Guang-
dong found jobs in railroad construction or other projects. The private 
sector also followed the government’s lead, particularly by expanding 
residential housing construction and providing supplies to the state-
sponsored projects (Figure 3.13). Within several months, the economy 
started to recover as the Keynesian multiplier predicts. The economy 
turned around and growth reached 8.7 percent in 2009. By 2010, the 
economy was fully recovered from recession, and inflation became the 
main threat instead. 
In contrast, the U.S. government had difficulties reaching an agree-
ment on spending. Many believed the U.S. stimulus package was too 
Investment 
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Figure 3.13  New Residential Building Construction, 2010 
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little, too conservative, and too late. Since the stimulus was announced, 
there has been little money spent on new infrastructure projects or other 
fixed capital investments. Thus, the economic recession continues and 
high unemployment remains even today. 
The money for capital investment comes from public and private 
saving in China, which accounts for more than half (52 percent) of the 
GDP (Figure 3.12). For each yuan the Chinese made, they spent less 
than half in consumption. Why is the savings rate so high in China? 
Most scholars would give the following list of explanations, in line with 
conventional theories: 
• Rapid growth in income. As personal income rises rapidly, old 
habits remain, hence consumption increase lags behind income 
increase. 
• A relatively younger population composition, so the larger work-
ing population provides a “demographic dividend.” 
China Russia Japan Korea Germany 
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• The influence of the Confucian culture and thrifty habits by the 
older generations. 
• A lack of social security and high cost of education for the chil-
dren, so households have to save a lot to take precaution. 
There are also some unconventional arguments for the high saving 
in China. Wei and Zhang (2011) argue that it was due to the one-child 
policy and preference for boys. As a result, illegal abortion of female 
fetuses still happens often in rural China, causing a shortage of girls. 
This leads to a competitive marriage market and rapidly rising marriage 
costs. Parents must save a lot in order to purchase an apartment for their 
sons, as it has become a prerequisite for marriage (apartments are very 
expensive in China and typically cost US$500,000 in large cities for a 
three-bedroom unit). 
TRADE AND ThE ChINESE CURRENCy ISSUE 
Among all the U.S.-China relationship issues, the trade deficit 
with China has produced the most media headlines. China has been 
the largest trade deficit source for the United States for years. In 2010, 
the United States had a trade deficit of $273 billion with China—the 
largest ever recorded. The trade deficit with China is even larger than 
the deficits the United States has with the next four ranked countries 
(Mexico, Japan, Germany, and Canada) combined (Table 3.4). Further, 
the trend of the growing total trade volume and trade deficit with China 
is continuing and does not seem likely to reverse in the near future (see 
Figure 3.1.) 
It should be noted that China’s trade deficit with the United States 
is a special case, as China runs much fewer trade surpluses with other 
countries. China’s global trade surplus in 2010 is $183 billion, which 
means that once the surplus with the United States is excluded, China 
is running an aggregate deficit with other countries. In the first quarter 
of 2011, China even ran a global trade deficit. In 2010, China overtook 
Germany as the world’s largest exporter, but it is still a greater importer 
than Germany (China is the second-largest importer behind the United 
States). Hence, the global trade surplus of China is smaller than Ger-
many ($183 billion versus $204 billion in 2010). 
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Table 3.4  Top Countries with which the U.S. has a Trade Deficit, 2010 
($, billions) 
1 China 273.0 
2 Mexico 66.4 
3 Japan 59.8 
4 Germany 34.5 
5 Canada 28.2 
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau. http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/top/dst/2010/12/ 
balance.html (accessed January 3, 2011). 
U.S. politicians and news media often blame undervalued currency 
for the deficit with China, though most economists would consider a 
lower gross saving amount as a more important factor for the U.S. trade 
deficit. Germany has an overvalued euro, but it is running a trade sur-
plus with the United States and even a large trade surplus with China. 
The Canadian dollar is overvalued against the U.S. dollar, but it ran a 
trade surplus with the United States in 2010. 
From my calculation (Chang 2011), China’s currency is indeed 
undervalued. The Chinese currency is 25 percent undervalued against 
the U.S. dollar, but 17 percent undervalued against the global balance 
equilibrium value because the U.S. dollar is about 10 percent overval-
ued against its global balance equilibrium value. China’s trade surplus 
with the United States is particularly large, partly because unlike the 
Euro zone and Japan, China keeps the RMB relatively stable with the 
U.S. dollar, thus reducing the foreign exchange cost in trade between 
China and the United States. Hence, American importers particularly 
prefer to trade with China due to lower and predictable transaction costs. 
Another reason is that China has become the major processing zone 
for the U.S. market with the help of many Taiwanese, Japanese, and 
U.S. companies. These companies import inputs from other countries, 
process in China, and finally export to the United States. This largely 
explains why China runs an overall trade deficit with other countries but 
runs a huge trade surplus with the United States. 
China also has an overwhelming presence in the international mon-
etary market due to its huge foreign exchange reserves and its posses-
sion of an increasing amount of U.S. debt. China had $3.1 trillion in 
foreign reserves as of June 2011. According to the Fed’s records, China 
owns about $1.12 trillion of U.S. government securities. In addition, 
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China owns other American dollar assets worth about $800 billion. The 
main reason for the recent swelling foreign exchange reserve in China 
is not because of the current account surplus, but because of a large 
amount of international floating capital flowing into China, speculating 
on the rise of yuan, and looking for better returns in emerging econo-
mies. The huge foreign reserve is not a blessing but rather a curse for 
China as it increases the inflationary pressure. Hence, China is now 
accelerating the appreciation of yuan, and at the same time, encourag-
ing its citizens to travel and invest overseas, to reduce the oversupply 
of the foreign reserves. 
ChINA’S ChALLENGES 
China is poised to be a rising power to the United States and the 
world in this twenty-first century, yet China itself faces challenges in 
the future. China has potential to be a great power, but also the poten-
tial to fail and implode. The Communist political authoritarian system, 
in particular, is unstable. When the Communist authoritarian system 
collapses, the resulting political and economic crisis could dwarf an 
economic recession. 
China is a huge economy, but with a population of 1.3 billion peo-
ple, China is still poor; the GDP per capita is low, ranking 94th in the 
world. Figure 3.14 shows the comparison between China and the United 
States in major indicators that relate to a country’s status and potential. 
In the figure, China’s numbers are measured as the percentages of those 
of the United States. The indicators include GDP per capita, renewable 
water per capita, energy consumption per capita, Environmental Sus-
tainable Index (ESI index), and fertility. China lags substantially behind 
the United States in these measures. Given the limited resources per 
capita that China possesses, if China continues the current production 
pattern at the current growth rate, its resources will be depleted at an 
unsustainable rate. Unless China can successfully transform its current 
growth pattern, China would hit a resource bottleneck in the near future. 
China’s fertility dropped to 1.54 in 2010, and the population will 
age quickly in the coming years. This sets up a “demographic time 
bomb” for the future. By the year 2050, the dependent ratio would reach 
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Figure 3.14  China’s Weakness: China Compared with the United States, 
2010 (U.S. = 100) 
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SOURCE: World Bank, United Nations, 2011. 
80 percent, and the elderly would make up more than 30 percent of the 
population. Figure 3.15 shows the projected demographics. 
To change its growth pattern from the current labor-intensive econ-
omy to one that is more technology intensive, China needs to increase 
highly skilled human capital. Yet, the current educational system and 
limits on technology do not promote creative thinking, research, and 
development, which are crucial for growth. At a time when information 
is a key to economic success, the information flow in China is often 
censored under the current Communist political system. The Internet 
censorship by the filter “Great Wall” often blocks necessary informa-
tion, from soft science to hard science—an unintended consequence 
that impedes economic growth. Scholars and scientists cannot access 
information or references that are necessary for research. In addi-
tion, China’s education system is corrupted. Under the current system, 
rewards and research grants are often allocated based on who has politi-
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Figure 3.15  China’s Demographic Time Bomb 
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cal influence or personal connections rather than on merit. As a result, 
professors and researchers focus on short-term quick gains rather than 
long-term investment and research projects. There is no serious and 
effective legal system to protect intellectual property rights; hence, 
truly original innovation is discouraged. Currently China’s technology 
is much behind that of the United States, but with such an ineffective 
or corrupted system as described above, the gap does not seem likely to 
close in advanced areas in the near future. 
Corruption and inefficiency are rampant in China. Journalist Gar-
naut describes “corruption in China growing at least as fast as the econ-
omy” (Garnaut 2010). Recently, a government audit report showed that 
embezzlers stole 187 million yuan, or roughly $28.5 million, from the 
Beijing-to-Shanghai portion of the high-speed railway project, result-
ing in the arrest of Railway Minister Liu Zhijun and his associate Zhang 
Shuguang (Beijing Morning Newspaper 2011). 
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Table 3.5  Income Gap in China 
Country Gini coefficient 
Sweden 0.230 
Taiwan 0.330 
United Kingdom 0.340 
U.S. 0.450 
China 0.469 
Brazil 0.567 
SOURCE: Wikipedia.org, originally from U.N. Gini data, 2011. 
China’s income gap is widening, frequently causing social and 
political conflict and unrest. The Gini index reaches 0.469 for China, 
which is higher than most countries in the world (Table 3.5). The Chi-
nese Communist government lacks the legitimacy to rule because it is 
not elected by people, and lacks much confidence from the common 
people. There is no independent legal system or channel where people 
can vent their grievances or trust they will be treated objectively. Hence, 
there exists a widespread hatred toward the governments and their offi-
cials, causing unrest and protests—there were 220,000 recorded inci-
dents of protest in 2009. Under the current system, China is politically 
unstable, and a large-scale protest that topples the government is pos-
sible in the future. 
Under the Chinese Communist authoritarian system, China lacks 
rule of law. The party determines everything, hence impeding not only 
creativity and independent thinking but also entrepreneurship. Further-
more, private property is still not protected. An increasing number of 
leftist Maoists are now calling for a revolution to expropriate the prop-
erties of the newly rich. Hu Jintao has done little to stop the Maoist 
leftists, which alarms many private entrepreneurs. As a result, there is 
an increasing number of rich or just well-to-do Chinese seeking emigra-
tion to the West, and billions of dollars of capital are flying from China 
to the United States and other immigration destinations such as Canada 
and Australia. 
Reformists in the party are concerned about the potentially danger-
ous situation. In his recent overseas trips, Premier Wen Jiabao called 
for political and economic reforms. On the table, he said, is government 
transparency, creating an environment where people and the media can 
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criticize and supervise the government. However, it is widely reported 
that Wen represents only the minority in the party and that the conserva-
tives opposing political reform are dominant. 
CONCLUSION 
China is a dynamic country, and one should never be surprised when 
significant events occur there, good or bad. China is a large economy 
with a great momentum, but it is still a poor country in per capita terms 
and has many domestic problems. China is dynamic with surprises and 
uncertainties. Do not be surprised if in the near future China overtakes 
the United States in GDP, makes the most airplanes in the world, or 
suffers the fallout of a political uprising that breaks down the system. 
In the interest of China, the United States, and the rest of the world, we 
hope China can gradually move forward to economic prosperity and 
political democracy. 
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Winners and Losers in 
China’s Economic Reform 
Terry Sicular 
University of Western Ontario 
More than three decades have passed since China began to trans-
form its economy. With this economic transformation has come rapid 
growth in both national income (GDP) and household incomes. Widen-
ing inequality has also emerged. China’s increasing income inequality 
has been documented in numerous studies, including Benjamin et al. 
(2008); Ravallion and Chen (2007); Gustafsson, Li, and Sicular (2008); 
Wan (2008); and World Bank (2009). 
This chapter discusses recent trends in inequality in China, with 
a focus on the period from 2002 onward, during which time China’s 
government adjusted its economic development strategy to underscore 
balanced growth. Prior to 2002, under the leadership of Jiang Zemin, 
China’s policies emphasized rapid growth. Growth was indeed rapid, 
but by the end of the Jiang era concerns had emerged about sustain-
ability, both politically and environmentally. After Hu Jintao and Wen 
Jiabao assumed leadership in 2002–2003, a new development strategy 
was announced that emphasized sustainable and harmonious growth. 
The new strategy, referred to as the “Scientific Vision of Development,” 
placed emphasis on balanced development and implemented a series of 
policies to reduce disparities and protect the economically vulnerable. 
Measures adopted included agricultural support policies, social wel-
fare transfers, targeted tax reductions, minimum wage increases, and 
increased spending on poverty alleviation. 
What happened after the adoption of the new strategy? After 2002 
China’s economy continued to grow rapidly; indeed, the size of the 
GDP pie roughly doubled by the late 2000s. But what happened to the 
distribution of that pie? Did inequality continue to rise, or was it moder-
ated? What happened to poverty levels? 
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Economists have long thought that economic development is initially 
accompanied by rising inequality, but that eventually forces emerge that 
will cause inequality to decline. This “inverted U” relationship between 
growth and inequality is called the Kuznets hypothesis, first proposed 
by Simon Kuznets (1955). The logic is that initially growth begins in 
certain sectors and regions, and the benefits of early growth therefore 
go to a small subset of the population, causing inequality to increase. 
As development continues, however, under the right conditions, growth 
will spread to other sectors and regions. Employment will expand, and 
the benefits of growth will be shared more widely. In the long term, 
inequality can decline. Rising inequality is therefore not necessarily a 
permanent feature of growth in general or in China. 
In this chapter I review findings of past studies and present new 
evidence on trends in inequality and poverty in China for the period 
2002–2007. The new evidence is based on joint research with Li Shi 
and Luo Chuliang (Beijing Normal University), and Yue Ximing (Ren-
min University of China) using nationwide household survey data col-
lected under the China Household Income Project (CHIP). It constitutes 
the first systematic evidence on inequality and poverty in China during 
the Hu-Wen era. 
Overall, we find that as of 2007 China had not yet reached the 
Kuznets turning point. The benefits of growth between 2002 and 2007 
were not shared equally: richer urban groups benefited more than 
poorer, rural groups. Nevertheless, both the poor and the rich saw their 
incomes grow, and poverty declined. Thus, some groups have “won” 
more than others, but we do not find evidence of many losers. 
DATA AND MEASUREMENT 
The data used in our analysis come from the four waves of house-
hold surveys conducted by CHIP, which collected data for 1988, 1995, 
2002, and 2007. These surveys cover urban households (mainly for-
mal urban residents with local urban registration, or hukou) and rural 
households. The samples of urban households and rural households 
are subsamples of the larger urban and rural household income sur-
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veys conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). In 2002 
and 2007 independent samples of rural-to-urban migrants were added. 
When combined with weights, the surveys are nationally representa-
tive, but migrants are underrepresented in earlier years of the CHIP
survey. However, migration was fairly modest before the late 1990s, so 
the resulting bias is likely not substantial. 
We measure income in per capita terms (household income divided 
by the number of household members). Income here is disposable 
(after tax) income, which includes wage earnings; pension income; 
net income from farming and self-employment; income from assets; 
in-kind and self-produced income; and transfers and subsidies, minus 
taxes. Asset income includes imputed rental income on owner-occupied 
housing. Imputed rent is the implicit earning on investment in housing, 
parallel to the returns to other assets such as interest earnings on savings 
deposits. We follow the literature and calculate imputed rental income 
on owner-occupied housing as a rate of return on the market value of 
owned housing. 
INEqUALITy 
Our measure of inequality is the Gini coefficient, a commonly used 
index of inequality that takes a value between 0 and 1. A Gini of 0 
would mean perfect equality—all members of the society have identi-
cal, equal income. A Gini of 1 would indicate perfect inequality—one 
person has all of the society’s income, and everyone else has no income. 
No real society has perfect equality or perfect inequality. The Gini coef-
ficients for actual countries mostly range from 0.20 (very low inequal-
ity) to 0.70 (very high inequality). 
Figure 4.1 shows income inequality in China measured in each 
of the four years of the CHIP survey. For comparability across years, 
inequality is measured without including migrants (including migrants 
in 2002 and 2007 in fact changes national inequality only slightly). 
As reported widely in many studies, inequality rose substantially 
between the 1980s and mid-1990s. Factors contributing to rising 
inequality at this time included growing regional and provincial income 
 
 
110  Sicular 
G
in
i c
oe
ff
ic
ie
nt
 
Figure 4.1  Income Inequality in China, 1988–2007 
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differences, a widening gap between urban and rural incomes, income 
disparities associated with educational differences, and in rural areas 
unequal access to higher-paying off-farm employment. 
Between 1995 and 2002, inequality in China remained roughly con-
stant, suggesting that perhaps China had reached the Kuznets turning 
point. Gustafsson, Li, and Sicular (2008) provide a detailed analysis of 
inequality in these years and identify the emergence of some inequality-
reducing factors. Some regions and provinces that had lagged behind 
others in the first period began to catch up. Rural off-farm employment 
became more widespread, contributing to a decline in rural inequality. 
Macroeconomic growth during this period was widely shared. Never-
theless, other disequalizing factors—the urban-rural gap and education-
based income disparities—continued. 
From 2002 to 2007 inequality resumed its upward trend. China had 
not yet reached the Kuznets turning point. By 2007, in fact, inequality 
in China had reached a level that was quite high by international stan-
dards. Figure 4.2 shows Gini coefficients for a selection of countries. 
In 2007 China’s Gini coefficient of 0.497 approached those of what are 
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considered to be high inequality countries such as Mexico and Zambia, 
although it was still lower than the extremely high Gini coefficients 
found in countries like Brazil and Colombia. 
Several factors appear to have contributed to the upward trend in 
inequality between 2002 and 2007. Within rural and urban areas, levels 
of inequality did not increase substantially; however, the gap between 
urban and rural incomes continued to widen. In 2007 urban incomes 
per capita on average were 4.1 times rural incomes. This ratio was up 
from 3.3 in 2002, which was already high by international standards. 
In other countries for which data are available, the ratio of urban to 
rural incomes ranges from below 2 in countries like India, Indonesia, 
and Malaysia to 2.2–2.3 in the Philippines and Thailand, to over 3 in 
countries like Zambia and South Africa. China is at or near the top of 
this range. 
We have used inequality decomposition by group to calculate the 
contribution of the urban-rural income gap to overall inequality. We 
Figure 4.2  Inequality: Country Comparisons 
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find that in 2002 the urban-rural income gap contributed an already 
large 46–47 percent of overall inequality in China. In 2007 the contri-
bution had risen to 51–54 percent. 
A second factor contributing to inequality has been household 
income from assets and property. During the Maoist era most property 
was nationalized or collectivized, and households owned little private 
property. In the 1990s major property rights reforms were implemented 
that gave households opportunities to own property. These reforms 
included the privatization of urban housing, the development of the 
urban real estate market, enterprise ownership reforms, and the expan-
sion of stock and financial markets. 
In the wake of these and other measures, household income from 
assets and property, including imputed rents from owner-occupied 
housing, rose to 10 percent of household income in 2002, and further 
to 15 percent in 2007. Asset income in China is unequally distributed, 
and its contribution to inequality has increased. A decomposition of 
income by source reveals that the contribution of income from assets 
and property to national inequality increased from 9 percent in 2002 to 
20 percent in 2007. 
The rise in inequality between 2002 and 2007 implies that some 
households benefited more and others less from growth during this 
period. Who, then, were the winners and losers? Figure 4.3 shows 
growth in household income by decile groups in the population. Each 
bar shows the level of income in 2007, measured in constant 2002 dol-
lars. The bottom portion of the bar is the level of income in 2002, and 
the top portion of the bar is the change in income between 2002 and 
2007, expressed in constant 2002 dollars. 
All decile groups, from the poorest 10 percent of the population 
at the far left to the richest 10 percent at the far right, enjoyed posi-
tive growth in income between the two years. Growth in income of the 
poorest decile, however, was much smaller in both percentage and abso-
lute terms than that of the richest decile. Income of the poorest decile 
increased by 406 yuan, less than 50 percent of 2002 income. Income of 
the richest decile increased by nearly 16,000 yuan, or roughly doubled. 
For intermediate deciles, growth in income was correlated closely to 
their position in the income distribution. 
Figure 4.3 thus shows that all income groups were “winners” during 
this period. Yet, some groups benefited more than others. This pattern 
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Figure 4.3  Per Capita household Income by Decile, 2002 and 2007 
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of income growth across deciles is of course associated with the rising 
inequality we have found during this period. 
POVERTy: WhAT hAPPENED TO ThE
MOST VULNERABLE? 
Changes in poverty levels are an important indicator of the impact 
of growth on the distribution of income. Regardless of whether the gap 
between poor and rich individuals increases, we care whether welfare 
improved for the poorest and most vulnerable members of society. 
Poverty can be measured in different ways. Here I present esti-
mates of the poverty head count—the number of people below a pov-
erty line—and the poverty rate—the share of the population below the 
poverty line. Studies of poverty in China have used a range of poverty 
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lines. The World Bank’s standard poverty line of $1.25 a day (measured 
in purchasing power parity prices) is widely used for China and also for 
other countries, and we use it in our analysis. Other poverty lines typi-
cally yield similar trends in poverty levels over time. 
Figure 4.4 shows estimates of poverty through 2002 from Chen and 
Ravallion (2008). Both the number of poor and the poverty rate declined 
dramatically between the early 1990s and early 2000s. Whereas in 1993 
the poverty rate was 40 percent, by 2002 it had fallen to 15 percent. This 
dramatic decline in poverty was in part due to economic growth, which 
raised many poor above the poverty line, and in part due to a range of 
policies aimed at lagging regions and poverty alleviation. 
Analysis of poverty using the CHIP data for 2002 and 2007 reveals 
that China’s poverty levels continued to decline during the Hu-Wen 
period. The CHIP data give slightly lower poverty rates in 2002 than 
Figure 4.4  Poverty in China 1993–2002, at $1.25/day 
473 
40% 
24% 
18% 15% 
292 
224 
197 
Poverty rate (%) 
Number of poor (millions) 
1993 1996 1999 2002 
SOURCE: Chen and Ravallion (2008). 
18 
Winners and Losers in China’s Economic Reform  115 
reported in the Chen and Ravallion (2008) study, but here we are mainly 
interested in the trend or change over time. As shown in Figure 4.5, 
based on the CHIP data, the poverty rate declined further between 2002 
and 2007, from 10 percent to less than 4 percent. Most of this decline is 
due to a steep reduction in rural poverty. 
China’s success in reducing poverty is outstanding by international 
standards. As a consequence of these trends, China has changed from a 
high-poverty country to a moderately low-poverty country (Figure 4.6). 
Moreover, China’s share of world poverty has declined substantially, 
from nearly 40 percent of the world’s poor in 1990 to only 15 percent in 
2005 (World Bank 2009). 
Figure 4.5  Poverty in China (%), 2002–2007, at $1.25/day 
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Figure 4.6  Poverty Rates: Country Comparisons, 2005–2006 ($1.25/day) 
0.70 
0.60 
0.50 
0.40 
0.30 
0.20 
0.10 
0.00 
SOURCE: CHIP. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Despite official rhetoric during the Hu-Wen period emphasizing 
shared growth, inequality in China continued to rise during their tenure, 
at least through 2007. Factors contributing to the expansion of inequal-
ity include further widening of the already large urban-rural income gap 
and the emergence of private property, which is distributed unequally. 
Inequality in income from property and assets is potentially a hot button 
issue, as China’s urban housing reform was not transparent or equitable, 
and more generally due to ongoing rent seeking in real estate and enter-
prise ownership. 
China has achieved major progress in poverty reduction. Neverthe-
less, although fewer people are poor in absolute terms, that is, relative 
to an absolute poverty line, relative poverty may be on the rise. If we 
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measure poverty in relative terms as the share of the population with 
incomes below 50 percent of median income, then we find that poverty 
increased from 12 percent in 2002 to 15 percent in 2007. While this 
increase in relative poverty is modest, it indicates that households at 
the bottom of the income distribution are falling further behind relative 
to those in the middle and top of the distribution. As China’s economy 
matures and the number of absolute poor shrinks, relative poverty will 
become an increasingly important social indicator. 
In summary, we find that China’s economic reforms have had many 
winners and few absolute losers. Yet, challenges to China’s harmoni-
ous society are ongoing. With development, the target has shifted, and 
China’s policies will need to evolve accordingly. 
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Changes in the World’s Workshop 
The Demographic, Social, and Political 
Factors behind China’s Labor Movement 
Mary Gallagher 
University of Michigan 
Labor strikes in southern China in the spring of 2010 awakened 
China watchers around the world to the possibility of a new wave of 
labor activism in China. The People’s Republic of China has experi-
enced labor strife before. During the reform period alone, the state has 
had to deal with autonomous worker organizations during the 1989 stu-
dent movement; a large but regionally bounded spate of protests against 
the state sector restructuring at the turn of the century; and, since 1995, 
a steady, inexorable rise in the number of individual workers who sue 
their employers each year. In most analyses, however, the Chinese state 
is portrayed as adept in reining in challenges to the labor status quo. A
truism is to state that there has yet to be a major labor movement that 
spans regional and workplace divisions. Workers may be angry but they 
are angry alone, not collectively. 
In this chapter, I introduce the general state of labor conditions in 
China while highlighting three important contextual changes that have 
occurred in the last decade. These contextual changes are important in 
understanding the current developments in labor activism and future 
potential for greater social instability around the issues of workplace 
rights and conditions and employment. The shifts in the demographic, 
social, and political context of workers in China have put pressure on 
the development model adopted by the Chinese state since the early 
1990s, which relies on cheap labor and labor-intensive manufacturing 
as key factors in rapid growth. As the foundations for this model dimin-
ish, local governments in China are pressured to find new sources of 
economic dynamism. If successful, China’s transition away from this 
119 
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development model to a more sustainable, consumer-driven economy 
will herald China’s arrival on the world stage as the key rising chal-
lenger to the United States. There are, however, many roadblocks on 
the path to middle- and high-income country status, especially for a 
country as large and regionally diverse as China. Labor issues are a key 
source of social instability and have been highlighted by high levels in 
the leadership as a focal point for policy reform and “stability preserva-
tion” policies. 
ChINA’S ChANGING DEMOGRAPhIC CONTExT 
In the 1990s, it was a surety among economists and foreign inves-
tors that China’s rural labor supply was virtually unlimited. Tens of 
millions of migrant workers poured into coastal developmental areas 
each year looking for the first factory jobs and opportunities to earn 
money, gain experience, and better the life chances of their kids, if not 
themselves. In 2003, to the surprise of many, there were reports in the 
Chinese media of a “migrant labor shortage” (民工荒 ) in development 
zones in China’s south. Although this shortage ebbed during the global 
financial crisis and China’s export crisis of 2008–2009, these shortages 
began to reappear soon after. Economists also noted that migrant wages, 
after a long period of relative stagnation, were growing quickly. 
As Yang (2011a), Cai (2008), and Cai and Wang (2011) have noted, 
China’s demographic changes since the 1980s have been particularly 
beneficial in fueling rapid export growth and industrialization. This 
“double demographic dividend” is the result of two different phenomena: 
rural-urban migration and an increase in the ratio of the working 
population to the dependent population. Both of these phenomena are 
reaching critical turning points, leading to greater challenges in export 
growth and low-cost, labor-intensive industrialization. Wages are going 
up, workers are choosier about employment opportunities, and labor 
markets are tightening in these key sectors (Cai 2008). 
Rural to urban migration in reformed China began in the late 1980s 
as the government relaxed its strict control over internal migration and 
residency status through the hukou system. Hukou is the shorthand 
term for the broader household registration system, which permits 
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administrative control over China’s population. This system, which 
was established by the People’s Republic of China in the 1950s, has 
connections to earlier forms of population control and registration in 
the Republican and Imperial periods, but the Chinese Communist Party 
went much further in administrative control over internal migration, in 
particular after the Great Leap Forward, 1958–1961, when very severe 
restrictions on rural to urban migration were put into effect. The hukou
policy’s constraints on migration meant that disparities between rural 
and urban citizens became entrenched and long lasting. Rural citizens 
were mostly shut out of employment opportunities in cities. Education 
became the one sure path out of rural life. (For a general discussion of 
hukou policies and history, see Chan and Buckingham [2008]; Chan 
and Zhang [1999]; and Wang [2005].) 
The relaxation of migration policies that began in the 1980s and 
quickened in the 1990s restarted the process of rural to urban migration, 
which is the normal development path for industrializing countries. 
Rural migration has increased rapidly since then as many young and 
middle-aged rural residents have left their legal residency in the rural 
areas to find employment in factories, services, or construction in coastal 
cities and development zones. The most recent 2010 census estimates 
that there are now nearly 200 million rural migrants in China. However, 
many rural citizens still find it difficult to become legal residents of the 
urban areas where they live and work. This is especially the case for 
those with low education. 
China’s growth trajectory has been heavily reliant on this migrant 
workforce, and its ability to access this rural surplus labor sets China 
apart from other reforming socialist or postsocialist countries. The large 
amount of surplus labor in agriculture suppressed the wages of migrant 
workers continuously during the 1990s and into this century (Yang 
2011b). Migrant workers have also been willing to work in exploitative 
conditions, including very long hours, unsafe environments, and 
insecure employment. Compared to the urban workers employed in 
the collective and state sectors, these workers were pliable, with low 
expectations about pay, conditions, and the terms of employment. 
Access to this labor pool significantly enhanced China’s ability to adopt 
export-oriented industrialization, following in the steps of its capitalist 
East Asian neighbors. 
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This period of rapid industrialization was also aided by the 
changing structure of the Chinese population as the one-child policy 
kicked in gradually in the 1970s. Birth rates declined while death rates 
also declined as people lived longer. There was an important period 
for growth when the ratio of the working population grew relative to 
the dependent population. Younger dependents declined faster than 
the retired population grew (Wang 2011). This period ended in 2010, 
when China’s working population began to decline. Yang (2011a) 
calls this China’s “condensed demographic transition.” Compared to 
other populous developing nations, China’s demographic changes are 
happening faster due to the effects of the one-child policy. 
There is considerable debate within and outside China about the 
nature of the current migrant labor shortage. Some question how it can 
exist permanently when there are still millions of potential migrants 
in rural areas (Knight, Deng, and Li 2010). Others note that this labor 
shortage coexists with equally dramatic reports of unemployment and 
underemployment of college graduates. I deal with the first issue in the 
next section. The second issue, on the coexistence of labor shortage and 
surplus, should be dealt with here. 
China’s labor markets are highly segmented with continuing 
institutional barriers to labor mobility across regions and across sectors. 
The hukou system is still fundamental in placing barriers between the 
labor markets of urban and rural citizens. There are also important 
social and cultural expectations about employment that further segment 
labor markets. Unemployed college graduates and unemployed rural 
migrants rarely compete in the same labor markets. There are some jobs 
that urban youth simply do not consider. Conversely, few employers 
in labor-intensive manufacturing would want to hire urban youth, who 
might not work hard enough or be able to withstand the harsh conditions. 
The very rapid expansion of the college educated since 2000 means that 
the requisite jobs for the college elite have not grown as quickly as 
that elite. Meanwhile, labor intensive manufacturing has grown very 
rapidly as China gained membership into the World Trade Organization 
and began to attract investment from other Asian countries that used 
to export directly to the United States and other developed markets. 
Barriers to labor mobility and segmentation based on hukou status and 
education level continue to exist in China. These factors help explain 
how labor shortages and labor surplus can coexist. 
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ThE ChANGING SOCIAL CONTExT OF ThE
“NEW GENERATION” OF MIGRANTS 
The one-child policy and the changes to China’s internal migration 
policies have also had transformative effects on the social and cultural 
characteristics of China’s youngest migrants, sometimes called the “new 
generation of migrants” (新生代农民工 ) to mark their differences from 
the earlier generation of migrant workers who left rural China in search 
of better opportunities after relaxation of the hukou system (Qiao and 
Chen 2010). These differences can be related to their status as part of 
the first “only child” generation, their better educational opportunities 
under reform, and their greater exposure to global youth culture through 
technological expertise and access to more sophisticated communication 
methods. 
Migrant workers born in and after the 1980s are part of a reform 
generation that is markedly different in basic characteristics, in political 
socialization, and in life experiences from that of their parents. In terms 
of basic demography, this generation is the first to be affected by the 
strict “one-child” policy that was implemented in the late 1970s. While 
in their parents’ generation a family might have several children, even 
rural children in this generation generally share at most one sibling. 
In urban areas, the majority of children born are only children. Given 
their greater importance to the family’s economy and long-term 
success, these “little emperors” have been lavished with attention and 
opportunity. Even rural children, who do not have the same educational 
and economic opportunities of their urban counterparts, have been given 
more attention and more protection from hard agricultural labor than 
in previous generations. Many rural parents understand that education 
is still the key to social mobility for their children. This focus on 
education has spared children backbreaking manual labor and allowed 
them to focus on their studies. Although rural children do not attain 
the same level of education as urban children, they now have much 
higher rates of middle school and high school completion. Even when 
they move on to labor intensive manufacturing as part of their “going 
out” strategy, they are already better educated and better prepared to 
make the transition to urban life. These educational characteristics also 
indicate the inexperience of post-1980 rural children with agricultural 
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work. An All China Federation of Trade Unions study found that 89 
percent of migrant workers in southern China did not intend to ever 
do agricultural work, and less than 45 percent had ever done it before 
leaving home (Qiao and Chen 2010). 
The post-1980s generation, both rural and urban, is also markedly 
different from their parents in terms of political socialization and life 
experiences under socialism. As children of the reform era, they have 
little familiarity with the mass political campaigns of the high Mao era. 
Their primary years of education and political socialization coincided 
with post-Tiananmen China, when economic growth was the major 
goal and the Chinese Communist Party emphasized a party open to 
all sectors of society, including entrepreneurs. The private sector was 
allowed to expand, and the “rule by law” campaign was disseminated in 
the media, encouraging people to protect their legal rights. The rural-to-
urban migration boom is also linked to this time period as China opened 
further to foreign direct investment and labor-intensive manufacturing 
development zones multiplied across the coastal provinces. 
These different demographic characteristics and life experiences 
have helped create a new generation of migrants who are challenging 
traditional barriers and identities that have existed in China since the 
Maoist hukou policy was put into place in the late 1950s. Three main 
characteristics of this new generation are worth examining here: 1) 
their frame of reference, 2) their long-term expectations, and 3) their 
potential capacity to organize their interests and grievances collectively. 
As surveys and interviews with young migrants show, young rural 
migrants are increasingly better integrated and familiar with global 
youth culture and Chinese urban culture. Their frame of reference is 
increasingly not what would have happened to them if they had stayed 
in the countryside, but what is possible for them as young, aspiring 
urban citizens. This change in their reference point (who they want to 
become) is, of course, related to their long-term plans and expectations. 
Rural migrants to Chinese cities generally do not envision a return to the 
countryside, but rather they hope for a gradual personal transformation 
from a low status to higher status. These aspirations translate into higher 
expectations on the job and some tendency to value work that offers 
future opportunity even at the expense of current lower pay. Many 
migrants also report distaste of jobs that are too lowly, dirty, dangerous, 
or boring. So, in addition to planning a gradual transition to urban 
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life, migrants also envision a certain degree of social and economic 
mobility. These expectations shape their workplace choices and, over 
time, they have become more selective about their place of employment 
when possible. 
Given this generation’s higher levels of education, better access to 
technology, and increased integration into urban culture, there seems to 
be greater potential for this generation to articulate collective interests 
and to act collectively to press for their interests and rights, vis-à-vis 
employers and the government alike. Chinese urban workers have 
acted collectively in the past, often organized by work unit, to protest 
about state-owned enterprise restructuring. Rural migrants have also 
used native-place affiliations and familial bonds to organize, but 
these modes of organization have not served them well at their urban 
workplaces where divisions between workers of different origins, 
dialects, and local cultures can be used by employers to fragment 
workers’ collective identity. In the strikes of 2010, observers pointed 
to workers’ new ability to organize within single workplaces and to 
design institutions to allow for leadership selection and representation. 
A collective identity is also being formed in the media and even 
in academia with the term new generation and the public attention to 
migrant conditions and social discrimination. This external validation 
of a collective identity is also a factor in the increased potential for 
young migrants’collective power. These social changes are not divorced 
from the changing political context. Since 2003, the party state has been 
much more attentive to and worried about the conditions and long-term 
development of China’s urbanizing citizens. This is the final context to 
which we now turn. 
ThE ChANGING POLITICAL CONTExT 
In 2003, the rising number of labor disputes, large-scale and 
destabilizing migrant workers’ wage arrears problem, and the media 
uproar over Sun Zhigang (a rural college graduate beaten to death in 
police custody in Guangzhou) redirected the state to focus on migrant 
labor issues. There were also a number of positive reasons for the 
state’s decision to begin to protect migrant workers’ rights. First, labor 
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unrest that had followed the state-owned enterprise restructuring of 
1999–2001 had begun to abate, and the state was feeling more confident 
about its ability to manage labor unrest through a combination of legal 
institutions and party-led direct intervention in labor-capital relations. 
Second, as Chinese growth boomed in the first decade of this century, the 
central government began to plan a gradual industrial upgrading for the 
coastal provinces and a move away from dependence on labor-intensive 
manufacturing. Raising wages, expanding protections, and enhancing 
employment security were all hoped-for policy consequences, but the 
government also aspired to draw new manufacturing investment into the 
central and western provinces, and to alleviate some of the imbalances 
and regional inequality that had developed alongside rapid growth and 
reform. 
It should also be noted that in addition to these positive or forward-
thinking aspects of the policy shift, the party state was and continues 
to be intently interested in preserving political stability. Positive 
developments such as increased employment security, new policies for 
collective wage bargaining, and enhanced position of the trade union 
are all part of an attempt to limit the development of an independent 
labor movement that might, in concert with other social forces, pressure 
the Chinese Communist Party to share power. When enhanced labor 
rights (or effective implementation of rights already on the books) clash 
with the imperative of the party’s monopoly on political power, labor 
rights have been trumped. 
ThE LEGISLATIVE AGENDA: ThE LABOR
CONTRACT LAW 
The Labor Contract Law, which was passed in 2007 and went 
into effect in 2008, is the paradigmatic example of China’s socialist 
party state regaining its interest in enhanced workers’ rights and better 
employment security. The period of reform from the 1980s through the 
beginning of the current century marked a gradual but relentless assault 
on the entitlements and privileges of the urban socialist workforce. 
Laws, regulations, and special reform measures, such as state enterprise 
restructuring, were constructed to chip away at the “iron rice bowl” of 
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employment security and extensive social benefits. The Labor Contract 
Law, through a supplementary law to the more market-friendly 1994 
Labor Law of the People’s Republic of China, signals a shift from ever-
increasing labor market flexibility, informalization, and insecure work 
(Gallagher and Dong 2011). 
In contrast to the basic principles of the Labor Law, the Labor Con-
tract Law has enhanced employment security through more stringent 
restrictions on (usually short) fixed-term contracts as the foundation of 
industrial relations in China. It also is more specific in some of the 
penalties for violations, and it grants the trade union more detailed 
provisions for collective negotiations. Although most media and aca-
demic attention has been on this law, there have been other legisla-
tive advances, including the Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration 
Law (2008), the Employment Promotion Law (2007), and the Social 
Insurance Law (2010). In addition to national level legislation, many 
localities have responded to the center’s push with local legislation and 
regulations of their own. Because the Labor Contract Law’s first year 
of implementation coincided with the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, 
however, some localities have attempted to use local implementation 
to reduce the impact of the Labor Contract Law on enterprises’ opera-
tional autonomy and the locality’s ability to attract external investment 
(Harper Ho 2009). 
ThE JUDICIAL AGENDA: MEDIATION ABOVE ALL 
The untimely confluence of a new, well-publicized, more protec-
tive law; a global economic crisis of unforeseen proportion; and longer-
term trends in rising wages and choosier workers led to an explosion of 
labor disputes in 2008, with these high rates sustained into more recent 
years. The central government, while committed to the new protections 
offered by the Labor Contract Law and other related laws, responded 
to this new spike in disputes with renewed emphasis on mediation 
and a sustained critique of and departure from adversarial resolution 
processes, especially litigation. This renewed interest in mediation is 
part of a broader agenda promoting the construction of a “harmonious 
society” under the aegis of the Chinese Communist Party. It is a clear 
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promotion of alternative models of political and social representation, 
away from democracy, pluralism, and freedom of association. While 
recognizing the need to promote the protection of workers’ rights, the 
party state has no intention of allowing such protection to flow into 
other areas of political reform. 
Mediation of labor disputes has long been enshrined as one method 
of dispute resolution. In the 1994 Labor Law, mediation is a voluntary 
first step in the resolution process. In those days, it was expected that 
mediation would occur within the enterprise and that the enterprise 
trade union would play a critical middleman role in bringing the two 
sides to an accepted compromise. With the reform of the state and 
collective sectors in the 1990s and the expansion of the private and 
foreign sectors, enterprise mediation declined quite dramatically as 
workers chose to resolve disputes at higher levels of administration and 
enterprises no longer maintained internal institutions that could serve in 
a mediating capacity. 
The recent revival of mediation has had to go beyond the enterprise, 
relying on government and party structures at the grassroots level to 
ensure harmonious resolution of labor disputes. This has led to some 
significant pressure on the institutions that manage arbitration and liti-
gation (the labor bureaus and the courts, respectively) to provide ample 
opportunities and incentives for mediated outcomes. Arbitrators and 
judges are encouraged through the evaluation systems to reach high 
levels of mediated settlements. When large collective disputes break 
out spontaneously at the workplace, the government sends out “stabil-
ity preservation teams” that use intergovernment and party coordination 
to pressure workers and employers alike for a mediated outcome (He 
and Su 2010). While legal experts have decried this trend as part of a 
larger shift away from “rule by law” (Minzner 2011), the party’s return 
to mediation is not surprising given the historical importance of media-
tion to resolve “contradictions within the people”—an idea important to 
Maoist thought (Lubman 1999). It is also a necessary adjustment to the 
very rapid growth in disputes wrought by the combination of economic 
changes and a rapidly developing legal system that gives workers 
impressive rights on paper. As more empowered workers make claims 
in the courts and in arbitration committees, the state has responded by 
pushing mediation. The continued reliance on mediation and the state’s 
ambivalence toward some of the consequences of its earlier decision to 
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develop the legal system (more social conflict, more overtly adversarial 
modes of resolution) are indicative of the contradictions embedded in 
the Chinese system. 
Reliance on mediation requires that the local government play a 
central role in the resolution of social disputes. It is intended to serve 
as a substitute for a more pluralistic opening toward effective collective 
representation of labor and capital. Instead of empowering the actors 
directly involved in disputes, the state has chosen to implicate itself 
directly into the resolution process. By doing so, the state can care-
fully push for better protection of workers’ interests while ensuring that 
worker demands do not grow too strong and threaten the local econ-
omy, or morph into political demands that might challenge the Chinese 
Communist Party’s hold on power. 
ThE INSTITUTIONAL AGENDA: COLLECTIVE
WAGE BARGAINING AND MANAGED INDUSTRIAL
TRANSFORMATION 
The Chinese state’s laser focus on “preserving social stability” 
(维稳) is always to maintain the political status quo, which allows 
the Chinese economy to continue to grow and the Chinese state to 
grow wealthier and more powerful. It builds up extremely important 
domestic and international legitimacy. But the Chinese state is nothing 
if not extremely ambitious. China’s leaders realize that maintaining the 
status quo is not enough; stability is the prerequisite for other plans. 
In this context of needing to maintain economic growth, but also 
to fix long-term problems, such as rising inequality and economic 
imbalances, the Chinese state envisions a gradual process of industrial 
transformation from labor-intensive manufacturing to high-tech, 
capital-intensive manufacturing and research and development. China’s 
role as the workshop of the world is a stepping-stone to something more 
valuable—as the laboratory of the world, as the R&D center of the world. 
At the same time, the movement of labor-intensive manufacturing from 
the coastal development zones of Guangdong and Jiangsu to internal 
provinces such as Henan, Sichuan, and Jiangxi will begin to alleviate 
China’s dramatic regional inequality. It will also make the urbanization 
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of China’s rural workers more tractable. Instead of leaving home to 
seek out urban areas for employment and opportunity, China’s rural 
citizens will have the jobs come to them. China’s new urban citizens 
will live in newly created cities as farms become suburbs and suburbs 
become metropolitan centers in their own right. 
One challenge revealed by the 2010 automotive strikes that has not 
been solved by the heavy-handed push for mediation and the new legal 
protections is the lack of institutional capacity for labor-capital bargain-
ing around interest conflicts. The vast majority of the nearly 700,000 
labor disputes in 2009 are “rights disputes,” when there is a conflict 
about the violation of the labor laws themselves. However, Chinese 
workers and employers have many disagreements and conflicts about 
their interests, such as wage increases, working conditions, quality of 
the cafeteria food, or the transportation from workplace to home. Many 
of the striking automotive workers in 2010, for example, were moti-
vated by a desire for wage increases that reduced the wage inequality 
between Japanese and Chinese workers employed by the same com-
pany and between Chinese workers in different plants owned by the 
same company. Because in most cases their wages already exceeded the 
minimum wage standards for their locality, they had wage demands that 
could not be settled through the current process of labor dispute resolu-
tion, which can only handle disputes over rights. 
Since the 2010 strikes, the government has revived the idea that 
China needs a system of collective bargaining and negotiation that 
would allow for regular and systematic discussion about wages between 
the government, employers, and workers. Such a system, it is believed, 
would not only reduce the likelihood of spontaneous workplace actions, 
but would also contribute to China’s desire for industrial transformation. 
Rising wages will gradually push some employers off the coast toward 
China’s central and western provinces, where incomes and expectations 
are much lower. The coastal provinces, with higher levels of education, 
a developed transportation infrastructure, and well-established ties to 
global production networks, will lead China in its next reformist effort, 
toward a knowledge economy. Like most development paradigms, this 
is a utopian vision, the realization of which is not assured. But it puts 
into better context the underlying reasons for the government’s support 
for more protective labor laws and the painstaking balance it strives 
to maintain between gains for labor (improved working conditions 
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and enhanced representation) and social stability, continued economic 
growth, and political dictatorship. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has attempted to place China’s recent labor activism 
into the broader context of China’s development trajectory. As noted in 
the three areas discussed above—demography, society, and politics— 
recent trends of increased labor activism cannot be explained by any 
one dimension, but rather by the confluence of factors that are currently 
in alignment. This alignment has widened the political space available 
to workers in pushing for new demands. Tighter labor markets have 
focused the minds of employers who had grown used to low expectations 
and a labor surplus. Political leaders at the top have realized that in 
order to rectify the dramatic growth in inequality since the 1980s, 
China’s coastal provinces must yield investment to cheaper places 
inland. China’s political system, however, has not changed, and there is 
no sign of any opening for freedom of association, independent unions, 
or a truly worker-led labor movement. The Chinese Communist Party 
hopes that it will satisfy the needs and demands of the new generation 
of workers, and in doing so make a workers’ movement against the 
party itself unnecessary. 
References 
Cai, Fang. 2008. “Approaching a Triumphal Span: How Far Is China toward 
Its Lewisian Turning Point?” Research Paper No. 2008/09. World Institute 
for Development Economics Research. Helsinki, Finland: World Institute 
for Development Economics Research, United Nations University. 
Cai, Fang, and Meiyan Wang. 2011. “Chinese Wages and the Turning Point 
in the Chinese Economy.” East Asia Forum, January 29. http://www
.eastasiaforum.org/2011/01/29/chinese-wages-and-the-turning-point-in
-the-chinese-economy (accessed January 5, 2012). 
Chan, Kam Wing, and Will Buckingham. 2008. “Is China Abolishing the 
Hukou System?” China Quarterly 195: 582–606. 
Chan, Kam Wing, and Li Zhang. 1999. “The Hukou System and Rural-Urban 
	  
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	
	 	
 
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	
	 	
	
	
	
 
132 Gallagher 
Migration in China: Processes and Changes.” China Quarterly 160: 818– 
855. 
Gallagher, Mary E., and Dong Baohua. 2011. “Legislating Harmony: 
Labor Law Reform in Contemporary China.” In From Iron Rice Bowl to 
Informalization: Markets, Workers, and the State in a Changing China, 
Sarosh Kuruvilla, Ching Kwan Lee, and Mary Gallagher, eds. Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, pp. 36–60. 
Harper Ho, Virginia E. 2009. “From Contracts to Compliance? An Early 
Look at Implementation under China’s New Labor Legislation.” Columbia 
Journal of Asian Law 23(1): 34. 
He, Xin, and Yang Su. 2010. “Street as Courtroom: State Accommodation of 
Labor Protests in South China.” Law and Society Review 44(1): 157–185. 
Knight, John, Deng Quheng, and Li Shi. 2010. “The Puzzle of Migrant Labour 
Shortage and the Rural Labour Surplus in China.” Department of Economics 
Working Paper Series No. 494. Oxford: University of Oxford. 
Lubman, Stanley. 1999. Bird in a Cage: Legal Reform in China after Mao. 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Minzner, Carl. 2011. “China’s Turn against Law.” American Journal of 
Comparative Law 59(4): 935–984. 
Qiao, Zhuanxiu, and Songshu Chen. 2010. “Research Report on the Problems 
of the New Generation of Migrant Workers.” Unpublished report. http:// 
news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-06/21/c_12240721.htm (in Chinese, 
accessed July 31, 2012). 
Wang, Fei-ling. 2005. Organizing through Exclusion and Division: China’s 
Hukou System. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Wang, Feng. 2011. “The Future of a Demographic Overachiever: Long-Term 
Implications of the Demographic Transition in China.” Population and 
Development Review 37(Supplement): 173–190. 
Yang, Yao. 2011a. “The Relationship between China’s Export-Led Growth and 
Its Double Transition of Demographic Change and Industrialization.” Asian 
Economic Papers 10(2): 52–76. 
———. 2011b. “China’s Export-Led Growth Model.” East Asia Forum, 
February 27. http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/02/27/chinas-export-led
-growth-model/ (accessed January 5, 2012). 
	 	 	 	 	 	
 
 
6 
Left Behind in Old Age? 
Sources of Support for China’s Rural 
Elderly in a Period of Growth, Migration, 
and Demographic Transition 
John Giles 
World Bank and the Institute for Labor 
Over the last 25 years, average incomes have risen considerably as 
China’s economy has undergone unprecedented growth and dramatic 
reductions in poverty. Not all regions of the country have benefited uni-
formly (Benjamin et al. 2008; Ravallion and Chen 2007) as gaps have 
grown between coastal and interior regions and between urban and 
rural areas of the country (Kanbur and Zhang 1999, 2005). In addition 
to geographic poverty traps that lead to different patterns of income and 
consumption growth (Jalan and Ravallion 2002), there are also consid-
erable differences across demographic groups not only in income levels 
(Chaudhuri and Datt 2009), but also in the level of coverage by safety 
nets and in the risks of falling into poverty (Duclos, Araar, and Giles 
2010; Jalan and Ravallion 1999). In particular, the movement of young 
rural adults to urban and coastal areas for higher income earning oppor-
tunities raises the prospect that older residents remaining in rural areas 
are at greater risk of falling into poverty. In general, rural residents lack 
access to pension support when they are of retirement age, and must 
rely on either their own labor income or support from family members, 
even as they age into their 70s and beyond. In rural China, financial sup-
port for the elderly remains the responsibility of adult children and is 
even codified into laws governing the family (Marriage Law 2001). As 
the population of potential care providers continues to shrink as a result 
of both China’s demographic transition and the availability of attractive 
migrant employment opportunities for the young, many observers have 
expressed concerns for the well-being of the rural elderly (Benjamin, 
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Brandt, and Rozelle 2000; Jiang and Zhao 2009; Li, Lu, and Feldman 
2009; Yao 2006). 
In this chapter, I use the 2005 1 percent population sample to docu-
ment the sources of support for older rural residents, and then present
updated evidence on the rates both at which the rural elderly coreside
with adult children and live in proximity to them. I then provide 
descriptive evidence on the extent to which private net transfers from 
adult children respond to low income levels of their elderly parents. To 
do this, I first introduce a framework for examining how net transfers 
respond to elderly income, and then make use of a unique data source 
with information on the age and residence location of all nonresident 
children of the household. These features of the data source allow us 
to reduce one form of bias common in many studies of intergenera-
tional transfers: we control for the size and quality of the transfer net-
work. Given specific concerns over abandonment by adult children, I 
examine whether transfer responsiveness varies when an elderly person 
has migrant children, and moreover, whether the variance of expected 
transfers differs between elderly with migrant children and those who 
only have children living nearby. 
The descriptive evidence presented shows somewhat higher vari-
ance in the predicted transfers to the elderly who have migrant chil-
dren, which is consistent with concerns that the current and future 
elderly may face more uncertainty in their support. Given that migrants 
employed in nonagricultural work are frequently in the informal sec-
tor, their incomes often are much more risky, thus it is not surprising 
that this risk is reflected in transfers to their parents. To decrease risk 
to private transfer income, China’s government is currently supporting 
new rural pension programs that are designed to reduce these perceived 
risks of elderly poverty and to complement existing motives for private 
transfers. 
Apart from income support from the family, income from own 
labor remains the other important source of support for the rural elderly. 
Recent research on elderly labor supply provides evidence that Chi-
na’s rural elderly continue to work well beyond age 60 out of neces-
sity. Recent studies of the retirement decision in rural China suggest 
that China’s rural elderly “work until they drop” (Pang, de Brauw, and 
Rozelle 2004), and only stop working when physically incapacitated. 
Physical labor in agriculture can take a significant toll on the bodies of 
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those still working after 60 years of age and raise the likelihood of seri-
ous injury. Pension support for the rural elderly can be expected to have 
a significant impact on the importance of working into old age, and is 
likely to affect the labor supply decisions of the elderly. One benefit of 
a rural pension is that it could make retirement a feasible choice, and 
thus improve standards of living of the rural elderly. 
In this chapter, I document the labor supply patterns of the rural 
elderly and show that a considerable share of that population works 
well beyond age 70. I examine the effects of both adult child migration 
and increasing family wealth on labor supply decisions of the elderly. 
The potential benefit that a pension may play in facilitating retirement 
is evident as I observe declining labor supply with increases in family 
wealth and other sources of income. 
The following section of the chapter presents evidence on the 
sources of support among China’s rural elderly. It first presents descrip-
tive statistics from the 2005 1 percent population sample on sources 
of support for China’s elderly, with particular attention to contrasts 
between elderly living in rural and urban areas, and then discusses 
implications of changes in living arrangements that underscore con-
cerns that the rural elderly are at increasing risk of falling into poverty. 
Finally, the section presents evidence on the responsiveness of transfers 
to the income levels of elderly households, with attention to changes in 
responsiveness over time. As the rural elderly often support themselves 
through work relatively late in life, the following section presents evi-
dence on the determinants of elderly labor supply. In particular, it high-
lights the relationships between income, health, and migrant status of 
children and labor supply of men and women in their 60s and 70s. A
final section summarizes important findings. 
SOURCES OF SUPPORT AMONG ChINA’S
RURAL ELDERLy 
Major differences exist in the primary sources of support for Chi-
na’s urban and rural elderly and between men and women from both 
groups of elderly. Table 6.1 presents findings on elderly sources of sup-
port by location and gender for 2005. Several differences across groups 
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Table 6.1  Primary Source of Support for China’s Elderly, 2005 (%) 
Urban Rural 
Source of support Average Male Female Average Male Female 
Labor income 13.0 18.4 7.9 37.9 48.5 27.5 
Pensions 45.4 56.9 34.6 4.6 8.1 1.3 
Dibao 2.4 1.8 2.9 1.3 1.8 0.9 
Insurance and subsidy 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0 
Property income 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.1 
Family support 37.0 20.7 52.3 54.1 39.3 68.5 
Other 1.5 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 1.7 
NOTE: Most significant share of support reported. 
SOURCE: National Bureau of Statistics (2006). 
among the elderly are notable. First, although pensions are the single 
most significant source of support for the urban elderly, they remain a 
very minor source of support for the rural elderly, almost entirely con-
fined to former civil servants and soldiers, and former village cadres.1 
In contrast, labor income is a much more significant source of support 
for the rural elderly than for the urban elderly, being the primary source 
of support for 37.9 percent of the rural elderly. Family support is an 
important primary support for both rural and urban elderly households, 
but its role for the rural elderly is substantially greater. 
Support through antipoverty programs does not figure prominently, 
most likely because the rural dibao—a social aid program provid-
ing cash assistance to the rural poor—was not an important source of 
income support for rural or urban elderly households.2 This finding may 
stem from the fact that the rural dibao was still being phased in at the 
time of the survey, although policy has shifted in the intervening period 
with the approval of rural dibao as national policy in 2007 with a resul-
tant expansion in coverage.3 Also notable is the inability of the elderly 
to earn income from property. In contrast to member countries of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development historically 
or other developing countries today, the elderly in China have not grown 
old in an environment in which they could accumulate land wealth. 
Lack of land wealth limits the ability of the elderly to earn income from 
rents and may also limit the scope for encouraging intergenerational 
transfers from their children (who would be prospective heirs). 
Left Behind in Old Age?  137 
Looking at sources of support by gender among the rural elderly, 
family support is more important for elderly women and labor income 
remains more important for men. As shown in Table 6.1, 68.5 percent 
of women over 60 report that financial support from family members 
is their most important source of support, whereas only 27.5 percent 
report that labor income is most important. By contrast, 48.5 percent 
of elderly men report that labor income remains their most impor-
tant source of support; only 39.3 percent report support from family 
members. When distinguishing the importance of pension by gender, a 
significantly higher share of rural men (8.1 percent) than women (1.3 
percent) report that pension income is their most significant source of 
financial support. The gap between men and women reflects historical 
differences between genders in employment in local government and 
the military. 
Rural elderly in their 60s are more likely to support themselves 
through labor income, whereas those over 70 depend far more on 
support from family members. Table 6.2 shows results by age cohort 
among the rural elderly and emphasizes the differences in financial sup-
port between younger and older elderly people. Younger elderly rely 
more on labor income, and a shift starts after age 70. Notably, however, 
nearly a quarter of the elderly between 70 and 75 report labor income 
as their main source of support. Apart from family support and labor 
income, no other source of support for the elderly varies significantly 
by age group. Moreover, no other component plays a particularly sig-
nificant role. 
Table 6.2  Source of Support for China’s Rural Elderly, by Age Group in 
2005 (share of income in percent) 
Age group (years) 
Source of support 60+ 60–64 65–69 70–74 75–79 80–84 85+ 
Labor income 37.9 64.3 45.1 24.4 12.0 4.3 1.7 
Pensions 4.6 4.7 5.1 4.7 4.4 3.8 2.6 
Dibao 1.3 0.8 1.2 1.5 1.9 2.0 2.1 
Insurance and subsidy 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Property income 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 
Family support 54.1 28.6 46.6 66.9 79.1 87.2 91.1 
Other 1.8 1.2 1.7 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.3 
SOURCE: National Bureau of Statistics (2006). 
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Evidence on Family Support 
Until the last few years, policy on pensions and safety nets has not 
focused significantly on the rural elderly because the family was assumed 
to be an adequate source of support. Policymakers had assumed the 
continued viability of traditional, family-based arrangements for two 
reasons. First, family values remain strong in rural areas, and Confu-
cian filial piety continues to sustain family care for the elderly. Second, 
any formal public policy response to the needs of the rural elderly may 
undermine existing private arrangements. For example, state transfers 
to the elderly may crowd out existing transfers from younger family 
members. 
With regard to the reliance on traditional family values, both policy-
makers and other observers have in recent years questioned the view 
that family support for the rural elderly will be sufficient. Fertility 
decline driven by China’s population policies may ultimately lead to 
a breakdown of the traditional support system, but conclusions from 
research spanning the literature on demography and economics dis-
agree on the likeliness of this outcome. Zimmer and Kwong (2003) 
show that more children increase the likelihood that the elderly will 
receive support, but current simulation results suggest that declines in 
fertility alone will not lead to a collapse of family-based support for 
the elderly. Other research has suggested that financial transfers to par-
ents respond to low income and low health status in urban areas (Cai, 
Giles, and Meng 2006), but that in rural areas interhousehold transfers 
are not often observed because they take the form of labor input into 
family farming (Lee and Xiao 1998).4 The following sections provide 
empirical evidence on elderly living arrangements and responsiveness 
of financial support to low incomes. 
Recent Changes to Living Arrangements and the Well-Being of 
the Elderly 
The share of rural elderly living with their children has declined 
rapidly, both in the long term and in recent years. Changes in living 
arrangements have been cited most frequently as a reason for concern 
for the well-being of the elderly. For example, Benjamin, Brandt, and 
Rozelle (2000) note that in rural northern China, over 85 percent of 
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the elderly lived in extended households in 1935, but this figure had 
dropped to just over 60 percent by 1995.5 The decline in coresidence 
with adult children is strikingly evident over the six rounds of the China 
Health and Nutrition Survey from 1991 to 2006. Figure 6.1 shows that 
in the survey, nearly 70 percent of elderly in rural areas lived with an 
adult child in 1991, but by 2006 this share had fallen to just over 40 
percent. As elderly parent age increases, the probability of coresidence 
with an adult child approaches 100 percent.6 
At the same time, a decline in coresidence does not necessarily 
reflect a drop in provision of care to the elderly. In-kind transfers, such 
as supply of labor on extended family plots, are difficult to pick up in 
surveys, yet such transfers often occur both within and across house-
holds. Changes in living arrangements reflect the increasing wealth of 
families. With increasing resources, coresidence may be unnecessary 
in caring for the elderly. Within villages in rural areas, elders and adult 
children are typically in the same small group (a sub-village administra-
tive unit) and live in proximity to one another. Given increases in hous-
ing wealth in rural areas since the mid-1980s, the trend toward nuclear 
Figure 6.1  Living Arrangements of China’s Rural Elderly 
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families may signal a wealth effect independent of the traditional value 
of providing support and care to elderly parents. 
In addition, the share of rural elderly with an adult child living 
nearby was actually higher. A more important factor may be the prox-
imity of adult children, not whether they coreside. Figure 6.2 summa-
rizes the living arrangements by age cohort from the 2004 Research 
Center for Rural Economy (RCRE) supplemental survey and includes 
information on children living within the same village as their elders. 
Although coresidence with adult children was less than 60 percent dur-
ing the 2003 reference period among those 60–70 years of age, more 
than half the elderly living alone or with a spouse in this age range had 
at least one adult child living in the village.7 This finding suggests that 
even though coresidence was well below the levels of the 1930s, adult 
children were still potentially available to provide care. 
Evidence suggests that migration decisions of adult children are 
influenced by the well-being of elderly parents. Decline in coresidence 
reflects a decline in support for the elderly only if associated with 
increased abandonment of the elderly. The rural elderly may have suf-
Figure 6.2  Living Arrangements of China’s Rural Elderly, by Age 
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ficient support if they are receiving transfers from local or migrant adult 
children. Giles and Mu (2007) explore this possibility by conducting 
separate analyses using two different data sources. They find a signifi-
cantly lower probability that a son will work as a migrant when a parent 
is seriously ill. Although parental illness has a statistically significant 
effect on migration, it does not completely drive the decision to return 
from migrant destinations. Depending on the data set and methodol-
ogy, the effect of illness varied from a 15 percent to 26 percent reduc-
tion in the probability that a son would be employed as a migrant, and 
this effect was reduced if other siblings remained behind in the village. 
Although this level of responsiveness to elderly illness is significant, it 
is not absolute. Moreover, elderly who are relatively healthy may have 
a much lower standard of living if nonresident adult children who are 
migrants are less likely to make transfers to their parents than adult 
children who live nearby. In light of these findings, the next section 
examines how private transfers respond to low income levels of the 
elderly, including whether transfer responsiveness differs with migrant 
status of children. 
Do Private Transfers Respond to Income of the Elderly? 
Two important reasons exist to examine the responsiveness of trans-
fers and transfer levels. First, as China rolls out its national rural pen-
sion program, concerns may arise about formal support for the elderly 
crowding out transfers from private sources. Second, while evidence 
from the risk-coping literature suggests that elderly households with 
migrant family members may be less likely to fall into poverty (Cai 
et al. 2012; Giles 2006), these findings are average effects and do not 
explore how transfers vary with pretransfer household income, nor do 
they consider the distribution of transfers and the risks that the elderly 
may fall into poverty if transfers do not materialize. 
Much early research on intrafamily transfers had used data from 
developed countries and focused on efforts to distinguish whether trans-
fers were motivated by altruistic or exchange motives.8 This distinction 
is important as it has implications for how transfers respond to exog-
enous income received by elderly households. If an altruistic motive 
dominates, then family members outside the household may respond 
to reduced levels of income by providing an offsetting transfer. This 
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raises the possibility that any increase in income, as might occur with 
a noncontributory pension payment, would lead to an offsetting reduc-
tion in transfers into the household. If the altruistic motive dominates, 
the transfer derivative (which picks up responsiveness of transfers to 
income) will have an unambiguously negative sign and the magnitude 
will equal one if increased income perfectly crowds out private trans-
fers. When exchange motives or other motives are more important, then 
we are unlikely to observe any crowding out with increased incomes, 
and the transfer derivative may not be significantly different from zero. 
Policy research examining the motives for transfers in developing 
countries has emphasized the importance of allowing both altruistic and 
exchange motives to be present at different levels of income. Theory 
thus suggests a net transfer function for the elderly: 
(6.1) Ti 
N  = ƒ(Ii) + x'iγ + εi , 
where Ti 
N are net transfers into the household, Ii is a measure of pre-
transfer income, and Xi is a vector of other exogenous variables which 
influence levels of transfers into and out of the household (and γ is the 
corresponding vector of coefficients on Xi). Errors in measurement and 
unexplained sources of variation are then represented by εi . What is 
important in this model is that we allow pretransfer income, Ii , to have 
a nonlinear effect on net transfer responses. Estimating how net trans-
fers, Ti 
N , vary with pretransfer income is our primary objective, but to 
do this we must appropriately control for other factors, xi , that affect 
transfers into the household. 
Our choice of data source to use for this analysis is driven by con-
cern that omitted variables related to the potential transfer network out-
side the household could bias estimates of how transfers respond to pre-
transfer income. This would occur, for example, if the size or quality of 
the transfer network was systematically related to pretransfer income. 
If number of children or their ability (measured through education) also 
reflects unmeasured dimensions of the ability of household members, 
then this may well be the case. In addition, knowing whether a house-
hold has family members who have migrated, even if in the more dis-
tant past, is important for making comparisons across households with 
migrant children and those with family members living locally. 
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The most appropriate existing data source for the study of transfer 
behavior is the RCRE household survey complemented with a Supple-
mental Survey conducted in RCRE households in 2004.9 An important 
feature of the survey is that it enumerated characteristics of former 
household members, including their current location and educational 
attainment, and this allows us to control for both the size and quality of 
the transfer network. Thus, among the regressors influencing the size of 
transfers, we include the number of children, which captures the effect 
of the potential transfer network size, and average education of children 
living outside the household, which proxies for the quality of the trans-
fer network.10 
Arguing that f (Ii ) may be nonlinear due to a switch from altru-
istic to exchange motives for transfers at a particular threshold, Cox, 
Hansen, and Jimenez (2004) estimate transfer responsiveness using an 
approach that allows one to estimate this threshold empirically as well. 
Understanding where this threshold is relative to the poverty line or an 
eligibility line for minimum living standard support may be important 
for thinking about safety net design and could be quite useful. Yet, an 
empirical approach that forces f (Ii ) to be composed of two linear por-
tions below and above a threshold may also be too restrictive. Earlier 
work examining transfers to elderly living in urban China raises doubt 
about the viability of the threshold model approach. Cai, Giles, and 
Meng (2006) show that the threshold model introduced by Cox, Han-
sen, and Jimenez (2004) leads to a switch from altruistic motives at 
less than half the basic needs poverty line for urban China. While this 
shouldn’t disqualify the approach altogether, the threshold also failed to 
fit the data very well. 
Another approach to allowing f (I i ) to be nonlinear is to use a par-
tial linear model for empirical estimation, and then empirically calcu-
late transfer derivatives at different levels of Ii. We use the partial linear 
model introduced by Yatchew (2003) and implemented for analysis of 
transfers in Cai, Giles, and Meng (2006). In this approach, observations 
in the sample are first ranked by Ii , and then differenced to obtain 
(6.2) ∆Ti 
N  = ∆ƒ(Ii) + ∆x'iγ + ∆εi . 
Since Ii is bounded as the sample size increases, ∆f (I i ) ≈ 0, and Equa-
tion (6.2) reduces to 
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(6.3) ∆Ti 
N  = ∆x'iγ + ∆εi . 
As long as Ii and other independent variables are not perfectly corre-
lated, OLS estimation of Equation (6.3) will yield consistent estimates 
of γ. In order to estimate the nonparametric relationship f (I i ), we use 
the estimated coefficients, γ̂, to calculate 
(6.4) ui = Ti 
N  − x'iγ̂ = ƒ(Ii) + εi . 
Assuming that the εi are independent across households and identi-
cally distributed, ui converges to f (I i ) for large sample sizes. We then 
use locally weighted regression (lowess) to estimate the nonparamet-
ric relationship between the response of transfers, f (I i ), to pretransfer 
income, Ii .11 We also calculate the income-varying transfer derivatives 
of f (I i ) as the slope of f (I i ) in the neighborhood of [I i −100, I i +100]. 
In Figure 6.3, we show the estimated transfer response, f (I i ), for 
different levels of pretransfer income, Ii. It is likely that transfer respon-
siveness from migrants may change as time away from home villages 
increases.12 In order to highlight changes in transfer responsiveness 
over time, we split the sample into an early period (1995–1998) and a 
later period (2000–2003). In each figure, we also separately show how 
transfers respond to pretransfer income levels for elderly households 
that have migrant children and those that do not. In order to highlight 
how transfers respond to income at different points in the income distri-
bution, we draw vertical lines at multiples of an annual nutrition-based 
poverty line of 875 RMB yuan per capita, and then report the slopes 
calculated at these points in Table 6.3. 
Evident in the top panel of Figure 6.3, elderly households found 
transfers more responsive to income at low levels in the earlier period 
if they had migrant children than if they did not. Indeed, the slope, 
or transfer derivative, was not indistinguishable from negative one 
for elderly households with pretransfer income below one half of a 
nutrition-based poverty line. This suggests that public transfers to the 
elderly with migrant children would crowd out private transfers at very 
low levels of income. By income levels near the poverty line, how-
ever, the transfer derivative was −0.5 for elderly households regardless 
of whether or not they had migrant children. Thus, even in the earlier 
period, one would not expect private transfers to be crowded out by 
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Figure 6.3  Net Transfers Received by Rural Elderly, by Migrant Status 
of Adult Children 
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SOURCE: Giles, Wang, and Zhao (2010), estimated using data from RCRE Rural 
Household Surveys for 1995–2003 from Anhui, Henan, Jiangsu, and Shanxi prov-
inces and the matched RCRE 2004 Supplemental Rural Household Social Network, 
Labor Allocation, and Land Use Survey. 
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Table 6.3  Estimated Transfer Derivatives for households with Elderly 
Residents 
Estimates in neighborhood of multiples of the poverty line 
Income Households without Households with 
per capita migrant children migrant children 
Multiple (RMB) 1996–98 2000–03 1996–98 2000–03
One-quarter 119–319 −0.84 −0.67 −1.73 −0.63 
poverty line 
One-half poverty line 338–538 −0.73 −0.57 −1.03 −0.35 
Poverty line 775–975 −0.52 −0.46 −0.49 −0.25 
Twice poverty line 1,650– −0.28 −0.35 −0.40 −0.21 
1,850 
Four times poverty line 3,400– −0.11 −0.24 −0.31 −0.20 
3,600 
NOTE: All values are in 2000 RMB yuan per capita. The nutrition-based poverty line is 
equal to 875 RMB yuan per capita. 
SOURCE: Giles, Wang, and Zhao (2010) estimates based on RCRE Rural Household 
Surveys for 1995–2003 from Anhui, Henan, Jiangsu, and Shanxi provinces and the 
matched RCRE 2004 Supplemental Rural Household Social Network, Labor Alloca-
tion, and Land Use Survey. 
payments from a noncontributory pension in those elderly households 
already at or above the poverty line. 
By the later period, we find that private net transfers into households 
with elderly residents become less responsive to income for households 
with migrant children. This decline in transfer responsiveness holds for 
the significant share of households with incomes ranging from half the 
nutrition-based poverty line (or 438 RMB/capita) to twice this value (or 
1750 RMB/capita), and indicates that any concern about a noncontribu-
tory pension crowding out private transfers is becoming less relevant 
over time. Indeed, the decline in responsiveness of transfers to low 
income raises the possibility that the elderly may be more exposed to 
the risk of poverty with increases in out-migration of adult children and 
increasing likelihood that migration of children is permanent. 
Will Private Transfers Keep the Rural Elderly Out of Poverty? 
When we examine the responsiveness of transfers to pretransfer 
income above, it is important to remember that the predicted transfer 
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levels in Figure 6.3 should be interpreted as expected values, and that 
actual transfers will be some distribution around these predicted values. 
In order to assess the risk that private transfers are not sufficient to keep 
the elderly out of poverty, we use a bootstrap estimation procedure to 
estimate the distribution of transfers around the predicted values. In 
Figure 6.4, we reproduce the predicted transfers from Figure 6.3 with 
confidence intervals added, and we also plot the threshold of combi-
nations of pretransfer income and private transfers sufficient to keep 
elderly households above the nutrition-based poverty threshold. This 
threshold is represented in each of the four graphs of Figure 6.4 as the 
straight line running from the net transfer axis when pretransfer income 
is zero to the point on the pretransfer income axis where net transfers 
are −500 RMB/capita and the household pretransfer income is just suf-
ficient to keep the household out of poverty. The top two panels show 
the range of net transfers for different levels of pretransfer income dur-
ing the 1995–1998 period for households without and with migrants, 
respectively. Comparing the top two figures, note that more of the lower 
bound of transfers lies below the poverty threshold for households that 
do not have migrant family members. Indeed, during the earlier period, 
elderly households with migrant family members appear very unlikely 
to have income per capita below the poverty line after private transfers 
are included in household income. 
Evident in the fourth panel of Figure 6.4, households with migrant 
family members are actually at a greater risk of falling into poverty by 
the 2000–2003 period. The fact that transfers are less responsive to low 
incomes, as highlighted above, suggests that a noncontributory pension 
or other support mechanism is unlikely to crowd out private transfers. 
Figure 6.4 provides evidence that such a transfer may be useful for 
reducing the risk that elderly households will fall into poverty. 
In Table 6.4, we summarize the range of transfers at five multiples 
of the poverty line. Drawing values from Figure 6.4, evidence sum-
marized in this table suggests that elderly households with pretransfer 
income per capita less than one-half the nutrition-based poverty line are 
at particular risk of falling into poverty. 
The analysis of transfers presented here suggests that a noncon-
tributory pension has the potential to play an important role in reduc-
ing the risk of elderly households falling into poverty. While the rural 
dibao is intended to assist poor households, it only comes into play 
148   Giles 
Figure 6.4  Confidence Intervals for Net Transfers Received by the Rural 
Elderly, by Migrant Status of Adult Children 
No migrant children 
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Figure 6.4  (continued) 
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150  
Table 6.4  Estimated Range of Transfers to households with Elderly Residents, Results for Neighborhoods of 
Different Multiples of the Poverty Line 
1995–98 2000–03 
Pretransfer Households Households Households Households 
income Portion of without migrant with migrant without migrant with migrant 
Multiple per capita estimated range children children children children 
One-quarter poverty line 119–319 Upper bound 1,356 1,643 1,489 1,655 
Mean 948 1,216 1,081 1,071 
Lower bound 531 718 664 479 
One-half poverty line 338–538 Upper bound 1,155 1,276 1,293 1,484 
Mean 811 910 942 953 
Lower bound 469 610 601 461 
Poverty line 775–975 Upper bound 785 908 1,019 1,381 
Mean 517 648 709 821 
Lower bound 307 420 473 290 
Two times poverty line 1,650–1,850 Upper bound 421 605 701 1192 
Mean 212 369 433 615 
Lower bound 87 120 216 55 
Four times poverty line 3,400–3,600 Upper bound 125 216 259 862 
Mean −48 −137 −7 274 
Lower bound −185 −568 −249 −345 
NOTE: All values are in 2000 RMB yuan per capita. The nutrition-based poverty line is equal to 875 RMB yuan per capita. 
SOURCE: Giles, Wang, and Zhao (2010) estimates based on RCRE Rural Household Surveys for 1995–2003 from Anhui, Henan, Jiangsu, 
and Shanxi provinces and the matched RCRE 2004 Supplemental Rural Household Social Network, Labor Allocation, and Land Use 
Survey. 
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after a household has been recognized as poor. Lowering the risk that 
an elderly household falls into poverty can have beneficial effects on a 
range of economic decisions. In particular, by reducing the risk of fall-
ing into poverty, it is likely that the incentive for unproductive forms of 
precautionary saving are reduced and we are also likely to affect labor 
supply and retirement decisions of elderly households. 
When considering the results from the four-province analysis of 
transfers, one should remember that although poorer areas of Anhui, 
Shanxi, and Henan are included in the analysis sample, these prov-
inces are generally considered middle income, and Jiangsu is included 
among upper-income coastal provinces. If transfer responsiveness to 
low income is also declining among households with migrant children 
in poorer regions of China, then a higher share of elderly households are 
likely to be at risk of slipping into poverty. 
ThE LABOR SUPPLy AND “RETIREMENT” DECISIONS OF
ChINA’S RURAL ELDERLy 
Recent studies of retirement decisions in rural China suggest that 
rural elderly “work until they drop” and stop working only when physi-
cally incapacitated (Pang, de Brauw, and Rozelle 2004). Benjamin, 
Brandt, and Fan (2003) find evidence suggesting that the likelihood 
of working in agriculture declines significantly with increases in fam-
ily wealth, raising the possibility that public transfers might facilitate 
reduced labor supply of the rural elderly. In China’s urban areas, where 
many of the elderly rely on pension support, relatively few elderly con-
tinue to work in retirement. By contrast, our earlier discussion noted 
that nearly 50 percent of rural men and 28 percent of women over retire-
ment age state that income from work remains their primary source 
of support. Because a considerable number of elderly receiving family 
support also continue to work, these figures significantly understate the 
degree to which China’s rural elderly continue to work after retirement 
age. 
Even as family wealth and incomes have increased among house-
holds in rural China, some data sources suggest that China’s rural 
elderly were more likely to work. Evident in Figure 6.5, employment 
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Figure 6.5  Employment Status of the Rural Elderly over Time 
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status increases across the age distribution from 1993 to 2003 for elderly 
relatives of RCRE panel households.13 Indeed, over this period of ris-
ing household incomes, employment rates of the rural elderly increased 
at every age. In fact, continued employment of the elderly may be an 
important contributing factor to the rising incomes of rural households. 
As rural household incomes increase with the migrant employment of 
younger adults, older parents remain behind and continue farming the 
household land. 
Features of China’s land tenure system may contribute to the effect 
of child migration on the labor supply of the elderly. Access to land 
in rural China has long been the safety net for able-bodied rural resi-
dents, but restrictions on the ability to transfer land may also influence 
the labor supply decisions of rural residents. The inability to rent land 
further reduces the income of an elderly person in retirement, and the 
possibility that village leaders will reallocate land that is not kept pro-
ductive may create additional incentives for older farmers to continue 
working household land. Changes in the Land Law enacted in 2002 and 
2003 may have facilitated land transfer and presumably may also have 
influenced the labor supply decisions of older rural residents. 
To examine the possibility that migration of children is systemati-
cally related to labor supply decisions of the elderly, Figure 6.6 shows 
the share of age cohorts employed by migrant status for men and 
women in 1998 and 2003. No systematic relationship between elderly 
retirement and migration status of children is immediately evident. At 
the same time, however, migration status of children and the labor sup-
ply decision of an elderly household resident are both systematically 
related to household composition, family wealth, earning ability of 
family members, and health status of the elderly person in question. 
In order to better characterize the relationship between migration and 
retirement and labor supply decisions of the elderly, it is important to 
explicitly model the labor supply decision of the elderly while control-
ling for these other factors. 
As a framework for understanding the retirement and work-
intensity decisions of the elderly, assume that individuals (or house-
holds) maximize utility subject to a family budget constraint. The bud-
get constraint is a function of wealth, income, available time, health sta-
tus, and nonlabor income of household members. From the constrained 
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Figure 6.6  Employment of the Elderly and Migrant Status of 
Adult Children 
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Figure 6.6  (continued) 
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utility maximization decision, we conceptualize a general model of 
labor supply: 
Ls = ƒ(Wh nw(6.5) it it , Iwit , I it , Hit ,Tit ,xit ,Vit , Djt) , 
where labor supply of individual i at time t, Lits , is a function of household 
wealth, With , income from work of all household members, Iwit , income 
unrelated to current work, I itnw , health status, Hit , an individual’s time 
endowment, Tit , and a vector of individual and household characteris-
tics reflecting preferences, xit , which include own age and demographic 
characteristics of the household affecting preferences. We also consider 
the presence of unobserved village institutional characteristics affecting 
labor supply, Vit , and province-year dummy variables controlling for 
provincewide macroeconomic shocks, Djt . Identifying precise effects 
of each of these variables can be complicated by three factors that may 
introduce bias into our estimates: 1) some are imperfectly observed;
2) there are functional relationships among some of these variables 
(e.g., health status may affect income through productivity, available 
time, and available household wealth); and 3) labor supply of an elderly 
individual may be simultaneously determined with the labor supply 
decisions of other family members. In order to avoid bias in our labor 
supply models, we use measures of education, age, and health, which 
are the longer-term determinants of income and wealth. 
Because wealth (With ) and current labor income (Iwit ) of a household 
are determined by the current and past productivity of household mem-
bers, we use information on educational attainment and age to charac-
terize productivity. Educational attainment of the elderly themselves is 
likely to be associated with lifetime earnings and accumulated wealth of 
the household. We use the average educational attainment of other adult 
household members to proxy for the value of household labor. Health 
status also affects productivity and ability to earn income through its 
impact on capacity for work. Elderly who are ill or suffer physical limi-
tations may be unable to provide much labor for farm activities. Thus, 
the complete set of proxies for With and Iwit in the reduced form are the 
educational attainment, health status, age and age-squared of the elderly 
family member, the average educational attainment of other adults of 
the household, and numbers of adults in different age categories. 
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The employment status and location of adult children may have 
an important impact on the retirement decision. Income earned by the 
household may be affected by whether a former resident works as a 
migrant in another location or in a nearby location. In particular, the 
effect of a migrant child is likely to be ambiguous. On one hand, a 
migrant adult child may raise household income through increased 
remittances more than the migrant lowers income through lack of work 
in agriculture. In this case, we would expect the existence of a migrant 
son or daughter to be negatively associated with elder parent labor sup-
ply. On the other hand, if loss of work capacity when a child migrates 
is not offset by remittances, migration of an adult child may make it 
more difficult for an elder parent to retire. Moreover, if residents of a 
village stand a chance to lose land if it is not kept productive, then land 
tenure insecurity may create an additional disincentive for retirement. A
migrant child will be associated with continued employment of elderly 
parents if the unobserved risk of land expropriation represented in Vit 
is correlated with factors influencing migration decisions, such as local 
poverty rates and lack of off-farm opportunities. 
Because it includes good measures of elderly health status, we use 
the China Health and Nutrition Survey to estimate a reduced form labor 
supply equation: 
other+β4ADLit+ β5Penit+ xit(6.6) Lits = β1Mit +β2Eit
own+ β3Eit ' γ + Djt +uit , 
where Mit is a dummy variable indicating whether a household has a 
migrant adult child. If increased household income through remittances 
dominates the effects of lost income from home production and con-
cerns about the risk of lost claim to land, then we would expect the 
coefficient on Mit to be negative.14 We expect that higher values of edu-
own othercational attainment of elderly, Eit , and other family members, Eit , 
will be associated with higher wealth and higher potential income and 
should be negatively related to elderly labor supply. Pension income, 
Penit , will be negatively related to labor supply as leisure is generally 
believed to be a normal good. Finally, we characterize the health of the 
elderly using z-scores calculated from the average responses to a set 
of activities of daily living questions, ADLit .15 We include a vector of 
individual characteristics, xit , which include age and age-squared and 
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are associated with own productivity, and demographic characteristics 
of the household, which affect preferences. 
In estimating different versions of this model, we find that coef-
ficients on each variable vary with gender, and depend on whether a 
retirement-age individual is among the young or old elderly. For this 
reason, we estimate models examining labor supply on subgroups of 
the population. These include younger men and women between 60 and 
70 years of age, and older elderly between 70 and 80 years of age. We 
also estimate two types of models: binary choice employment models 
in which the outcome variable is an indicator of whether the elderly 
household member has engaged in productive income-earning activity 
over the previous year, and tobit models estimating the number of hours 
that the individual worked over the year. We present results of key coef-
ficients for employment models in Table 6.5 and impacts on hours in 
Table 6.6. 
Not surprisingly, we find that as potential household incomes 
increase, the likelihood that an older person is working decreases. This 
effect is evident in Table 6.5 from examining the effects of pension 
receipt and educational attainment on employment. For each 1,000 
RMB per capita received as pension income, the probability that a man 
works (whether in his 60s or 70s) falls by 8 percent and the probability 
that a woman works falls by 6 percent to 6.4 percent. Own educational 
attainment does not have a significant effect on employment of men 
in their 60s, but each additional year of education is associated with 
a 1.6 percent reduction in the probability that a woman in her 60s is 
employed, and a 1.2–1.3 percent reduction in probability that elderly 
people in their 70s are working. An increase in the average years of 
education of other family members has an even stronger depressing 
effect on labor force participation: higher average levels of education 
are associated with higher permanent income of the family, and this 
facilitates retirement. 
Ill health, as represented by increases in the activities of daily living 
(ADL) z-score, also lowers the likelihood that an individual engages 
in productive activities. Since men are often tasked with more physi-
cally demanding jobs in agriculture, it is not surprising that this effect is 
stronger for men in both age categories than for women. A one standard 
deviation increase in the ADL z-score is associated with an 11 and 8 
percent decrease in probability of employment for men and women, 
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Table 6.5 Factors Affecting Labor Supply Decisions of the Elderly, 
Linear Model 
Dependent variable: engaged in productive activities during the year 
Ages 60–70 Ages 70–80 
Variable Men Women Men Women 
Has migrant member 0.009 0.058 0.010 0.081*** 
(0.041) (0.046) (0.046) (0.032) 
Years of education −0.005 −0.016*** −0.013*** −0.012** 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) 
Years of education of other −0.017*** −0.020*** −0.018*** −0.015*** 
household members (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
ADL z-score −0.113*** −0.079*** −0.103*** −0.049** 
(0.029) (0.026) (0.022) (0.020) 
Income from pension/ −0.083*** −0.064*** −0.084*** −0.060*** 
1,000 RMB (0.012) (0.012) (0.011)  (0.010) 
R-squared 0.237 0.287 0.261 0.179 
Observations 483 586 705 818 
NOTE: *significant at the 0.10 level; **significant at the 0.05 level; ***significant at 
the 0.01 level. Migrant family member = a member of the household from a previous 
round is no longer a household member and has moved outside the home province. 
All models include age, age-squared, household demographic variables (number of 
household members over 60, number of children younger than 3, children 3–7, chil-
dren 8–13, children 14–16, spouse present), and year dummy variables interacted with 
regions to control for provincewide macroeconomic effects. 
SOURCE: China Health and Nutrition Survey (1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004). 
respectively, in their 60s, and a 10 and 5 percent decrease for men and 
women in their 70s. 
When we examine the effects of migration on elderly labor supply, 
we observe positive coefficients for all subgroups. This indicates that 
the effects of lost farm income and uncertainty about land tenure likely 
dominate the effects of increased income from remittances in labor 
supply decisions. Nonetheless, this effect is not statistically significant 
for men or for women under 70. Women over 70, however, are 8 per-
cent more likely to continue working (most likely in agriculture) if the 
household has a migrant child. 
When we examine the number of hours worked in Table 6.6, we find 
consistent results. Women over 70 with a migrant child work 411 hours 
more during a year, or the equivalent of 10 40-hour work weeks. For 
regions of the country planting two crops a year, this would amount to 
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Table 6.6  Factors Affecting hours Worked by the Elderly, Tobit Model 
Dependent variable: hours worked 
Ages 60–70 Ages 70–80 
Variable Men Women Men Women 
Has migrant child 44.3 −7.6 199.1 411.2** 
(168.6) (146.3) (162.1) (162.7) 
Years of education 15.2 −1.5 −27.0* −14.3 
(18.3) (16.1) (15.1) (21.5) 
Education of other −12.3 −53.1*** −40.4** −45.5*** 
household members (19.6) (16.6) (18.8) (16.0) 
ADL z-score −416.9*** −299.9*** −294.4*** −211.6*** 
(132.7) (94.8) (85.1) (70.6) 
Income from −447.9*** −314.1*** −350.4*** −308.0*** 
pension/1,000 RMB (71.1) (56.7) (52.9) (49.0) 
Observations 479 586 705 816 
NOTE: *significant at the 0.10 level; **significant at the 0.05 level; ***significant at 
the 0.01 level. Migrant family member = a member of the household from a previous 
round is no longer a household member and has moved outside the home province. 
All models include age, age-squared, household demographic variables (number of 
household members over 60, number of children younger than 3, children 3–7, chil-
dren 8–13, children 14–16, spouse present), and year dummy variables interacted with 
regions to control for provincewide macroeconomic effects. 
SOURCE: China Health and Nutrition Survey (1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004). 
full-time work during the agricultural busy season. Signs of the effects 
of education are of the same direction as in the employment models of 
Table 6.5, but once employed education itself does not have a strong 
effect on number of hours worked. 
Number of hours of labor supplied is also very sensitive to health 
status and to receipt of pensions. An increase in one standard devia-
tion of the ADL index is associated with a 417-hour reduction in labor 
supplied by men in their 60s, and a reduction of 350 hours by men in 
their 70s. Women in their 60s reduce labor supply by 300 hours with 
a one standard deviation increase in their ADL index, while women in 
their 70s reduce hours by 211 hours in response to a similar worsening 
in their health. Pension receipt also has a stronger depressing effect on 
hours worked by men in their 60s. 
The urban elderly are much less likely to work after age 60 than 
rural elderly, and the results presented here suggest that any mechanism 
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providing the rural elderly with a flow of income in old age is likely to 
reduce both employment and hours worked. Were China’s government 
to develop a pension system for the rural elderly, it is likely that China’s 
rural residents may choose to retire rather than work until they are no 
longer able to do so. 
CONCLUSION 
Whereas the urban elderly receive significant support from pen-
sions, the rural elderly rely primarily on their own labor income and 
financial support from their children. More men over 60 rely primar-
ily on their own labor income for support, whereas elderly women are 
somewhat more dependent on transfers from family members. Evi-
dence presented on responsiveness of private transfers to income levels 
and on the determinants of elderly labor supply suggests that the intro-
duction of a pension system may lead to more security for the elderly 
without requiring them to continue working into old age.
Private transfers are responsive to low levels of elderly income, but 
they do not perfectly crowd out income from other sources. At levels of 
income below the poverty line, transfers from adult children increase as 
elderly income decreases. When elderly incomes are at and even below 
the poverty line, however, private transfers are not perfectly crowded 
out by increases in income. A social welfare benefit that raises incomes 
of the elderly will not crowd out private transfers. 
Migrant children continue to provide remittance support to their 
parents, but the predicted range of transfers suggests growing risk that 
low-income elderly may be left in poverty. On average, the predicted 
transfer from adult children is sufficient to maintain elderly incomes 
above the poverty line. When the range of potential transfers is consid-
ered, however, elderly parents with migrant children clearly face more 
risk that private transfers will be insufficient to maintain standards of 
living above the poverty line. 
Elderly with higher incomes are less likely to work, as are elderly 
who are in poor health. Elderly with nonlabor income from pensions or 
in households with higher levels of education, and thus more income-
earning potential, are less likely to participate in income-earning activi-
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ties. If the elderly receive some type of social welfare support, they are 
more likely to exit the labor force when over 60. 
Elderly in poor health are less likely to work. Declines in health 
status associated with decreases in ability to perform daily tasks are 
associated with lower participation in work activity and fewer working 
hours for those who are still working. Improving the use of the health 
care system for preventive purposes may keep older workers productive 
and earning incomes for a longer period of their lives. Further research 
examining the effects of new rural health insurance programs (under the
New Cooperative Medical System) is warranted to determine whether it 
facilitates improved health and work capacity of older workers. 
Migration of adult children may have a significant impact on the 
work status of elderly women. Having a migrant child in the family 
raises the probability that a woman over 70 will still be in the labor 
force and, conditional on working, will work more hours in a year. For 
men and women under 70, a migrant child has a positive but statisti-
cally insignificant effect on participation in income-earning activities. 
Notes 
The author acknowledges financial support for writing this chapter from two grants 
provided by the Knowledge for Change Trust Fund at the World Bank (RF-P116739-
RESE-TF094568 and RF-P121130-RESE-TF098764). 
1. The data were collected before initiation of the national rural pension pilot pro-
gram in 2009. 
2. This finding is consistent with findings in the World Bank’s China poverty assess-
ment (Chaudhuri and Datt 2009) using other National Bureau of Statistics data. 
3. See World Bank (forthcoming) for a detailed discussion of the evolution of rural 
dibao and other forms of rural social assistance, noting coverage expansion of 
rural I from just over 8 million in 2005 to almost 48 million in 2009. 
4. Using other methods, Cameron and Cobb-Clark (2008) find no evidence that 
transfers to parents respond to low parent income in Indonesia. 
5. Selden (1993) concludes that a transition to the nuclear family imposes a heavy 
price on the rural elderly. Living arrangements are thought to be important for 
elderly support across East Asia, including Cambodia (Zimmer and Kim 2002), 
Thailand (Knodel and Chayovan 1997), and Vietnam (Anh et al. 1997). 
6. Two very different conclusions are consistent with evidence of greater incidence 
of coresidence with age: the oldest, who are more likely to be infirm, tend to move 
in with adult children; alternatively, if coresidence has an effect on the quality of 
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care provided, then perhaps only the elderly living with adult children reach old 
age. 
7. Coresidence in rural areas of the four RCRE provinces was also somewhat higher 
than observed for rural areas of the CHNS panel. 
8. Barro (1974), Becker (1974), and Cox (1987) make important theoretical distinc-
tions highlighting different motives for transfers. Much of the empirical research 
in the United States has suggested that intergenerational intervivos transfers are 
driven by exchange motives (e.g., Cox and Rank 1992; McGarry 1999) rather 
than based on altruistic motives. It is important to remember, however, that in the 
United States, the Social Security safety net provides substantial insurance against 
poverty in old age, and thus it is not as surprising to find an emphasis on the flow 
of resources from older to younger generations. 
9. We use the 1995 to 2003 waves of RCRE’s annual household survey from four 
provinces (Anhui, Henan, Jiangsu, and Shanxi) in which a supplemental survey 
(Supplemental Rural Household Social Network, Labor Allocation, and Land Use 
Survey) was carried out in collaboration with Michigan State University in 2004. 
A detailed description of the RCRE household survey and comparison to other 
household surveys conducted in China can be found in Benjamin, Brandt, and 
Giles (2005). 
10. Other regressors included among the X’s are age, years of schooling, marital sta-
tus, an indicator for whether the household has any members in schooling, the 
number of household residents, the number of working household residents, 
shares of household residents in different demographic categories, numbers of 
nonresident family members in different demographic categories, village dummy 
variables to control for the local economic environment, and province-year dum-
mies to control for macroeconomic shocks. 
11. Specifically, we use a bandwidth of 0.25 with observations weighted using a tri-
cube weighting function as calculated by the lowess command in Stata. The low-
ess estimator was developed by Cleveland (1979) and has a benefit over some 
kernel estimators in that it does not suffer from bias near the end points. 
12. The Poverty Assessment (Chaudhuri and Datt 2009) emphasized that 65 percent 
of rural migrants had lived in the current city where they were working for more 
than three years, and this duration was significantly longer than reported in a simi-
lar survey conducted in 2001. 
13. The information comes from a retrospective work history carried out as part of 
a supplemental survey conducted with RCRE in 2004. The supplemental survey 
asked about the work history of current and former household residents and their 
parents. 
14. It is also important to remember that we do not identify a causal relationship 
between migrant children and elderly labor supply. Unobservable factors related 
to the family (related to motivation, interest in income, or specific abilities) may 
affect both the migration decisions of adult children and labor supply decisions of 
their parents. 
15. Bound (1991) has argued that information from ADLs contributes less bias than 
self-reported health in models of retirement behavior. In the CHNS, individuals 
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over age 50 are asked to rate the difficulty from 1 (no difficulty) to 4 (cannot do at 
all) of the following activities: walking a kilometer; sitting continuously for two 
hours; standing up after sitting for a long time; climbing one staircase; lifting or 
raising a 5-kilogram bag; squatting down, kneeling down, or bending over; bath-
ing yourself; eating by yourself; putting on your clothes; using the toilet. We cal-
culate average responses to these questions for each individual, and then calculate 
z-scores over all elderly. 
References 
Anh, Truong, Bui T. Cuong, Daniel Goodkind, and John Knodel. 1997. “Liv-
ing Arrangements, Patrilinearity and Sources of Support among Elderly 
Vietnamese.” Asia-Pacific Population Journal 12(4): 69–88. 
Barro, Robert J. 1974. “Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?” Journal of Polit-
ical Economy 82(6): 1095–1117. 
Becker, Gary. 1974. “A Theory of Social Interactions.” Journal of Political 
Economy 82(6): 1063–1093. 
Benjamin, Dwayne, Loren Brandt, and Jia-Zhueng Fan. 2003. “Ceaseless Toil? 
Health and Labor Supply of the Elderly in Rural China.” William Davidson 
Institute Working Paper No. 579, Department of Economics. Toronto: Uni-
versity of Toronto. 
Benjamin, Dwayne, Loren Brandt, and John Giles. 2005. “The Evolution of 
Income Inequality in Rural China.” Economic Development and Cultural 
Change 53(4): 769–824. 
Benjamin, Dwayne, Loren Brandt, John Giles, and Sangui Wang. 2008. 
“Income Inequality during China’s Economic Transition.” In China’s Great 
Economic Transformation, Loren Brandt and Thomas Rawski, eds. New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 729–775. 
Benjamin, Dwayne, Loren Brandt, and Scott Rozelle. 2000. “Aging, Well-
Being, and Social Security in Rural North China.” Population and Devel-
opment Review, Supplement 26: 89–116. 
Bound, John. 1991. “Self-Reported versus Objective Measures of Health in 
Retirement Models.” Journal of Human Resources 26(1): 106–138. 
Cai, Fang, John Giles, and Xin Meng. 2006. “How Well Do Children Insure 
Parents against Low Retirement Income? An Analysis Using Survey Data 
from Urban China.” Journal of Public Economics 90(12): 2229–2255. 
Cai, Fang, John Giles, Philip O’Keefe, and Dewen Wang. 2012. The Elderly 
and Old Age Support in Rural China: Challenges and Prospects. Washing-
ton, DC: World Bank. 
Cameron, Lisa Ann, and Deborah A. Cobb-Clark. 2008. “Do Co-Residency 
and Financial Transfers from Children Reduce the Need for Elderly Par-
	 	 	  
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	
	 	 	 	  
	 	
	
 
	 	 	
	 	 	 	
 
	 	 	
	 	 	
 
	 	 	
	 	
	
 
	 	 	  
 
	
	 	 	
Left Behind in Old Age?  165 
ents to Work in Developing Countries?” Journal of Population Economics
21(4): 1007–1033. 
China Health and Nutrition Survey. Various years. China Center for Disease 
Control and Prevention and the Carolina Population Center. Chapel Hill, 
NC: University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. http://www.cpc.unc.edu/ 
projects/china (accessed January 16, 2012). 
Chaudhuri, Shubham, and Gaurav Datt. 2009. From Poor Areas to Poor 
People: China’s Evolving Poverty Agenda, an Assessment of Poverty and 
Inequality in China. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Cleveland, W.S. 1979. “Robust Locally Weighted Regression and Smoothing 
Scatterplots.” Journal of American Statistical Association 74(368): 829– 
836. 
Cox, Donald. 1987. “Motives for Private Income Transfers.” Journal of Politi-
cal Economy 95(3): 509–546. 
Cox, Donald, Bruce E. Hansen, and Emmanuel Jimenez. 2004. “How Respon-
sive to Private Transfers to Income? Evidence from a Laissez-Faire
Economy.” Journal of Public Economics 88(9–10): 2193–2219. 
Cox, Donald, and Mark R. Rank. 1992. “Inter-Vivos Transfers and Intergen-
erational Exchange.” Review of Economics and Statistics 74(2): 305–314. 
Duclos, Jean-Yves, Abdelkrim Araar, and John Giles. 2010. “Chronic and 
Transient Poverty: Measurement and Estimation, with Evidence from
China.” Journal of Development Economics 91(2): 266–277. 
Giles, John. 2006. “Is Life More Risky in the Open? Household Risk-Coping 
and the Opening of China’s Labor Markets.” Journal of Development Eco-
nomics 81(1): 25–60. 
Giles, John, and Ren Mu. 2007. “Elderly Parent Health and the Migration 
Decision of Adult Children: Evidence from Rural China.” Demography
44(2): 265–288. 
Giles, John, Dewen Wang, and Changbao Zhao. 2010. “Can China’s Rural 
Elderly Count on Support from Adult Children? Implications of Rural-to-
Urban Migration.” Journal of Population Ageing 3(3–4): 183–204. 
Jalan, Jyotsna, and Martin Ravallion. 1999. “Are the Poor Less Well Insured? 
Evidence on Vulnerability to Income Risk in Rural China.” Journal of 
Development Economics 58(1): 61–82. 
———. 2002. “Geographic Poverty Traps? A Micro Model of Consumption 
Growth in Rural China.” Journal of Applied Econometrics 17(4): 329–346. 
Jiang, Chen, and Xiaojun Zhao. 2009. “A Study on the Opportunity Cost of 
China’s Elderly Care.” Management World [Guanli Shijie] 10: 80–87. 
Kanbur, Ravi, and Xiaobo Zhang. 1999. “Which Regional Inequality? The 
Evolution of Rural-Urban and Inland-Coastal Inequality in China from 
1983 to 1995.” Journal of Comparative Economics 27: 686–701. 
 
	 	 	
	 	 	
	 	
	
 
	 	 	
	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	  
	
	 	 	  
 
	 	 	 	  
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	  
 
	 	
	 	 	 	 	
166 Giles 
———. 2005. “Fifty Years of Regional Inequality in China: A Journey through 
Central Planning, Reform, and Openness.” Review of Development Eco-
nomics 9(1): 87–106. 
Knodel, John, and Napaporn Chayovan. 1997. “Family Support and Living 
Arrangements of Thai Elderly.” Asia-Pacific Population Journal 12(4): 51–68. 
Lee, Yean-Ju, and Zhenyu Xiao. 1998. “Children’s Support for Elderly Parents 
in Urban and Rural China: Results from a National Survey.” Journal of 
Cross-Cultural Gerontology 13(1): 39–62. 
Li, Shuzhuo, Song Lu, and Marcus W. Feldman. 2009. “Intergenerational Sup-
port and Subjective Health of Older People in Rural China: A Gender-Based 
Longitudinal Study.” Australasian Journal on Ageing 28(2): 81–86. 
Marriage Law. 2001. The Marriage Law of the People’s Republic of China, 
Section 3, Article 21. http://www.nyconsulate.prchina.org/eng/lsqz/laws/ 
t42222.htm (accessed July 2, 2012). 
McGarry, Kathleen. 1999. “Inter-Vivos Transfers and Intended Bequests.” 
Journal of Public Economics 73(3): 321–325. 
NBS (National Bureau of Statistics). 2006. 2005 One Percent Population Sam-
ple Data. Beijing: China Statistics Press.
Pang, Lihua, Alan de Brauw, and Scott Rozelle. 2004. “Working until You 
Drop: The Elderly of Rural China.” China Journal 52: 73–96. 
Ravallion, Martin, and Shaohua Chen. 2007. “China’s (Uneven) Progress 
against Poverty.” Journal of Development Economics 82(1) (January 2007): 
1–42. 
Research Center for Rural Economy (RCRE). Various years. Rural Household 
Surveys for 1993–2003 from Anhui, Henan, Jiangsu, and Shanxi Provinces. 
Beijing: Ministry of Agriculture, Research Center for Rural Economy. 
———. 2004. Supplemental Rural Household Social Network, Labor Allo-
cation, and Land Use Survey. Beijing: Ministry of Agriculture, Research 
Center for Rural Economy. 
Selden, Mark. 1993. “Family Strategies and Structures in Rural North China.” 
In Chinese Families in the Post-Mao Era, Deborah Davis and Stevan Har-
rell, eds. Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 139–164. 
World Bank. Forthcoming. Social Assistance in Rural China: Tackling Poverty 
through Rural Dibao. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Yao, Yingmei. 2006. “Issues of Old Age Support for the ‘Empty Nest’ Rural 
Elderly in Developed Region, a Case of Rural Zhejiang Province.” Popula-
tion Research [Renkou Yanjiu] 30(6): 38–46. 
Yatchew, Adonis. 2003. Semiparametric Regression for the Applied Econome-
trician. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Zimmer, Zachary, and Sovan Kiry Kim. 2002. “Living Arrangements and 
Left Behind in Old Age?  167 
Socio-Demographic Conditions of Older Adults in Cambodia.” Policy 
Research Division Working Paper No. 157. New York: Population Council. 
Zimmer, Zachary, and Julia Kwong. 2003. “Family Size and Support of Older 
Adults in Urban and Rural China: Current Effects and Future Implications.” 
Demography 40(1): 23–44. 

	 	 	
 
7 
China in 2049 
Zhiwu Chen 
Yale School of Management 
The People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949, and its cur-
rent economic reforms were implemented beginning in 1978 following 
the end of the Cultural Revolution. Since then, China has become an 
economic powerhouse, neatly timing the advent of globalization and 
organized free trade. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine historical trends in, and 
the impact of, modern reforms on the Chinese economy; to look at what 
is likely to happen to growth, earnings, and savings over the next four 
decades; and to compare the Chinese economy to the U.S. economy 
over this period of time. 
ThE BIG PICTURE 
Figure 7.1 shows a likely growth pattern of the Chinese economy in 
the coming decades. It depicts three different phases. The initial phase 
goes from 2010 to 2016, during which no major shifts in the growth 
model of the Chinese economy will likely occur. Growth continues at a 
rate of about 8.5 percent per year despite the likelihood that the Chinese 
government will implement substantial changes in policies relating 
to investments, exports, and domestic consumption that could impact 
growth. Although there is much talk in the Chinese media about how 
reforms in these sectors will have a negative effect, it is unlikely such 
reforms will have much negative impact due to political reasons and 
other complications. 
It is presumed that, in 2016, there will be a peak of the Chinese 
economy in the real term followed by a downturn—the second phase— 
of 12 percent in the year 2017. Why a 12 percent decline? This predic-
169 
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Figure 7.1  Possible Future Path for the United States and China 
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NOTE: Assumptions: China’s GDP grows at 8.5 percent until 2016, declines by 12 per-
cent in 2017, and then at 5.5 percent a year thereafter; U.S. grows at 3 percent a year. 
tion is inferred from the Asian financial crisis that occurred in 1998. 
There are many similarities between the current Chinese economy and 
the Korean economy during that period. As shown in Figure 7.2, per 
capita GDP in Korea rose sharply during the first half of the 1990s only 
to drop precipitously beginning in 1997. I assume a similar pattern will 
occur in the Chinese economy. 
However, it should be noted that other organizations predict con-
tinued, steady growth during this period. For instance, the Conference 
Board (2012) projects growth at 8.0 percent in 2012, 6.0 percent annu-
ally in 2013–2016, and 3.5 percent annually in 2017–2025. 
After the setback in 2017, the Chinese economy should resume its 
growth—the third phase. When this occurs, beginning in 2017–2018, 
the growth rate should be 5–6 percent per year through 2049. The Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) projects average annual growth of 5.56 
percent for years 2009–2050 (Dadush and Stancil 2009). During this 
same period, some analysts predict that the U.S. economy would grow 
at 3 percent per year, which is possibly an optimistic prediction con-
sidering its unsteady growth rate in recent years. The IMF projects an 
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annual growth rate for the United States of 2.7 percent over the same 
period. 
The resumption of growth should occur due to socially and politi-
cally acceptable reforms that commonly take place in any economy, 
including the U.S. economy and the economies of other advanced 
nations, when hit by crisis. In fact, a looming economic crisis is partly 
what spurred the reformers led by Deng Xiaoping to undertake major 
political and economic reforms in 1978 just after the Mao-era Cultural 
Revolution, during which many people were displaced or lost their lives 
or property for proposing political and economic changes. Without 
Deng’s reforms, the Chinese economy and society overall would not 
have evolved to what it is today. 
Even now, China’s economy is heavily influenced by its major
policymakers. Fundamentally, there should be incentives for major 
political, economic, and cultural changes to a society. From 1979 to 
2009, China’s leaders were prompted to implement reforms in these 
Figure 7.2  GDP per Capita for Korea, 1990–2000 (current $) 
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areas in order to maintain strong and continued economic growth, and I 
predict they will continue this process even after 2017–2018. 
As seen in Figure 7.1, in 2049, China’s nominal GDP should sur-
pass the United States’ nominal GDP, under the ceteris paribus assump-
tion that the RMB-dollar exchange rate remains relatively stable over 
time. If purchasing power parity (PPP) is taken into account, China’s 
GDP is projected to surpass the United States’ GDP in 2027, about 22 
years earlier than in the nominal term. 
hISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Let us take a historical look at the Chinese economy using Figure 
7.3. The per capita GDP of China up until 1950 was almost stagnant 
and remained around $500 per annum. From 1950 to 1973, the GDP per 
capita per annum increased about 60 percent, and from 1973 to 1998 it 
increased by about 300 percent. Furthermore, it continued to grow so 
Figure 7.3  China’s per Capita GDP over 2000 years 
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that the GDP per capita in 2011 is estimated at $5,184 (IMF 2011). In 
short, as shown in Figure 7.3, most of the growth in China’s per capita 
GDP occurred in the last 30 to 60 years. 
Figure 7.4 provides a more detailed look at the rapid growth in per 
capita GDP that occurred recently using PPP-adjusted dollars. Using 
this measure, the figure shows that per capita GDP increased by a factor 
of 20 times over the period 1980–2009. 
Observing income growth and productivity growth together helps 
provide a more complete picture of China’s long-term economic prog-
ress. Here I focus on the income side, and for comparison I provide a 
measure for how much in terms of consumables a laborer earns for a 
day’s labor. 
Figure 7.5 provides a timeline showing real earnings in terms of 
meat and rice. In 1769, a day’s labor earned a typical worker about 3 jins 
(China’s unit of weight measurement as equivalent to pounds) of meat; 
in 1850 it was around 2 pounds. From then until 1973 a day’s labor 
Figure 7.4  China’s Past Growth in per Capita GDP (in PPP-adjusted $) 
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earned less than 2 jins. Currently, a typical Chinese laborer earns the 
equivalent of about 10 jins of meat per day, which implies that workers 
today are about 4 times as productive as the workers before 1973, even 
taking into consideration the rising prices. Rice as a measure followed 
a similar path, but beginning in 1973, the productivity increase is even 
greater, almost 10 times that before 1973. 
What has caused such growth and progress in China? Many econo-
mists and commentators say it is due to the vast amount of cheap labor 
available in China. But, in fact, China’s population has been declin-
ing as the share of the global population. In 1830, China had about 
40 percent of the world’s population. In 1913, China’s population was 
one-third of the world’s population. China now has roughly 1.4 billion 
Figure 7.5  Real Earnings per Day for a Beijing Worker 
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people, or about 20 percent of the global population. So the argument 
that China’s vast and low-cost workforce is the main driving force of 
economic growth is well grounded. If such a labor force was available 
in the past, why didn’t China experience growth earlier on? In addition, 
in 2011 the minimum wage in China was raised in most of the country 
by 21.7 percent, making China’s labor force higher paid than several of 
its East Asian neighbors (BBC 2011). What is it, then, that propels such 
dynamic economic growth in China? 
To understand the driving factor of economic growth of present-
day China, let’s consider a quote from a book published in Shanghai in 
1914, Finance in China (Wagel 1914). The following excerpt, quoted 
then in the New York Times, highlighted the threat of China’s economy 
to Western economies: 
It is often said that the peril of today is not the Chinese behind the 
gun, but the Chinese as the manufacturers of guns and of many 
other things, equally calling for the highest technical skill. It has 
been the fashion of newspaper writers dealing with the develop-
ment of China to state that the danger to the West lies in the indus-
trial expansion of China, and it is averred that the Chinese, with 
their cheap labour and keen aptitude for imitation, competing with 
the dear labour and the heavy cost of transportation of the West, 
would certainly be able to beat the latter. (Wagel 1914, p. 291) 
After the publication of Wagel’s book, Western nations became 
nervous about China’s rise because they thought that China would inev-
itably become economically dominant due to, as Wagel points out, its 
cheap labor relative to the West. However, such anxieties were some-
times seen as contributing factors that helped foment the Cultural Revo-
lution, war, and other disruptions in China. 
In what way is China different now from its past? Figure 7.6 shows 
the correlation between GDP growth and the population of China over 
several centuries to 2008. 
Going back to 1600, the correlation between population and GDP
growth was almost 100 percent. By 1820, the correlation remained very 
high, almost 97 percent. These high correlations were due to the fact that 
labor was the primary, if not the sole, factor of production. During that 
period, modern technology was practically nonexistent, production was 
almost exclusively labor intensive, therefore GDP grew in step with the 
population. It wasn’t until the effects of the industrial revolution spread 
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Figure 7.6  Long-Term Trends: Correlation between China’s Population 
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to China in the latter part of the nineteenth century that the correlation 
declined. Production became more capital intensive, and hence the cor-
relation between population and GDP declined. This decrease contin-
ued until after 1950 when it began to increase. The correlation grew 
more quickly beginning around 1973 as China began to take advantage 
of the trend of globalization and a freer trade environment. 
Globalization opened up more of the Chinese economy to inter-
national markets mainly due to the establishment of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), whose policies tend to benefit China more than 
other economies. This international order of trade that has been encour-
aged by Western industrialized economies is a key reason for China’s 
economic success during the past 30 years. 
In the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, the inter-
national order was based on a country’s military power, which implied 
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a gunboat-based order rather than a rule-based order. The East India 
Company of the eighteenth century is an example of a successful prac-
titioner of gunboat-based order. It maintained its own navy and military 
power, facilitating its participation in international trade. Eventually, 
technology developed during the industrial revolution in the Western 
nations spread to China, enabling it to transition from a gunboat-based 
economy to a rule-based economy. Today, rule-based order provides the 
basis for the entry of multinational corporations in China such as Gen-
eral Electric, whose army of lawyers help it conduct business. 
Gunboat-based and rule-based trade and investment have vast dif-
ferences in transaction costs. For instance, employing lawyers is less 
expensive than maintaining a military force. Therefore, the transaction 
costs for trade today are less than during the gunboat-based age. This 
allows China to incur much lower transaction costs for trade today and 
serves as another reason why its economy is less encumbered and freer 
to grow. 
Let’s compare the reforms under Deng Xiaoping in 1978 with those 
made in the nineteenth century under the Qing Dynasty (1644–1911). 
During the Qing Dynasty, Li Hongzhang, a leading statesman, built 
military power that allowed China to become economically competi-
tive. Without this power China would not have been able to engage, on 
a significant scale, in international trade and investment. On the other 
hand, Deng Xiaoping did not have to build military power to compete 
for trade. Instead he implemented market-oriented rules and regulations 
that attracted foreign direct investment and international trade. 
Figure 7.7 shows the per capita GDP of China and the rest of the 
world from over 2000 years ago until the end of the twentieth century. 
As depicted by the steep slope of the line, China began gaining on the 
rest of the world after 1973, when globalization and the reforms imple-
mented five years later began to have an impact. 
As Wagel (1914) pointed out, China is sometimes characterized as 
having a keen ability to imitate new technologies that were developed 
by others, and the gains China has made since 1973 are due to such 
imitation. However, there are both pros and cons to this depiction. It is 
an advantage when countries only need to imitate in order to be able to 
pursue fast growth. However, such growth can also impede incentives 
to innovate and to conduct timely institutional reforms, so imitation can 
also be seen as a disadvantage. 
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Figure 7.7  Per Capita GDP: World vs. China 
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SOURCE: Maddison (2001). 
Cost-saving manufacturing technologies developed in the twenti-
eth century spread throughout the world in part due to policies imple-
mented by the WTO. China became the major benefactor of this dis-
persal of technology. Still, there is another factor that helps to explain 
the success of China’s economy in the last 30 years: the change in 
policies that affect the decision making on resource allocation and its 
control. China’s economic policies are formulated in such a way that 
they are conducive to fast economic growth despite the fact that there 
are some negative side-effects that resulted, such as the dominance of 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in certain industries, environmental 
degradation, crowding-out of private property to the public sector, and 
substandard working conditions. 
The rising pace of factor productivity growth can be attributed in 
part to overinvestment and the emergence of excess capacity in a num-
ber of important industries. China emerged as the world’s largest steel 
producer in 1996 when its output reached 100 million metric tons, put-
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ting it ahead of both the United States and Japan for the first time. The 
industry has continued to grow at a rapid pace. This is an example of 
the extent of China’s industrialization and serves as just one example 
of an SOE that contributes substantially to the growth of its economy. 
World Trade Organization membership had an immediate impact 
on Chinese economic growth, paving the way for more efficient day-
to-day operations of Chinese corporations while reducing the risk 
premium investors applied to investment in the country. In addition, 
WTO membership established a powerful catalyst for a more serious 
approach to economic reform and industrial efficiency. As the benefits 
of those changes materialized, China achieved sustainable incremental 
economic growth while gradually reducing the risk premium of invest-
ment. This significantly cut the discount at which Chinese equities 
have traded against global market peers. As a major force driving the 
national economy of China, the fast expansion of SOEs has contributed 
significantly to China becoming the world’s second-largest economy. 
OWNERShIP STRUCTURE OF PRODUCTIVE ASSETS
At the end of 2006, according to government records, land owned 
by the government was valued at 50 trillion RMB. At the same time, 
there were about 119,000 SOEs valued at about 29 trillion RMB. 
Therefore, the combined value of government land ownership plus 
SOEs amounted to 79 trillion RMB, which was roughly one-tenth of 
comparable U.S. government holdings. A few years later these values 
grew due to the expanding economy and land value appreciation. While 
at the end of 2006 state-owned assets were roughly 76 percent of the 
total national wealth in China, in 2010 that percentage likely declined 
to roughly 70 percent of the total national wealth because of the increas-
ing trend toward privatization, particularly in the industrial sector. 
Figure 7.8 shows a comparison of total government expenditures 
with total household expenditures in China as a percentage of GDP. 
In 1952, household consumption was about 69 percent of GDP, pretty 
close to today’s household expenditures in the United States, which is 
roughly 71 percent of GDP. At the founding of the People’s Republic of 
China, the economy was driven by household consumption. Over the 
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Figure 7.8  China’s household Consumption vs. Government 
Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP 
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years, during the planned economy period, this consumption declined 
so that now it is roughly 36 percent of GDP. Even in the reform period 
this share continues to decline. On the other hand, government expendi-
ture as a percentage of GDP increased from 16 percent in 1952 to about 
30 percent in the 2000s. Government expenditures as a share of GDP
have almost doubled in the last 60 years, while private consumption 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP declined. 
The government in China also has practically unchecked taxation 
power. To introduce a new tax or to raise tax rates, the government 
doesn’t have to go through parliamentary debates. The ministry of 
finance and state council generally meet together and make new tax 
policy. It is somewhat daunting that a few people could simply gather 
in a room at the time of their choosing and make decisions that may 
alter the tax rates and policies of the world’s second-largest economy. 
There is no accountability to the taxpayers. As a result, government 
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expenditures as the share of GDP, as the bold line depicts in the figure, 
trend upward. 
The Chinese government’s budget was roughly 8 trillion RMB in 
2010, which is about half of the U.S. annual government budget at the 
current exchange rate. But, if we use PPP, the Chinese budget may actu-
ally be bigger than the U.S. budget. The main question facing China’s 
policymakers is how to spend that 8 trillion RMB. Social groups and 
political leaders are both influential in this decision. In China the politi-
cal situation influences the distribution of resources, including how 
the budget is apportioned to different provinces and societies. Public 
accountability of the government budget spending is still waiting on 
establishment of the democratic institutions in China. 
The growing concern among those tracking China’s economy comes 
from the fact that SOEs, which were previously focused on manufac-
turing industries, are entering the financial industry, thereby expand-
ing their influence further into the economy. They are doing so for two 
reasons: 1) it is useful for satisfying their own development needs and 
assures that they receive the financial support they need to grow, and 2) 
some SOEs see value in having a financial license or room for financial 
equity growth, and thus hope to profit from undertakings in finance. 
However, I believe that these two points, taken either individually or 
together, are not sufficient reasons to justify allowing SOEs’ expansion 
into the financial domain. 
SAVING 
It is true that Chinese people generally save more of their income 
than people of other nationalities. As Figure 7.9 shows, the gross sav-
ings rate as a percentage of GDP rose from around 40 percent in 1992 to 
about 50 percent in 2006. However, looking at just the household sec-
tor’s savings as a percentage of GDP, there is little variation over that 
period of time, staying at about 20 percent, although trending slightly 
upward in the 2000s. This relatively steady rate is due mainly to the fall 
in the share of household income as a share of national income rather 
than a decline in the household savings rate (Prasad 2009). 
 
 
 
182 Chen 
Figure 7.9  household, Enterprise, and Government Savings as a 
Percentage of GDP, China, 1992–2006 
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Savings by SOEs has been more evident. Beginning in 2003, SOEs’
%
 
savings rate as a percentage of GDP jumped sharply from about 15 per-
cent to over 20 percent before falling back slightly. The SOEs are not 
subject to monitoring by the National People’s Congress or other gov-
ernmental agencies, and they are not required to redistribute profits or 
remit them to the Ministry of Finance. Their profits and increased value 
are not translated into consumption since households do not receive 
these benefits. The same is true for the sales of land and SOEs them-
selves, the proceeds of which go to the government treasury. Govern-
ment saving also increased gradually to about 9 percent from a steady 5 
percent seen throughout the 1990s. 
Figure 7.10 shows gross savings as a percentage of GDP in seven 
other industrialized nations—including the United States—and the 
world overall. Note that, over the same period of 1992–2006, the rate 
ranges from a low of 13.3 percent (in Canada in 1992) to a high of 33.8 
percent (in Japan, also in 1992). The U.S. rate ranges from a low of 
14.4 percent in 1993 to a high of 18.8 percent in 1998 (EconStats 2012). 
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Figure 7.10  Gross Savings as a Percentage of GDP, Seven Countries plus 
the World, 1992–2006 
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Therefore, it is apparent that China’s gross savings rate is quite high rel-
ative to other large nations, which is one reason why its policymakers
are encouraging domestic consumption, which has not been growing as 
fast as GDP, as a means of rebalancing the nation’s growth and reducing 
its account surplus. 
SUMMARy 
China’s economy is mainly investment and export driven as opposed 
to being driven by domestic consumption like the U.S. economy is. 
Because of that, the consequences are that the economy is too depen-
dent on these sectors. It also finds itself overly dependent on energy-
intensive industries and insufficiently so on the service sector. Transi-
tioning to a more balanced economy, one in which private consumption 
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plays a greater role, will be a challenge for China’s economic policy-
makers. Because of the political pressure applied by the vested interest 
group who benefit from the current policies, there is no incentive for 
them to alter policy in order to transition to a more balanced economy. 
Other problematic consequences resulting from how China’s economy 
has developed include the crowding out of private firms in industries 
in which SOEs became dominant players and barriers to legal develop-
ment and the rule of law in the economy. 
Still, the current model for economic growth in China will likely 
continue despite recessions and other economic uncertainty worldwide. 
In fact, these issues emphasize the importance of a highly coordinated 
state-controlled economy, particularly the rising influence of SOEs 
through state-owned banks and other financial institutions. 
To summarize, the economic benefits accrued as a result of the indus-
trial revolution have been completely absorbed into China’s economy, 
as have the benefits from the international movement of investment and 
capital. China’s current growth may be attributed mainly to government 
sector involvements in the economy. Risks remain, however. These 
include being overly reliant on the government-dominated economic 
model, the ascending SOEs and the power they continue to amass, an 
increasingly tougher environment for private and foreign firms to oper-
ate freely in, and the fact that local governments are becoming major 
borrowers from banks. 
References 
BBC. 2011. “China Minimum Wage Up by 21.7% despite Economic Cooling.” 
London: BBC. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-15456509 (accessed 
January 31, 2012). 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 2010. The World Factbook. New York: 
Skyhorse Publishing. 
Conference Board. 2012. The Conference Board Global Economic Outlook. 
New York: The Conference Board. http://www.conference-board.org/data/ 
globaloutlook.cfm (accessed February 6, 2012). 
Dadush, Uri, and Bennett Stancil. 2009. “The G20 in 2050.” International Eco-
nomic Bulletin. November 19. http://carnegieendowment.org/2009/11/19/ 
g20-in-2050/cv (accessed February 6, 2012). 
EconStats. 2012. World Economic Outlook (WEO) Data. Washington, DC: 
	 	 	 	 	
	 	
China in 2049 185 
International Monetary Fund. http://www.econstats.com/weo/vo15.htm 
(accessed February 1, 2012). 
IMF. 2011. World Economic Outlook Database. Washington, DC: Interna-
tional Monetary Fund. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/02/ 
weodata/index.aspx (accessed February 2, 2012). 
Maddison, Angus. 2001. The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective. Paris: 
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development. 
Prasad, Eswar. 2009. “Rebalancing Growth in Asia.” NBER Working Paper 
No. 15169. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Wagel, Srinivas R. 1914. Finance in China. Shanghai: North-China Daily 
News and Herald, Ltd. 

 
 
Authors 
Gene H. Chang is a professor of economics and the director of the Asian 
Studies Institute at the University of Toledo. 
Zhiwu Chen is a professor of finance at Yale University. 
Mary Gallagher is an associate professor of political science at the University 
of Michigan. 
John Giles is a senior labor economist in the Development Research Group at 
the World Bank and a research fellow at the Institute for Labor (IZA) in Bonn. 
Wei-Chiao Huang is a professor of economics at Western Michigan University. 
Robert B. Koopman is the chief economist at the United States International 
Trade Commission. 
Terry Sicular is a professor of economics at Western University, Canada. 
Huizhong Zhou is a professor of economics at Western Michigan University. 
187 

	   
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
	 	  	 	 	   
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
	 	  	 	 	 		
	
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
   
 
  
 
   
 
 
 
 
Index 
The italic letters f, n, and t following a page number indicate that the subject information 
of the entry heading is within a figure, note, or table, respectively, on that page. Double 
italics indicate multiple but consecutive elements. 
Activities of daily living (ADL) 
bias in, 163–164n15 
index of hours worked, 160, 160t 
z-score in, and ill health, 158–159, 
159t, 162 
AD. SeeAnti-dumping 
ADL. SeeActivities of daily living 
Africa 
ranks of country economies in, 80 
See also specific countries in, e.g.,
Mali; Zambia 
Agricultural sector, 4–5, 121 
Chinese economy and, compared, 
89–91, 91t 
land tenure in, and elder support, 
13–14, 153, 157 
rural children in, 123–124 
rural elderly in, 134–135, 151 
Airline passengers, as GDP proxy, 85, 87 
All China Federation of Trade Unions, 
124 
Anhui province, China, 143, 151, 163n9 
Anti-dumping disputes 
U.S, import injury cases, 30, 31–38, 
34t, 35f, 36f 
WTO and, 29–31, 32t, 33t 
Argentina, 116f 
U.S. complaints to WTO against, 31, 
32t 
Armenia, poverty rate, 116f 
Asia 
average U.S. duty rates on imports 
from, 36, 37f 
U.S. imports from, 39f, 40f, 68t, 69, 
70t 
U.S. non-oil exports-imports to or 
from, 21–22, 22t, 23t 
use of processing trade by, countries, 
38, 64t–65t, 67t, 122 
See also regions or countries within, 
e.g., East Asia; Japan 
Australia, 32t, 103 
use of processing trade by, 62, 64t,
67t 
Austria, 84, 111f 
Automobiles. See Motor vehicles and 
parts 
Balassa-Samuelson effect, 92 
Bangladesh, income and Gini coefficient 
in, 111f 
Banking sector. See Financial sector 
Belgium, U.S. complaints to WTO 
against, 32t 
Bell, Mayor Michael, public property 
and, 79 
Bergsten, C. Fred, on exchange rate 
policy, 74n6 
Big-box retail stores, Chinese products 
in, 79 
Bolivia, poverty rate, 116f 
Brazil, 90f, 116f 
GDP compared, 84f, 85t 
GDP of, as growth indicator, 73–74, 
73f 
income and Gini coefficient in, 103t,
111, 111f 
U.S. complaints to WTO against, 31, 
32t 
use of processing trade by, 62, 65t,
67t 
Brown, Lester, 89, 91 
Business services, value-added, 68t, 69, 
70t 
Cambodia, living arrangements, 162n5 
Canada, 88f, 99, 103, 111f 
savings rate in, 182, 183f 
189 
   
 
  
 
  
 
          
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 	   
 
 	    
 
      		
	
 
  
 	  
	 	   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  
 
 
  
 
 
   
 
  
 
        
 
 		
	
   
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
	
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
190 Huang and Zhou 
Canada, cont. 
trade volume with U.S., 81, 82, 82t,
99 
U.S. complaints to WTO against, 31, 
32t, 33t 
U.S. imports from, 39f, 40f, 68t, 69, 
70t 
U.S. trade deficits with, 3, 71, 72f, 98,
99t 
use of processing trade by, 62, 63, 
64t, 66, 67t 
Chemical products, global supply chains, 
68t 
Chile, U.S. complaints to WTO against, 
32t 
China 
economic long-term outlook for, 5, 
14–15, 80, 182, 183–184 
elder support in, 12–14 (see also
under Elderly population, rural) 
inequality in, 8–10 (see also under
Income) 
labor markets in, 10–12, 119–120 (see 
also Labor dynamics in China) 
perceptions and views of, 1, 79–104 
size of economy in, 4–7, 81t, 83–88 
(see also under Chinese economy) 
See also Trade relationships, China-
U.S. 
China Health and Nutrition Survey 
(CHNS), 139, 157, 163n7 
bias in, 163–164n15 
China Household Income Project 
(CHIP), 108 
poverty data and, 114–115, 115f, 116f 
as rural-urban surveys, 108–109 
China law and legislation, 127–128, 130, 
133 
Chinese economy, 79–80, 169–184 
agricultural production and, 89–91 
American perspective on, 79–104 
challenges of, 100–104, 117 
China-U.S. comparisons, 80–83, 81t,
83f, 95–97, 100, 101f, 170–171, 
170f 
currency issue in, 98–100 
development of, 3, 4, 11, 18, 23, 
119–120, 172–179 
government influence on, 5, 95–96 
growth of, 15, 80, 85–86, 91–98, 93f,
94f, 95f, 96f, 97f, 107, 169–172 
move toward balance in, 2, 7, 101, 
104, 107, 129, 183–184 
power of, and demographics, 6–7, 80,
97, 100–101, 102f 
reform of, 103, 107–117, 177 (see 
also Economic reforms) 
true size of, 83–88, 84f, 85f, 87f, 88f,
89f, 90f 
Chinese firms 
as anti-dumping targets, 31, 33–37, 
34t 
ownership of, reforms during 1990s, 
112, 116, 124 
types of, 22, 24f, 25f 
CHIP. See China Household Income 
Project 
CHNS. See China Health and Nutrition 
Survey 
Collective bargaining, 126, 129–131 
trade unions and, 127, 128 
workforce grievances and, 124–125 
Colombia, income and Gini coefficient 
in, 111, 111f 
Communist system 
authoritarian regimes of, 80, 100, 103 
censorship and corruption under, 
101–102 
centrally planned economic policies 
of, 1, 3, 17, 74n1, 94, 184 
hukou system under, 10–11, 12, 121 
labor unrest management by, 126, 131 
legitimacy of, 7, 103, 126 
post-Tiananmen socialism under, 
124–127 
Competitive advantage, as trade 
relationships theory, 82 
Conference Board, growth predictions 
by, 170 
Confucius, influence on elderly, 98 
Congo, poverty rate, 116f 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
   
 
		
	  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
         
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
 
  
 
Index 191 
Construction and related materials 
cement production, 56t, 60t, 88 
as infrastructure investment, 94–97, 
96f 
residential housing and, 93, 96, 97f 
Consumer products 
cheap, and U.S. reliance on China, 2, 
79, 81 
Chinese imports as, 28t, 82 
economic growth in U.S. led by, 3, 
17, 18 
sustainable economy based on, 119–
120 
Corruption, 7, 96, 102, 125 
Creditors, U.S. Treasury bills and, 2, 81, 
99–100 
Cultural Revolution, 169, 171 
Currency valuation, 174f 
global estimations of, 6, 84–85 
manipulation of, 38, 99 
trade and, 41, 71–73, 98–100 
Demographics 
China, and economic power, 6–7, 80, 
97 
fertility and, 6, 100–101, 102f 
social changes in post-1970s China, 
11–12, 98 
Deng Xiaoping, reforms under, 171, 177 
Denmark, U.S. complaints to WTO 
against, 32t 
Dibao, 133 
as antipoverty safety net, 136, 136t,
137t, 147, 151, 162n3 
Dispute cases, treatment of, 30 
Domestic value-added (DVA) shares. See 
under Foreign investment 
enterprises (FIE); Hummels, 
Ishii, and Yi (HIY) on global 
trade; Koopman, Wang, and Wei 
(KWW) on global trade 
Dominican Republic, poverty rate, 116f 
East Asia, 121, 162n5 
East India Company, as gunboat-based, 
177 
Economic and Technological 
Development Areas (ETDAs), 23, 
24f–26f 
Economic development 
geographic differences in China, 4, 
11, 84, 126, 129–130 
globalization and, 15, 176–179, 178t 
labor-intensive manufacturing sector 
and, 119, 126 
policy instruments as factor in, 3–4, 
17–18, 169 
Economic growth, 41 
China and, 15, 80, 85–86, 91–98, 93f,
94f, 95f, 107, 169–172 
share of GDP as, indicator, 73–74, 73f 
Economic reforms in China, 103, 107–
117, 169, 177 
data and measurement, 108–109 
effect on economically vulnerable, 
108, 113–115, 116f 
inequality and, 109–113 
sustainable growth and, 107–108, 
171–172 
Economic relationships. See Trade 
relationships, China-U.S. 
Education, 98, 122, 130 
China state control of, 7, 101 
income disparities based on, 8, 10, 
110, 150t, 156, 158–160, 160t,
161 
social mobility and, 11, 121, 123 
EEC. See European Economic 
Community 
Egypt, U.S. complaints to WTO against, 
31, 32t, 33t 
Elderly population, China, 81t, 98, 102f 
dependency of, 6–7, 12–13, 101 
poverty risk for, 133, 151 
urban vs. rural, 136, 136t, 160–161 
Elderly population, rural, 133–164 
family support for, 133–134, 137–
138, 137t, 146–151, 148f–149f,
150t 
gender differences and support for, 
13–14, 135–136, 137, 161 
 
 
   
 
  
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
   
 
 
	 	  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
   
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
	 	  
  
 	 	 	 	   
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
   
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
192 Huang and Zhou 
Elderly population, rural, cont.
labor supply decisions of, 134–135, 
151, 153, 156–161, 159t, 160t,
163n14 
living arrangements of, 138–141, 
139f, 140f, 162–163n6, 162n5, 
163n7 
private income transfers and, 141–
146, 145f, 146t 
retirement decisions of, 134–135, 
151, 158, 160–161 
sources of support for, 133–151, 137t 
Electricity production, as GDP proxy, 
87–88, 88f 
Electronics 
as traded goods, 17, 21, 22–23, 53, 
54t, 58t 
value-added, from world trade 
partners, 68t, 69, 70t 
Employment, 110, 127 
gains in, and currency appreciation, 
71–72, 75n16 
off-farm, 127, 157 
rural elderly, status, 13–14, 135–136, 
137, 151, 152f, 153, 154f–155f,
162, 163n13 
rural-urban gap in, 8, 10–11 
See also Workforce 
Employment Promotion Law (2007), 127 
Energy resources, 95, 183 
consumption per capita, China vs.
U.S., 6, 100, 101f 
electricity production, 87–88, 88f 
Environmental Sustainability Index 
(ESI), 100, 101f, 107 
ETDAs. See Economic and 
Technological Development Areas 
Euro zone (EU-15), 37f, 75n14, 99 
GDP of, as growth indicator, 73–74, 
73f 
U.S. exports-imports to or from, 22t,
23t 
U.S. trade deficits with, 3, 71, 72f 
European Economic Community (EEC). 
U.S. complaints to WTO against, 
31, 32t, 33t 
European Union (EU), 31, 82, 89f 
GDP growth rate compared to China, 
91, 95f 
rank of Chinese economy and, 31, 80 
U.S. imports from, 30, 68t, 69, 70t 
use of processing trade by, 62, 63, 
64t, 67t, 75n12 
See also Euro zone (EU-15); 
European Economic Community; 
and specific countries within, e.g.,
Germany 
Exchange rates 
China’s policy on, and U.S. deficit, 
30, 74n6, 99–100 
GDP and, 4–5, 172 
managed, and economic development,
3, 18 
purchasing power and, 84–85 
RMB to dollar, 6, 42f, 71–72, 72f, 99, 
172 
Exports from China, 183 
enterprise types for, 24f, 25f 
global supply chains in, 3, 6, 23, 
24f–26f, 29, 38, 41, 43, 57 
policy incentives for, 18, 23, 74n3 
reliance on U.S. for, 2, 20, 21, 81, 82 
value-added shares of, 38–74 
Exports from U.S., composition of, 
19–20, 21, 22, 23t, 26f, 27t, 82 
Family values, 98, 138 
education and, 11, 121, 123 
rural elderly support and, 133–134, 
137–138, 137t, 146–151, 
148f–149f, 150t 
Fertility, 138 
China-U.S. comparisons, 100–101, 
101f 
demographic time bomb, 6, 102f 
FIEs. See Foreign investment enterprises 
Financial crises and recession, recovery 
from, 95–97 
Financial sector, 9, 112, 181 
banks and China government control 
of, 5, 94, 184 
equities in, 179, 181 
 
About the Institute 
The W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research is a nonprofit re-
search organization devoted to finding and promoting solutions to employment-
related problems at the national, state, and local levels. It is an activity of the 
W.E. Upjohn Unemployment Trustee Corporation, which was established in 
1932 to administer a fund set aside by Dr. W.E. Upjohn, founder of The Upjohn 
Company, to seek ways to counteract the loss of employment income during 
economic downturns. 
The Institute is funded largely by income from the W.E. Upjohn Unem-
ployment Trust, supplemented by outside grants, contracts, and sales of pub-
lications. Activities of the Institute comprise the following elements: 1) a re-
search program conducted by a resident staff of professional social scientists; 
2) a competitive grant program, which expands and complements the internal 
research program by providing financial support to researchers outside the In-
stitute; 3) a publications program, which provides the major vehicle for dis-
seminating the research of staff and grantees, as well as other selected works in 
the field; and 4) an Employment Management Services division, which man-
ages most of the publicly funded employment and training programs in the 
local area. 
The broad objectives of the Institute’s research, grant, and publication pro-
grams are to 1) promote scholarship and experimentation on issues of public 
and private employment and unemployment policy, and 2) make knowledge 
and scholarship relevant and useful to policymakers in their pursuit of solu-
tions to employment and unemployment problems. 
Current areas of concentration for these programs include causes, conse-
quences, and measures to alleviate unemployment; social insurance and income 
maintenance programs; compensation; workforce quality; work arrangements; 
family labor issues; labor-management relations; and regional economic de-
velopment and local labor markets. 
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32t, 33t 
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International trade 
gunboat- vs. rule-based order in, 
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processing in, 24f–26f, 41, 43–44, 
45t, 46–49, 50, 57, 64t–65t,
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IO (Input-output) tables of global trade, 
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U.S. complaints to WTO against, 31, 
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22t, 23t, 68t, 69, 70t 
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Jiangxi province, China, 129–130 
Joint ventures, 25f, 79, 177 
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Koopman, Wang, and Wei (KWW) on 
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government influence on, 5, 83, 103 
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North American Free Trade Agreement 
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value-added trade with, countries, 66, 
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compared, 136 
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against, 32t 
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food production and, 89, 91, 92f 
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recession recovery and, 96, 97f 
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Property rights 
intellectual, unprotected, 7, 102 
private, 7, 9, 103, 112 
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migration and, 13–14, 134, 161 
motives for, 141–142, 163nn8–11 
private income transfers and rural 
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Romania, U.S. complaints to WTO 
against, 32t 
Russia 
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Savings rate 
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low, and unemployment, 41, 42f 
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Social security 
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Social stability, 126 
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South Korea, 31, 95f 
automobile production in, 88, 90f 
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23, 24f–26f 
State-owned enterprises (SOEs), 24f–26f,
181 
dominance of, 178–179, 184 
restructuring of, 125–126, 127–128 
savings rate in, 182, 182f 
Steel production. See under Metals and 
materials 
Strikes, labor activism and, 119, 130 
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Taiwan, 99 
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global supply chains involving, 66, 
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